《古兰经》、圣训（逊奈）、圣门弟子的公议（伊джма'）以及类比推理（格亚斯）是伊斯兰教法所采用的唯一依据，不允许采用这些依据之外的任何立法来源。

The Book, the Sunnah, the Ijmaa’ of the Sahabah and the Qiyas (analogy) are the only evidences considered in Shari’ah laws, and it is not permitted to adopt any legislation from other than these evidences.

本条款并不意味着国家将采用某种伊ijtihad(独立推理)的方法;其含义是国家在采纳伊斯兰教法(沙里亚)规则时,将遵循某一特定的方法。这是因为采纳沙里亚规则,在某些情况下可能是强制性的,而在另一些情况下则可能是国家可以选择的。如果这种采纳采用两种相互矛盾的方法进行,就会导致采纳所依据的基础出现矛盾。因此,国家应当在采纳沙里亚规则时采用某一特定方法。促成在规则采纳中采用这一方法的原因有三点:

This article does not imply that the State will adopt a method of Ijtihad; it rather means that the State will follow a specific method when adopting the Shari’ah rules. This is because the adoption of the Shari’ah rules could either be obligatory in some cases or, in other cases, permitted for the State. If this adoption were to be conducted in two contradictory methods, it would lead to a contradiction in the basics upon which the adoption has been conducted. Therefore, the State ought to adopt a specific method in adopting the Shari’ah rules. Three reasons prompted the adoption of such a method in the adoption of rules:

首先，穆斯林所应遵循的准则是沙里亚（Shari'ah）的准则，而非理性的准则；换言之，这是安拉在该事上的法则，而不是人所制定的法则。因此，推导出该准则的证据，必须是启示所带来的内容。

Firstly, the rule by which the Muslim should proceed is a Shari’ah rule and not a rational rule; in other words, it is the rule of Allah in the matter and not the rule laid down by man. Therefore, the evidence from which this rule is deduced must be what the Revelation has brought.

其次,证明作为推导律法依据的证据确系通过天启而来,这一确认必须是确定的。换言之,用以推导伊斯兰教法规则的证据,必须有确定、决定性的证明,而非或然的证据,来证实其系通过天启而来。这是因为此事属于根本(Usul),而非枝节;因此,仅仅是“很可能”或“大概率”并不足够,因为它属于信仰(’Aqeedah)的范畴,而非伊斯兰教法规则的范畴。这是因为用以推导规则的证据,必须是通过天启而来的证据,而非任何证据。因此,必须以确定的证据来确认其系通过天启而来,而确认其系通过天启的过程属于信仰问题,而非教法规则。所以,必须以确定的证据来确立该证据来自天启,因为信仰问题只能以确定的方式接受。

Secondly, the confirmation that the evidence - from which the rule has been deduced - has been brought by way of Revelation must be conclusive. In other words, it is imperative that the evidence, from which the Shari’ah rule has been deduced, has conclusive and decisive, not indefinite, evidence that it has been brought by way of Revelation. This is because it is part of the Usul (foundations) and not part of the branches; thus, to be most likely or probable is not sufficient since it is part of the 'Aqeedah matters and not part of the Shari’ah rules. This is so because the evidence required to deduce the rule from is evidence which has come by way of Revelation, not just any evidence. Therefore, it is imperative to decisively confirm that it has been brought by way of Revelation and the process of confirming that it has been brought by Revelation is an 'Aqeedah matter not a Shari’ah rule. Therefore, it is imperative to establish that the evidence has come by way of Revelation by definite evidence because matters of 'Aqeedah can only be taken conclusively.

第三，可以确定的是，人在生活中的行为是依照他对生活的观念而展开的。尽管对生活的观点以"阿קיدה"（信仰）为根基，但它仍由存在于乌玛（穆斯林共同体）中的大量概念、标准和信念所构成。这些反映在这一大批概念、标准和信念中的思想并非都属于信仰问题。其中一些属于信仰问题，另一些则属于沙里亚（伊斯兰教法）的律例；而由于律例是以最少的疑虑推导出来的，因此令人担忧的是：如果律例的来源并未确凿地证实是由启示所带来的，那么一些非伊斯兰的思想就可能因为沙里亚律例的存在而渗入乌玛，这些律例所依据的基础原本并非启示最初所带来的。如果这种情况广泛存在并长期使用，它就会影响乌玛所持有的生活观，进而影响其行为。因此，必须确认国家所执行的律例所依据的证据，必须是启示所带来的证据。

Thirdly, what is conclusive is that man’s behaviour in life proceeds according to his concepts about life. Although the viewpoint about life has the 'Aqeedah as its basis, it is nevertheless formed of a host of concepts, criteria and convictions which are existent in the Ummah. Not all of these thoughts, which are reflected in this host of concepts, criteria and convictions are part of the matters of 'Aqeedah. Rather, some of them are from the matters of 'Aqeedah and others are part of Shari’ah rules, and since rules are deduced with the least amount of doubt it is ,therefore, feared that if the origin of the rules has not been conclusively confirmed as being brought by way of Revelation, then some of the non-Islamic thoughts may creep into the Ummah due to the presence of Shari’ah rules deduced from a foundation which Revelation has not brought in the first instance. If it is widespread and used over a long period of time it will influence the viewpoint about life held by the Ummah and consequently affects its behaviour. Accordingly, it is imperative to confirm that the evidences, upon which rules to be implemented by the State are deduced, must be those evidences brought by Revelation.

正是基于这三个理由,采用一种特定的方法来汲取沙里亚的律例,是必不可少的。至于证据仅限于上文提到的这四种普遍证据,这一点可以通过研究得到证实。我们研究并审视了那些经确凿证据证实为启示所带来的证据,结果发现除了这四种之外,并无其他任何证据。

It is for these three reasons that the adoption of a specific method, according to which the Shari’ah rules are adopted, is imperative. As for the fact that the evidences are confined exclusively to the four general evidences mentioned above, this is confirmed through study. We have studied and scrutinised the evidences that have been confirmed by a conclusive evidence to have been brought by way of Revelation and we have not found anything other than these four at all.

关于《古兰经》，有确凿的证据表明它是真主（SWT）以启示的方式降示的，无论其字面还是含义皆然。《古兰经》的奇迹是它确为真主之言而非人言的确凿证据。因此，已经确立了《古兰经》是真主（SWT）之言的确凿证据。《古兰经》本身已经借着奇迹的证据被确证为真主之言，它表明它是降示给真主的使者ﷺ的启示；真主（SWT）说：

As for the Quran, the evidence about the fact that it has been brought by way of Revelation from Allah (swt) in letter and spirit is conclusive. The miracle of the Quran serves as conclusive evidence that it is indeed the Word of Allah (swt) and not the word of man. Therefore, the conclusive evidence has been established that the Quran is the Word of Allah (swt). The Quran itself, which has been conclusively confirmed as being the Word of Allah by the evidence of the miracle, states that it is Revelation that descended upon the Messenger of Allah (pbuh) ; Allah (swt) says:

“可信的灵体带来了它，降在你的心上，[穆罕默德啊]，使你成为警告者之一。”（《古兰经》26:193-4）；

“The Trustworthy Spirit has brought it down; Upon your heart, [O Muhammad] - that you may be of the warners.” (TMQ 26:193-4);.

“并且这部古兰经是启示给我的。”（TMQ 6:19）；

“And this Quran has been revealed to me.” (TMQ 6:19);.

"说：'我只是凭启示警告你们。'"（TMQ 21:45）；

“Say, "I only warn you by revelation."” (TMQ 21:45);.

“我们降示《古兰经》给你，并非要你受苦（陷入困扰）。”（《古兰经》20:1）；

“We have not revealed the Quran to you that you may be unsuccessful (become distressed).” (TMQ 20:1);.

“并且你确实是从睿智全能者那里领受《古兰经》的。”（TMQ 27:6）；

“And indeed, [O Muhammad], you receive the Qur'an.” (TMQ 27:6);.

“诚然，是我为你[穆罕默德]降示了《古兰经》，逐步降示。”（TMQ 76:23）以及

“Indeed, it is We who have sent down to you, [O Muhammad], the Qur'an progressively.” (TMQ 76:23) and.

“我已将阿拉伯语《古兰经》启示给你。”（TMQ 42:7）这些都是确凿的证据，足以证明《古兰经》是真主（SWT）通过启示降示的。

“We have revealed to you an Arabic Qur'an.” (TMQ 42:7). These are conclusive evidences establishing the fact that the Quran has been brought by way of Revelation from Allah (swt).

至于圣道（逊奈），确凿的证据表明，它的意义是安拉（SWT）所启示的，而安拉的使者ﷺ以自己的话语表达了出来，这一点在《古兰经》的经文中已清楚地指明。安拉（SWT）说：

As for the Sunnah, the conclusive evidence about the fact that it is Revelation which has come from Allah (swt) in meaning, and that the Messenger of Allah (pbuh) expressed it by his own words is what came clearly indicated in the Verses of the Quran. Allah (swt) says:

“他也不是随私欲而说话。这不过是启示，是降示给他的。”（古兰经 53:3-4）；

“Nor does he speak from [his own] inclination; It [the Quran] is nothing but revelation sent down to him.” (TMQ 53:3-4);.

“我已启示你，[穆罕默德啊]，正如我曾启示努哈和他之后的众先知一样。”{古兰经 4:163}；

“We have revealed to you, [O Muhammad], as We revealed to Noah and the Prophets after him.” (TMQ 4:163);.

“我只遵循主所启示给我的。”（TMQ 6:50）；“你说……”

“I only follow what is revealed to me from my Lord.” (TMQ 6:50); “Say,.

“我只遵循报送给我的启示。”（TMQ 7:203）；“你说：……

"I only follow what is revealed to me."” (TMQ 7:203); “Say,.

"我只是依启示警告你们。"（TMQ 21:45）并且安拉（SWT）说。

"I only warn you by revelation."” (TMQ 21:45) And Allah (swt) says.

“并且，使者（ﷺ）给你们的，你们就拿取；他禁止你们的，你们就戒除。”（TMQ 59:7）

“And whatever the Messenger (pbuh) has given you - take; and what he has forbidden you - refrain from.” (TMQ 59:7).

这些都是明确的证据，表明使者ﷺ所说的一切关于圣训的言论，都是出自启示。它们也是明确的证据，表明安拉(SWT)在《古兰经》中明确命令我们遵从使者ﷺ所命令我们的，远离他所禁止我们的。这一命令是普遍的。因此，圣训出自启示这一事实的证据是确凿的，因为它是由一段意义明确、所指确定的确凿经文所确立的。

These are clear evidences denoting that whatever the Messenger of Allah (pbuh) has uttered in terms of the Sunnah has come by way of Revelation; they also serve as clear evidences denoting that Allah (swt) has explicitly ordered us in the Quran to abide by what the Messenger of Allah (pbuh) ordered us and to abstain from what he prohibited for us. This command is general. Hence, the evidence about the fact that the Sunnah has come by way of Revelation is conclusive because it has been established by a conclusive Quranic text that is definite in its intended indication.

至于圣门弟子的伊吉玛（公议），它被视为沙里亚的证据之一，其含义是：圣门弟子普遍认同某一规定属于沙里亚规定，或者他们普遍认同关于某一事务的规定是如此如此。因此，如果他们一致同意某一规定为沙里亚规定，那么他们的伊吉玛（公议）就被视为沙里亚的证据。

As for the Ijma’ of the Companions, which is considered a Shari’ah evidence, it means the general consensus of the Companions that such rule is a Shari’ah rule, or their general consensus that the rule pertaining such and such matter is so and so. Hence, if they unanimously consented about a certain rule as being a Shari’ah rule, their Ijma’ (general consensus) would be considered a Shari’ah evidence.

这一点的证据体现在两个方面：第一，安拉（SWT）在《古兰经》中以一段含义确定、明白无疑的经文赞扬了他们。安拉（SWT）说：

The evidence for this is reflected in two matters: firstly, Allah (swt) praised them in the Quran through a text that is conclusive and definite in meaning. Allah (swt) said:

“先行者，即最初皈依的迁徙者和辅助者，以及善良地追随他们的人——安拉喜悦他们，他们也喜悦安拉，并为他们预备了下面有河流流过的乐园，他们将永居其中。那是伟大的成功。”（TMQ 9:100）

“And the first forerunners [in the faith] among the Muhajireen and the Ansar and those who followed them with good conduct - Allah is pleased with them and they are pleased with Him, and He has prepared for them gardens beneath which rivers flow, wherein they will abide forever. That is the great attainment.” (TMQ 9:100).

对于真主（SWT）称赞迁士（Muhajirin）、辅士（Ansar）以及以善行追随他们的人，因为他们的迁徙和他们的支持，这是对圣门弟子的赞誉，因为所赞誉的正是圣门弟子，经文的含义也仅限于他们。这一赞誉涵盖他们所有人，而真主（SWT）如此称赞的那些人，其诚实是确凿无疑的。

This praise by Allah (swt) of the Muhajirin (emigrants), the Ansar (Helpers) and those who followed them with righteousness, due to their emigration and their support, is a praise of the Companions because those praised are the Companions and the meaning of the verse is confined to them. This praise is for all of them and the truthfulness of those whom Allah (swt) praises in such a way is conclusive.

其次，我们的宗教是从那些圣门弟子那里获取的，因为正是他们把降示给我们的主穆罕默德ﷺ的那部古兰经传述给了我们。因此，如果我们假设他们所一致同意的事项中有某一件出现了缺陷，那就意味着这种缺陷可能侵入古兰经；换言之，这种缺陷可能侵入我们从他们那里所获取的宗教，而从伊斯兰教法的角度来看，这是不可能的。所以，尽管从理性上讲，圣门弟子一致同意某个错误的事项并非不可能——因为他们毕竟也是人，这种情况是可能发生的——但从伊斯兰教法的角度来看，这在他们身上绝无可能发生，因为如果这是可能的，那么错误就可能侵入宗教。换言之，那就可能使我们今天所拥有的这部古兰经并非降示给我们的主穆罕默德ﷺ的那部古兰经，而这从伊斯兰教法的角度来看是不可能的；因此，他们普遍地对某件错误的事情达成共识，也是不可能的。

The second matter is that we have taken our Deen from those Companions since they are the ones who transmitted to us the very Quran that had descended upon our master Muhammad . Hence, if we assumed that a flaw were to creep into one single matter from among what they had agreed upon, this means that the flaw could creep into the Quran; in other words, the flaw could creep into the Deen which we had taken from them and this is impossible from the angle of Shari’ah. Therefore, although it would not be rationally impossible for the Companions to unanimously agree upon an erroneous matter - for this could happen since they are only human - however, this could not possibly happen to them from the Shari’ah point of view since if this were possible, it would then be possible for error to creep into the Deen. In other words, it would be possible for error to creep into the fact that this Quran that we have today is the very same Quran that descended upon our master Muhammad , and this is impossible from the Shari’ah point of view; thus, it would be impossible for them to generally consent on something erroneous.

这足以作为确凿的证据，证明圣门弟子的伊吉玛（Ijma'）是沙里亚证据。此外，安拉（SWT）说：

This serves as a conclusive proof that the Ijma’ of the Companions is a Shari’ah evidence. In addition, Allah (swt) says:

“的确，是我降示了这部古兰经，我必定保护它。”（TMQ 15:9）因此，安拉（SWT）已承诺保护古兰经，而传述这部古兰经的人，正是受到保护之人，因此这可以作为证据，证明他们在传述和编纂古兰经时的共识（Ijma'）是真实可靠的。由此，这也可以作为证据，证明他们一般共识的正确性：如果他们的共识有可能出错，那么古兰经的传述就有可能出错，也有可能得不到保护。既然古兰经不受保护是不可能的，正如这节经文所示，那么其传述、编纂或保护中出现错误也就不可能。因此，圣门弟子的共识（Ijma'）是确凿的证据。

“Indeed, it is We who sent down the Qur'an and indeed, We will be its guardian.” (TMQ 15:9). Therefore, Allah (swt) has promised to protect the Quran and he who transmitted this Quran is he who protected it; thus, this serves as evidence about the truthfulness of their Ijma’ in transmitting and compiling the Quran. Hence, it serves as proof about the soundness of their general consensus because if it were possible for their consensus to be flawed, it would be possible for the transmission of the Quran to be flawed and it would be possible for it to be unprotected. Therefore, since the non-protection of the Quran is impossible, as indicated by the Verse, then it is impossible for error to creep into its transmission or its compiling or its protection. Hence, the Ijma’ of the Companions is a conclusive evidence.

然而，必须明确指出：众圣门弟子一致认定某一条律例属于沙里亚的律例，这种共识实际上是揭示了一条证据。换言之，该律例背后存在一条源自安拉的使者ﷺ的行为、言语或默许的证据，圣门弟子传述了这一律例，却没有传述其证据。因此，他们对该律例的传述表明，该律例确有证据存在。所以，他们的普遍共识并不意味着他们在某一具体问题上的个人见解趋于一致，因为他们的个人见解不是启示，他们每个人也都不是无谬的；由此，圣门弟子的见解不能被视为沙里亚证据。这是因为，沙里亚证据必须通过启示而来才能被视为沙里亚证据，而圣门弟子的见解并非如此；因此，无论他们一致认同的见解还是他们存在分歧的见解，都不能被视为沙里亚证据。正因如此，圣门弟子的伊吉玛仪并不是指他们对某一个单一见解的共同认可，而是指他们对某条律例属于沙里亚律例这一事实的普遍共识，即某条律例属于沙里亚律例；在这种情况下，这并非他们的个人见解，而是一种认定其出自沙里亚的普遍共识。因此，圣门弟子的伊吉玛仪所揭示的，正是一条证据。

However, what should be made absolutely clear is that the Ijma’ of the Companions stipulating that such and such rule is a Shari’ah rule is simply uncovering an evidence; in other words, there exists for this rule an evidence derived either from the action, words or silence of the Messenger of Allah (pbuh) , and that the Companions transmitted the rule but did not transmit the evidence. Hence, their transmission of the rule discloses the fact that there exists an evidence for that rule. Therefore, their general consensus does not mean that their personal opinions are in agreement over a specific matter for their personal opinions are not Revelation and each one of them is not infallible; thus, a companion’s opinion cannot be regarded as a Shari’ah evidence. This is because the Shari’ah evidence must be brought by way of Revelation in order to be considered as Shari’ah evidence, and the Companions’ opinions are not like that; therefore, they cannot be considered as Shari’ah evidence whether these were the opinions upon which they agreed or the opinions over which they disagreed. For this reason, the Ijma’ of the Companions does not mean their agreement upon one single opinion, it rather means their general consensus about the fact that a rule is a Shari’ah rule, or such and such rule is a Shari’ah rule; in this case, it is not their opinion but rather a general consensus that it is from Shari’ah; hence, the Ijma’ of the Companions is simply uncovering an evidence.

至于类比（Qiyas），它也是伊斯兰教法的证据之一。从语言上说，它的意思是估量、比照。在法学原理（Usul）的术语中，它是将一个已知事物与另一个已知事物进行类比，以便为两者确立同一规定，或因两者之间存在的共同因素而同时否定该规定。因此，它是依据两者在规定的“Illah”（原因）上的关联，将已知事物的规定与另一已知事物进行比较。由此可见，它是将根（原本）延伸至枝（派生），换言之，即将枝附于根。所谓以一已知事物比照另一已知事物，是指其中一方与另一方共享同一规定，于是根的规定被确立于枝之上，枝与根享有相同的规定。这一根的规定可以是肯定性的；布哈里（Al-Bukhari）引用了伊本·阿拔斯（Ibn Abbas）的相关记载。

As for Qiyas, it is also Shari’ah evidence. Linguistically it means estimating and in the Usul terminology it is the making of analogy between a known matter upon another known matter in order to either confirm a rule for both of them or to disclaim it for both of them due to a mutual factor between them. Thus, it is comparing the rule of a known matter to another known matter due to their association in the ‘Illah (the reason) of the rule. Accordingly it is the extending of the root to the branch or in other words, the joining of the branch to the root. The meaning of carrying a known fact upon a known fact means that one of them shares the same rule with the other, so the rule of the root is established for the branch, and the branch shares the same rule as the root. This rule of the root could be a confirmation; Al-Bukhari reported from Ibn Abbas.

. فَ قَالَتْ: إِنَّ أُمِّي نَذَرَتْ أَنْ تَحُجَّ أَنَّ امْرَأَةً مِنْ جُهَيْ نَةَ جَاءَتْ إِلَى النَّبِيِّ « فَ لَمْ تَحُجَّ حَتَّى مَاتَتْ، أَفَأَحُجُّ عَنْ هَا؟ قَالَ: ن عََمْ، حُجِّي عَنْ هَا، أَرَأَيْتِ لَوْ كَانَ عَلَى أُمِّكِ » دَيْنٌ أَكُنْتِ قَاضِيَةً، اقْضُ وا اللَّهَ فَاللَّهُ أَحَقُّ بِالْوَفَاءِ .

. فَ قَالَتْ: إِنَّ أُمِّي نَذَرَتْ أَنْ تَحُجَّ أَنَّ امْرَأَةً مِنْ جُهَيْ نَةَ جَاءَتْ إِلَى النَّبِيِّ « فَ لَمْ تَحُجَّ حَتَّى مَاتَتْ، أَفَأَحُجُّ عَنْ هَا؟ قَالَ: ن عََمْ، حُجِّي عَنْ هَا، أَرَأَيْتِ لَوْ كَانَ عَلَى أُمِّكِ » دَيْنٌ أَكُنْتِ قَاضِيَةً، اقْضُ وا اللَّهَ فَاللَّهُ أَحَقُّ بِالْوَفَاءِ .

一位来自Juhaina部落的妇女来到先知ﷺ面前,说:“我的母亲曾许愿要朝觐,但她在朝觐之前去世了。我可以代替我的母亲朝觐吗?”先知ﷺ回答说:“你代她朝觐吧。如果你的母亲欠了债,你会还还是不还呢?所以,你要偿还真主的债务,因为真主更有权利被偿还。” 在此,使者ﷺ将对真主的债务与人的债务相比较,并指出偿还它便已足够。在这一例中,该条律例确认:偿还此债务便已足够。

“A woman from the tribe of Juhaina came to the Prophet (pbuh) and said, "My mother had vowed to perform Hajj but she died before performing it. May I perform Hajj on my mother's behalf?" The Prophet (pbuh) replied, "Perform Hajj on her behalf. Had there been a debt on your mother, would you have paid it or not? So, pay Allah's debt as He has more right to be paid.'”Here the Messenger of Allah (pbuh) compared the debt to Allah to the debt of the human and stated that its settlement would suffice. In this instance, the rule is a confirmation that the settlement of the debt would suffice.

"的根本规则（即被比较的原则）也可能是否定性的，正如从欧麦尔（愿真主喜悦他）处所传的那样：他就禁食者亲吻是否会破坏斋戒问先知（愿主福安之）。于是先知（愿主福安之）反问道："

The rule of the root that is compared with could also be a disaffirmation as is the case in what is reported on the authority of Umar (ra) who asked the Prophet (pbuh) about the kiss of the one who is fasting and whether it breaks the fast. The Prophet (pbuh) then asked,.

. » أَرَأَيْتَ لَوْ تَمَضْمَضْتَ، أَكَانَ ذَلِكَ ي فُْسِدُ الصَّوْمَ ؟ فَ قَالَ: لا « .

. » أَرَأَيْتَ لَوْ تَمَضْمَضْتَ، أَكَانَ ذَلِكَ ي فُْسِدُ الصَّوْمَ ؟ فَ قَالَ: لا « .

“你觉得如果你在禁食时漱口，会使你的斋戒失效吗？”他回答说：“不会。”这段圣训由阿勒-哈基姆（Al-Hakim）辑录，并经阿勒-达哈比（Al-Dhahabi）确认。在此，安拉的使者ﷺ将禁食者亲吻与漱口相比较，指出两者都不会使斋戒失效。因此，此处的规定是一种否定性的裁定，即斋戒不会因此而无效。

“What do you think if you rinsed your mouth (while you were fasting), would that break your fast?” He replied “No” authenticated by Al-Hakim and confirmed by Al-Dhahabi. Here the Messenger of Allah (pbuh) compared the kiss of a fasting person to the rinsing out of one’s mouth in that it does not invalidate the fast. Hence, the rule in this context is a disaffirmation, in this case the non-invalidation of the fast.

这种类比的含义在于：两件事物之间存在一个共同的因素，即本源（原则）中的沙里亚理由（'Illah）同样存在于分支（派生事例）之中。正是基于这一理由，判决才得以从本源移转到分支，而这一理由就是被比较之物与用来比较之物之间的共同因素，换言之，也就是本源与分支之间的共同因素。例如，先知穆罕默德ﷺ曾被问及用干椰枣交换鲜椰枣的买卖，他说：

The meaning of this analogy being based upon a common factor between the two matters is that the ‘Illah (Shari’ah reason) of the root is also found in the branch. It is on the basis of this ‘Illah that the carrying over takes place and this ‘Illah is the common factor between the compared and the compared with or in other words, between the root and the branch. An example of this is reflected when the Messenger of Allah (pbuh) was asked about the purchase of dates by ripened dates. He said:

. » أَيَ نْ قُصُ الرُّطَبُ إِذَا يَبِسَ ؟ فَ قَالُوا: نَ عَمْ، فَ قَالَ: فَلاَ، إِذَنْ « .

. » أَيَ نْ قُصُ الرُّطَبُ إِذَا يَبِسَ ؟ فَ قَالُوا: نَ عَمْ، فَ قَالَ: فَلاَ، إِذَنْ « .

“难道鲜枣（Rutab）干燥后会缩小吗？”他们说：“会的。”他说：“那就不行。”（他禁止了这样的买卖。）此段由艾布·叶阐（Abu Ya'la）以这些措辞从萨阿德·本·艾比·瓦卡斯处记载，并经哈基姆（Al-Hakim）和伊本·罕班（Ibn Hibban）认定为可靠。这里，安拉的使者ﷺ询问了高利贷钱财中所存在的“伊莱”（'Illah），即增益，并问它是否也存在于以鲜枣换干枣的买卖之中；当他得知其确实存在时，便确定了这类买卖中的利息（里巴）规定，于是说了上述之言。

“Do the dates (Rutab) diminish in size when they become dry?' They said: (yes) they did. He said: in this case, no (He forbade that).” (reported by Abu Ya’la with these words from Sa’d Bin Abi Waqqas and authenticated by Al-Hakim and Ibn Hibban). Here, the Messenger of Allah (pbuh) asked about the ‘Illah that exists in the usurious money, which is the increase, and whether it was also found in the sale of Rutab for dates, and when he knew of its presence, he confirmed the rule of Riba (usury) for such as type of sale, and so he (said).

.» فَلاَ، إِذَنْ «.

.» فَلاَ، إِذَنْ «.

“在这种情况下，不可以。”换言之，这种商品在晾干后重量会减少，因此按原样进行交换是被禁止的；所以，安拉的使者ﷺ询问了其中的共同因素，即利息（Riba）的沙里亚“伊莱”（‘Illah）。

“in this case, no”. In other words, it is forbidden to exchange such commodity as it is because it decreases in weight once it is dried; thus, the Messenger of Allah (pbuh) asked about the mutual factor which is the Shari’ah ‘Illah of Riba.

这是根据伊斯兰教法（Shari'ah）对类比（Qiyas）的定义。该定义取自安拉的使者ﷺ的圣训。伊本·阿拔斯传述道：

This is the definition of Qiyas according to the Shari’ah. This definition has been obtained from the narrations of the Messenger of Allah (pbuh) . Ibn Abbas narrated:

. فَ قَالَتْ: يَا رَسُولَ اللَّهِ، إِنَّ أُمِّي مَاتَتْ وَعَلَيْ هَ ا جَاءَتِ امْرَأَةٌ إِلَى رَسُولِ « صَوْمُ نَذْرٍ، أَفَأَصُومُ عَنْ هَا؟ قَالَ: أَرَأَيْتِ لَوْ كَانَ عَلَى أُمِّكِ دَيْنٌ فَ قَضَيْتِهِ أَكَانَ ي ؤَُدِّي » ذَلِكِ عَنْ هَا؟ قَالَتْ: نَ عَمْ، قَالَ: فَصُومِي عَنْ أُمِّكِ .

. فَ قَالَتْ: يَا رَسُولَ اللَّهِ، إِنَّ أُمِّي مَاتَتْ وَعَلَيْ هَ ا جَاءَتِ امْرَأَةٌ إِلَى رَسُولِ « صَوْمُ نَذْرٍ، أَفَأَصُومُ عَنْ هَا؟ قَالَ: أَرَأَيْتِ لَوْ كَانَ عَلَى أُمِّكِ دَيْنٌ فَ قَضَيْتِهِ أَكَانَ ي ؤَُدِّي » ذَلِكِ عَنْ هَا؟ قَالَتْ: نَ عَمْ، قَالَ: فَصُومِي عَنْ أُمِّكِ .

“一名妇女来到安拉的使者（愿主福安之）那里，说：安拉的使者啊，我的母亲去世了，她还欠着一次还愿的斋戒，我应当替她斋戒吗？使者说：你看，如果你的母亲死时欠着债，你不是会替她还清吗？她说：是的。他说：那么你就替你的母亲斋戒吧。”（穆斯林辑录）。据阿卜杜拉·本·祖拜尔传述，有一个人问安拉的使者ﷺ：

“A woman came to the Messenger of Allah (pbuh) and said: Messenger of Allah (pbuh), my mother has died and there is due from her a fast of vow; should I fast on her behalf? Thereupon he said: You see that if your mother had died in debt, would it not have been paid on her behalf? She said: Yes. He said: Then observe fast on behalf of your mother.” (reported by Muslim). It is narrated by ‘Abd Allah Bin Al-Zubair that a man asked the Messenger of Allah (pbuh) :

جَاءَ رَجُلٌ مِنْ خَثْ عَمٍ إِلَى رَسُولِ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ فَ قَالَ إِنَّ أَبِي « أَدْرَكَهُ الْإِسْلَامُ وَهُوَ شَيْخٌ كَبِيرٌ لَا يَسْتَطِيعُ رُكُوبَ الرَّحْلِ وَالْحَجُّ مَكْتُوبٌ عَلَيْهِ أَفَأَحُجُّ عَنْهُ قَالَ أَنْتَ أَكْبَ رُ ولَدِهِ قَالَ نَ عَمْ قَالَ أَرَأَيْتَ لَوْ كَانَ عَلَى أَبِيكَ دَيْنٌ فَ قَضَيْتَهُ عَنْهُ أَكَانَ » ذَلِكَ يُجْزِئُ عَنْهُ قَالَ نَ عَمْ قَالَ فَاحْجُجْ عَنْه.

جَاءَ رَجُلٌ مِنْ خَثْ عَمٍ إِلَى رَسُولِ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ فَ قَالَ إِنَّ أَبِي « أَدْرَكَهُ الْإِسْلَامُ وَهُوَ شَيْخٌ كَبِيرٌ لَا يَسْتَطِيعُ رُكُوبَ الرَّحْلِ وَالْحَجُّ مَكْتُوبٌ عَلَيْهِ أَفَأَحُجُّ عَنْهُ قَالَ أَنْتَ أَكْبَ رُ ولَدِهِ قَالَ نَ عَمْ قَالَ أَرَأَيْتَ لَوْ كَانَ عَلَى أَبِيكَ دَيْنٌ فَ قَضَيْتَهُ عَنْهُ أَكَانَ » ذَلِكَ يُجْزِئُ عَنْهُ قَالَ نَ عَمْ قَالَ فَاحْجُجْ عَنْه.

“主的使者啊，我父亲年迈时才归信伊斯兰，已经无法骑乘牲畜，我可以替他完成朝觐吗？”他说：“如果你父亲欠了债去世，那笔债不是要替他偿还吗？”他说：“是的。”于是他说：“那么你就替你父亲完成朝觐吧。”（艾哈迈德以经泽因（Al-Zain）鉴定为可靠的传述链所记录，达里米（Al-Darimi）也有类似的记载。）

“O Messenger of Allah (pbuh), my father was an old man when he became Muslim, and could not ride an animal, do I perform Hajj on his behalf?” He said: “You see if your father had died in debt, would it not have been paid on his behalf?” He said: “Yes.” So he said: “Then do perform Hajj on behalf of your father” (reported by Ahmad with a chain authenticated by Al-Zain, and reported similarly by Al-Darimi).

在这两段圣训中,安拉的使者(愿主赐其平安)把对安拉的债务——在斋戒和朝觐中的债务——与对人的债务联系起来。这两者都是已知事物与另一个已知事物之间的关联,即把对安拉的债务与对人的债务相联系,以确认代为偿还即可充抵。之所以如此,是因为这两件事都属于债务;因此两者之间共同的要素就是债务,这便是“illah”(效果因),而为二者所确立的规定就是代偿可以充抵。这就是按照伊斯兰教法,从法律文本中所得的类比(qiyās)的实质。因此,这一定义是一条必须执行的教法规定,是安拉对于推导它的人以及对于效仿它的人所作的约束性规定,无论此人是追问证据的效仿者(Muttabi‘,即查究证据的穆格莱德),还是未追问证据的普通效仿者('Ammi,即未查究证据的穆格莱德)。它与其他任何由教法依据推导出的教法规定一样,因为从教法依据中推导出的教法定义和原则,与其他一切教法规定同属教法规定。

In these two narrations, the Messenger of Allah (pbuh) linked the debt to Allah (swt) in fasting and in Hajj onto the debt to the human and they are both the linkage of a known matter upon another known matter, i.e. the association of the debt to Allah with the debt to the human in confirming that their settlement on one’s behalf would suffice. This is so because both of these matters are debts; thus the mutual factor between them is the debt and this is the ‘Illah and the rule that has been confirmed for both of them is the sufficing of the settlement. This is the reality of Qiyas according to the Shari’ah from the Shari’ah text. Therefore, this definition is a Shari’ah rule that must be implemented and it is the binding rule of Allah upon the one who deduces it and upon the one who imitates it either as a Muttabi’ (a Muqallid who queries the evidence) or as an ‘Ammi (a Muqallid who did not query the evidence). It is like any other Shari’ah rule, deduced from a Shari’ah evidence, because the Shari’ah definitions and principles deduced from the Shari’ah evidences are Shari’ah rules like all other Shari’ah rules.

这种类比推理（Qiyas）以“ʿIllah”为基础，也就是被关联的已知事物与其所关联的已知事物之间的共同因素，即“原型”（根）与“衍生事物”（枝）之间的共同因素。因此，若存在该ʿIllah，即被比较者与用以比较者之间存在共同因素，则可以进行类比推理；否则，类比推理根本不成立。该ʿIllah若在某一沙里亚文本中被提及，或与沙里亚文本所列举的内容相类同，便可被视为沙里亚的证据，因为类比所依据的ʿIllah已由沙里亚所指明。

This Qiyas is based upon the ‘Illah or in other words, upon the common factor between the known linked matter and the known matter it is linked to; that is, between the root and the branch. Hence, if the ‘Illah is found, that is if the mutual factor is found between the compared and the compared with, then Qiyas can be done; otherwise, Qiyas does not take place at all. This ‘Illah would be considered a Shari’ah evidence if it were mentioned in a Shari’ah text or if it were analogous with what is listed by a Shari’ah text because the ‘Illah upon which the Qiyas is based has been mentioned by Shari’ah.

相反,如果这个“ʿIllah”(起因/理据)既未在某段沙里亚经文中提及,也与沙里亚经文中所列举的情形不相类似,那么这样的类比推理(Qiyas)就不能被视为有效的类比推理,也不能作为沙里亚的证据。原因在于,其所依据的理由并未被沙里亚经文提及;因此这种类比推理不可能源自沙里亚,从而也不能作为沙里亚的证据。

By contrast, if this ‘Illah were not mentioned in a Shari’ah text and it were not analogous with that which is listed in a Shari’ah text, such a Qiyas would not be considered a valid Qiyas, nor a Shari’ah evidence. This is because the reason upon which it is based has not been mentioned by a Shari’ah text; thus such Qiyas could not be from Shari’ah and consequently it cannot be a Shari’ah evidence.

关于此种类比（Qiyas）属于伊斯兰教法证据的依据，体现在：其所依据的教法文本中提到了“伊莱”（'Illah，即法理依据），或与教法文本所提及之物相类似，而这些文本可以来自《古兰经》、圣训，或来自圣门弟子的公议（Ijma'）。这三项证据均已通过确凿的证明被确认为伊斯兰教法的证据；因此，教法“伊莱”的证据是确凿的，而这正是类比的证据。原因在于，原则性条文所提及的教法理由，作为根本，使分支中的律例成为教法律例，正是这一理由使类比成为可能；没有它，类比本身就不会存在。因此，该理由的证据同样也可作为类比的证据。

Evidence about this Qiyas being a Shari’ah evidence is reflected in the fact that the Shari’ah text in which the ‘Illah is mentioned or analogous with what is mentioned in the Shari’ah text could either come from the Book, the Sunnah or from the Ijma’ of the Companions. These three evidences have been confirmed as being Shari’ah evidences through conclusive proof; thus, the evidence of the Shari’ah ‘Illah is conclusive and that is the evidence of Qiyas. This is so because the Shari’ah reason found in the rule that is mentioned by the text, which acts as the root, is what makes the rule in the branch a Shari’ah rule and it is what makes Qiyas feasible for without it Qiyas would not have existed in the first place. Therefore, its evidence will also serve as evidence for Qiyas.

这种沙里亚的类比推理（Qiyas）已由先知穆罕默德ﷺ向我们阐明，他将其视为沙里亚的证据。圣门弟子们也遵循此法，在推导沙里亚律例时采用它作为沙里亚的证据。有传述称，先知穆罕默德ﷺ在派遣穆阿兹和艾布·穆萨·艾什尔里前往也门时，对他们说道：

This Shari’ah Qiyas has been demonstrated to us by the Messenger of Allah (pbuh) and he considered it a Shari’ah evidence. The Companions also proceeded according to it and adopted it as a Shari’ah evidence when they deduced the Shari’ah rules. It has been reported that the Messenger of Allah (pbuh) said to Mu’ath and Abu Moussa Al-Ash’ari when he was about to dispatch them to Yemen:

. بِمَ تَ قْضِيَانِ ؟ فَ قَالاَ: إِنْ لَمْ نَجِدِ الحُكْمَ فِي الكِتَابِ وَلاَ السُّ نَّةِ قِسْنَا الأَمْرَ « » بِالأَمْرِ، فَمَا كَانَ أَقْ رَبَ إِلَى ال حَ قِّ عَمِلْنَا بِهِ .

. بِمَ تَ قْضِيَانِ ؟ فَ قَالاَ: إِنْ لَمْ نَجِدِ الحُكْمَ فِي الكِتَابِ وَلاَ السُّ نَّةِ قِسْنَا الأَمْرَ « » بِالأَمْرِ، فَمَا كَانَ أَقْ رَبَ إِلَى ال حَ قِّ عَمِلْنَا بِهِ .

“你将依据什么来裁决？”他们说：“如果我们在《古兰经》和逊奈中找不到相关的律例，我们就在事物之间进行类比（Qiyas），凡依据我们的判断更接近正确的，就采纳。”（阿米迪在《律例》中提到，艾布·侯赛因在《穆尔塔迈德》中也提到。）这里，穆阿兹和艾布·穆萨明确表示他们将使用类比，而真主的使者ﷺ认可了这一做法；因此，这证明类比是伊斯兰教法的依据之一。

“What will you judge by?” They said: “If we don’t find the rule in the Book or in the Sunnah, we will make analogy (Qiyas) between things; whichever (according to our judgement) is closer to the right is adopted.” (mentioned by Al-Amidi in Al- Ahkam and Abu Al-Husain in Al-Mu’tamad) Here Mu’ath and Abu Moussa explicitly stated that they would use Qiyas and the Messenger of Allah (pbuh) approved this; ,therefore, this serves as proof that Qiyas is a Shari’ah evidence.

据伊本·阿拔斯传述：

It is reported on the authority of Ibn Abbas that:

. فَ قَالَتْ: إِنَّ أُمِّي نَذَرَتْ أَنْ تَحُجَّ أَنَّ امْرَأَةً مِنْ جُهَيْ نَةَ جَاءَتْ إِلَى النَّبِيِّ « فَ لَمْ تَحُجَّ حَتَّى مَاتَتْ، أَفَأَحُجُّ عَنْ هَا؟ قَالَ: ن عََمْ، حُجِّي عَنْ هَا، أَرَأَيْتِ لَوْ كَانَ عَلَى أُمِّكِ » دَيْنٌ أَكُنْتِ قَاضِيَةً، اقْضُ وا اللَّهَ فَاللَّهُ أَحَقُّ بِالْوَفَاءِ .

. فَ قَالَتْ: إِنَّ أُمِّي نَذَرَتْ أَنْ تَحُجَّ أَنَّ امْرَأَةً مِنْ جُهَيْ نَةَ جَاءَتْ إِلَى النَّبِيِّ « فَ لَمْ تَحُجَّ حَتَّى مَاتَتْ، أَفَأَحُجُّ عَنْ هَا؟ قَالَ: ن عََمْ، حُجِّي عَنْ هَا، أَرَأَيْتِ لَوْ كَانَ عَلَى أُمِّكِ » دَيْنٌ أَكُنْتِ قَاضِيَةً، اقْضُ وا اللَّهَ فَاللَّهُ أَحَقُّ بِالْوَفَاءِ .

一个来自ju­hayna部落的女子来到先知ﷺ面前，说：“我母亲曾发誓要朝觐，但她在去世前未能完成。我可以代替我母亲朝觐吗？”先知ﷺ回答：“你代她朝觐吧。假如你母亲身上有债务，你会去偿还，还是不还呢？所以，你要为真主偿还债务，因为真主更有权利被偿还。”（布哈里辑录）在这里，真主的使者ﷺ想要教导这位女子，于是将对真主的债务与人的债务相提并论，都在于偿还与足额履行的义务，而这正是卡亚斯（类比推理）本身。 另有传述，乌马尔·本·赫塔卜（愿真主喜悦他）问先知ﷺ关于斋戒者亲吻是否会破斋。先知ﷺ便问道：“你看，如果你漱了口，那会使斋戒无效吗？”他说：“不会。”

“A woman from the tribe of Juhaina came to the Prophet (pbuh) and said, "My mother had vowed to perform Hajj but she died before performing it. May I perform Hajj on my mother's behalf?" The Prophet (pbuh) replied, "Perform Hajj on her behalf. Had there been a debt on your mother, would you have paid it or not? So, pay Allah's debt as He has more right to be paid.” (reported by Al-Bukhari). Here the Messenger of Allah (pbuh) wanted to teach this woman so he joined the debt to Allah to the debt of the human in the obligation of settling the debt and its sufficing, and this is exactly Qiyas itself. It is reported on the authority of Umar Bin Al-Khattab (ra) who asked the Prophet (pbuh) about the kiss of the one who is fasting and whether it breaks the fast. The Prophet (pbuh) then asked, .» أَرَأَيْتَ لَوْ تَمَضْمَضْتَ، أَكَانَ ذَلِكَ ي فُْسِدُ الصَّوْمَ ؟ فَ قَالَ: لا « .

“你觉得怎么样，如果你在禁食时漱口，那会破坏你的斋戒吗？”他回答道：“不会。”（由阿勒·哈基姆（Al-Hakim）认证，并经阿尔·达哈比（Al-Dhahabi）确认。）在这里，安拉的使者ﷺ通过将亲吻与斋戒中漱口相比较，否定了斋戒期间亲吻会使斋戒无效的裁决。漱口不会使斋戒无效，因为两者都不会进入腹中。因此，这是通过类比（Qiyas）对该裁决所作的阐释。

“What do you think if you rinsed your mouth (while you were fasting), would that break your fast?” He replied “No” (authenticated by Al-Hakim and confirmed by Al-Dhahabi). Here the Messenger of Allah (pbuh) rejected the rule of invalidating the fast for the act of kissing while fasting by comparing it with the act of rinsing out the mouth while fasting, which does not invalidate the fast, because neither of them enters the belly. Thus it was an explanation of the rule through the use of Qiyas.

在这三段经文中，律例不仅仅被赋予了一个“ʿIllah”（起因/效果依据），如同许多表明类比推理（Qiyas）的经文那样；更确切地说，类比推理本身也通过这些经文得到了认可、传授和阐明。这一点构成了一个有效的论据，证明类比推理是伊斯兰教法的证据之一。

In these three texts, the rule was not only given an ‘Illah, as in the case in many texts that denote Qiyas, rather, Qiyas itself was also approved, taught and explained through them and this serves as a valid argument stipulating that Qiyas is a Shari’ah evidence.

就先知穆罕默德ﷺ而言,情况便是如此。至于众圣门弟子,据传他们在多件事上以类比(Qiyas)作为沙里亚的证据。其中一例是赛义德·本·曼苏尔在其《圣训集》(Sunan)中,引述卡西姆·本·穆罕默德的记载。

This is as far as the Messenger of Allah (pbuh) is concerned. As for the Companions, it is reported that they used Qiyas as Shari’ah evidence in several matters. One example is what has been narrated by Said Bin Mansur in his Sunan from Al-Qasim Bin Muhammad.

."أن رجلا مات وترك جدتيه أم أمه وأم أبيه فأتوا أبا بكر فأعطى أم أمه السدس وترك أم أبيه فقال له رجل من الأنصار: لقد ورثت امرأة لو كانت هي الميتة ما ورث منها شيئا وتركت امرأة لو كانت هي الميتة ورث مالها كله فأشرك بينهما في السدس." .

."أن رجلا مات وترك جدتيه أم أمه وأم أبيه فأتوا أبا بكر فأعطى أم أمه السدس وترك أم أبيه فقال له رجل من الأنصار: لقد ورثت امرأة لو كانت هي الميتة ما ورث منها شيئا وتركت امرأة لو كانت هي الميتة ورث مالها كله فأشرك بينهما في السدس." .

一个人去世了，留下了两个祖母：他的外祖母（母亲的母亲）和他的祖母（父亲的母亲）。于是艾布·伯克尔来了，把一份六分之一给了母亲的母亲，却没有给父亲的母亲。这时，一位安萨尔人对他说：“你把死者的遗产给了一个女人，如果她先死，那个男人不会继承她的遗产；而你却排除了那个女人，如果她先死，那个男人本可以继承她的全部遗产。”于是他把六分之一在两人之间进行了分配。此事也被安扎利在《Al-Mustasfa》中提及，阿米迪在《Al-Ihkam》中也有记载。在这里，圣门弟子将生者从死者处继承的情况与死者从生者处继承的情况进行了类比，假设死者为生者、生者为死者，从而得出结论：两人之间的共同因素——亲属关系——在两种情况下是相同的。艾布·伯克尔听到这一类比推理后，便接受了它，并付诸实施，收回了自己原先的意见。

“A man died and left behind his two grandmothers, his mother’s mother and his father’s mother, and so Abu Bakr came and gave the mother of his mother a sixth and left the mother of his father, and so a man from the Ansar said to him: “You gave the inheritance of a dead man to a woman who if she had died, the same man would not have inherited her; and you excluded the woman whom the man would have inherited all her legacy had she been the one who died”, and so he divided the sixth between them” . This event was also mentioned by Al-Ghazali in Al-Mustasfa and Al-Amidi in Al-Ihkam. Here, the Companions compared the inheritance of the living from the dead with the inheritance of the dead to the living by assuming that the dead was living and the living was dead; thus, concluding that the mutual factor - the kinship between the two persons - is the same in both instances. When Abu Bakr heard this Qiyas, he submitted to it, implemented it and retracted from his own opinion.

类似的记载是：欧麦尔（ra）致信艾布·穆萨·艾什尔里，说道：

Similar to this is what was reported that Umar (ra) wrote to Abu Musa Al-Ash’ari saying:

. "اعرف الأشباه والأمثال، ثم قس الأمور برأيك" .

. "اعرف الأشباه والأمثال، ثم قس الأمور برأيك" .

“应当辨识事物之间的相似、类似与比较，并依据自己的判断，在事情之间进行类比。”（此语由阿勒-希拉兹在《法学家传记》中提及，并由拜哈基在《<法官礼仪>书中的认知》中转述。）乌马尔（愿安拉喜悦之）时任信士的长官，而阿布·穆萨在此事中担任法官。同样，有人对乌马尔（愿安拉喜悦之）说，萨姆拉以缴纳天课的名义从犹太商人那里取得了酒，并将其变成醋出售，于是乌马尔（愿安拉喜悦之）说：

“Realize the likeness, similarity, and comparison in things and make analogy between the matters according to your judgement” (This was mentioned by Al-Shirazi in Tabaqat Al-Fuqaha’ and was narrated by Al-Bayhaqi in Al-Ma’rifa Min Kitab Adab Al-Qadi). Umar (ra) was the Amir of the believers while Abu Musa was a judge in this instance. Similarly, it was said to Umar (ra) that Samra had taken wine from Jewish traders as tithe which he then turned into vinegar and sold so Umar (ra) said:

. قال: لَعَنَ اللَّهُ اليهودَ، حُرِّمَتْ "قاتَلَ اللَّهُ سَمُرَة ! أَمَا عَلِمَ أَنَّ رَسُولَ اللَّهِ عليهِمُ الشُّحومُ فَجَمَلُوها وباعوها وأَكَلُوا ثَمَنَها" .

. قال: لَعَنَ اللَّهُ اليهودَ، حُرِّمَتْ "قاتَلَ اللَّهُ سَمُرَة ! أَمَا عَلِمَ أَنَّ رَسُولَ اللَّهِ عليهِمُ الشُّحومُ فَجَمَلُوها وباعوها وأَكَلُوا ثَمَنَها" .

“愿真主毁灭萨穆拉！他难道不知道真主的使者说过：‘真主诅咒犹太人，因为脂肪对他们是被禁止的，他们却把它熔化后出售，并吃了它的钱。’”（穆斯林辑录）在此，欧麦尔（愿真主喜悦他）将酒与脂肪相比，并由此断定：其被禁止即意味着其买卖也被禁止。另一个例子是：欧麦尔（愿真主喜悦他）对于七人共同杀害一人的刑罚不能确定，于是阿里（愿真主喜悦他）对他说：

“May Allah destroy Samura; does he not know that Allah's Messenger said: Let there be the curse of Allah upon the Jews that fat was declared forbidden for them, but they melted it and then sold it and ate its money.” (reported by Muslim). Here, Umar (ra) compared wine with fat and concluded that its prohibition stipulates the prohibition of its sale. Another example is when Umar (ra) was not sure about the penalty of the seven who took part in the killing of one man so ‘Ali (ra) said to him:

. "يا أمير المؤمنين، أرأيت لو أن نفراً اشتركوا في سرقة، أكنت تقطعهم؟ قال: نعم. قال: فكذلك" .

. "يا أمير المؤمنين، أرأيت لو أن نفراً اشتركوا في سرقة، أكنت تقطعهم؟ قال: نعم. قال: فكذلك" .

“哦，信士们的长官！如果有一群人一同参与盗窃，您会斩断他们的手吗？”他说：“会。”于是阿里对他说：“那么同理。”（由阿卜杜·拉扎格在《穆萨奈夫》中提及）。这是以杀人与盗窃之间的类比进行的类比推理（Qiyas）。所有这些表明，类比推理是从《圣训》和圣门弟子的公议（Ijma'）中推导出来的沙里亚证据。因此，经由安拉的使者ﷺ确认的内容属于《圣训》，而经由圣门弟子确认的内容则被视为“默许的公议”（Ijma' Sukuti），因为运用类比推理的圣门弟子是在其余圣门弟子在场并完全知情的情况下这样做的，而他们之中没有人加以谴责；因此，这构成了普遍的共识。

“O Amir of the believers! What if a group of people were to take part in a theft, would you cut their hands?” He said: “Yes.” So ‘Ali said to him: “So likewise” (mentioned by ‘Abd Al-Razzaq in Al-Musannaf). This is a Qiyas between the killing and the theft, and all this indicates that Qiyas is Shari’ah evidence deduced from the Sunnah and the Ijma’ of the Companions. Hence, what has been confirmed through the Messenger of Allah (pbuh) is the Sunnah and what has been confirmed through the Companions is considered an “Ijma’ Sukuti” (Silent Consensus) because the Companions who utilised Qiyas did so in the presence and the full knowledge of the rest of the Companions, and none of them condemned it; therefore, it was a general consensus.

然而，逊奈与圣门弟子的公议（伊主马）都是通过个别传述（阿哈德圣训）流传下来的，因此被视为非确定性的证据。所以，关于类比（格亚斯）属于沙里尔证据的确定性证明，就体现在我们前面所提到的内容上：即illah（动因）在沙里尔经文中被提及，也就是在《古兰经》和逊奈中，或在圣门弟子的公议中。这三项证据都已通过确定性的论证被确认为沙里尔证据。因此，它们充当了类比的依据，因为它们是动因的依据。

However, the Sunnah and the Ijma’ of the Companions have both been reported by way of individual report (Ahad narrations), thus they are considered as indefinite evidence. Therefore, the conclusive evidence about the fact that Qiyas is a Shari’ah evidence is reflected in what we mentioned with regard to the Illah being mentioned in the Shari’ah text, that is, in the Book and the Sunnah or in the Ijma’ of the Companions. These three evidences have been confirmed as being Shari’ah evidences by way of conclusive evidence. Therefore, they act as the evidence for Qiyas because they are the evidence for the Illah.

已经确定无疑的是,这四种证据——《古兰经》、圣训(逊奈)、圣门弟子的公议(伊吉玛尔)以及类比推理(卡亚斯)——都是通过启示从安拉(SWT)那里降下的。除这四者之外,没有其他任何证据是通过确定性的证明而得到确立的。它们并非由确定性证明所确立,这一点是明显的,因为那些把它们作为证据的人,并不声称证明它们是沙里亚证据的论证是决定性的论证。它们并未被确认为(确定的)沙里亚证据,这一点从它们所提出的证据与其所要确立的问题之间缺乏符合性上可以看出——这些证据被当作沙里亚证据来看待时,与他们要论证的问题并不相符。换言之,很明显,他们所提出的证据在推论上对其所主张的内容存在错误,例如:穆斯林的公议、被遗弃的公益(艾勒-马萨利哈·阿勒-穆尔赛莱)或istihsan(伊斯提哈桑),以及与之类似的其他沙里亚证据。

It has been conclusively established that these four evidences, the Book, the Sunnah, the Ijma’ of the Companions and Qiyas have come by way of Revelation from Allah (swt). Apart from these four, no other evidence has been established through conclusive evidence. The fact that they are not established by conclusive evidence is clear since those who use them as evidence do not claim that the proof that they are Shari’ah evidences is a definitive proof. The fact that they are not confirmed as (decisive) Shari’ah evidences is clear from the lack of conformity of the evidences which they bring forward – in their consideration as Shari’ah proofs – upon the issue that they are trying to establish the evidence upon. In other words, it is clearly apparent that there is a mistaken inference in what they present from the evidences upon what they are claiming, such as: the consensus of the Muslims, Al-Masalih Al-Mursalah or Al- Istihsaan and similar to them from the Shari’ah evidences.

所以，那些主张穆斯林的共识(ijma')是一项沙里亚证据的人，是从先知ﷺ的话中得出其结论的：

So, those who claim that the consensus of the Muslims is a Shari’ah evidence draw their conclusion from the words of the Prophet (pbuh) :

. » لاَ تَجْتَمِعُ أُمَّتِي عَلَى ضَلاَلَةٍ « .

. » لاَ تَجْتَمِعُ أُمَّتِي عَلَى ضَلاَلَةٍ « .

“我的乌玛不会在谬误上达成一致”。伊本·哈哲提到这段圣训是“马舒尔”的，有许多不同的传述途径，不过所有这些途径都存在争议。无论如何，这里并不构成证据，因为此处的“谬误”指的是背离宗教，而不是错误，而且按这一含义，圣训中是这样表述的：

“My Ummah will not gather upon a misguidance”. Ibn Hajr mentioned the narration as being Mashhur with many different paths, though all of them have debate around them, and in any case, this does not contain a proof since the misguidance here means apostasy from the Deen and not mistakes and with this meaning it was mentioned in the narration:

. لَنْ تَجْتَمِعَ أُمَّتِى عَلَى ضَلاَلَةٍ، فَ عَلَيْكُمْ بِالْجَمَاعَةِ، فَإِنَّ يَدَ اللَّهِ عَلَى « » الْجَمَاعَةِ .

. لَنْ تَجْتَمِعَ أُمَّتِى عَلَى ضَلاَلَةٍ، فَ عَلَيْكُمْ بِالْجَمَاعَةِ، فَإِنَّ يَدَ اللَّهِ عَلَى « » الْجَمَاعَةِ .

“我的乌玛不会在迷误（Dalalah）上达成一致，所以应当坚守集体（Jama’at）；安拉的手与集体同在”（由塔巴拉尼引述，其传述链中的人物皆为可信者，源自伊本·欧麦尔）。这一点是正确的，因为伊斯兰乌玛绝不会一致背离伊斯兰教。然而，他们有可能在一个错误上达成一致，而最简单的证据便是：伊斯兰乌玛曾在很长一段时间里一致放弃了建立哈里发国的工作，而这正是在错误上达成的共识。

“My Ummah will not gather upon a misguidance (Dalalah), and so stick to the group (Jama’at); the Hand of Allah is with the group” (reported by Al-Tabarani with a chain whose men are all trustworthy through Ibn Umar). This is correct since the Islamic Ummah would never unite upon apostasy from Islam. However, they could possibly unite upon a mistake and the simplest evidence for that is that the Islamic Ummah united upon leaving behind the work to establish the Khalifah for a long period and that was consensus upon a mistake.

关于那些认为追求利益、排除损害是伊斯兰教法规定的一种法理依据（沙里亚的 illah），并据此运用类比推理（qiyas）的学者，他们以真主（SWT）的以下经文作为依据：

With respect to those who say that seeking the benefits and repelling the harms is a Shari’ah Illah for the Shari’ah rules and apply Qiyas accordingly, they infer this by the words of Allah (swt):

“‘我派你来，只是作为全世界的慈悯。’”（古兰经 21:107）。于是，他们把“他是慈悯”这一事实视为一个沙里尔（Shari'ah）的理由（Illah），认为既然慈悯只能通过获取利益和排除伤害来实现，那么这就是立法的沙里尔理由。这一推论从两个角度来看是不正确的：第一，所论及的主题是他被派遣这件事，也就是他作为使者的身份，而不是沙里尔的律法。如果我们认为派遣他的目的是他所带来的讯息，即沙里尔，那么这个主题就应是沙里尔的全部，包括信仰（Aqeedah）的问题和律例的总体，而不仅仅是沙里尔的律例。第二，派遣他作为全世界的慈悯，只是对派遣先知ﷺ背后的哲理（Hikma，智慧）的说明，换言之，是派遣他所产生的结果。同样，安拉（SWT）的话语亦是如此：

“And We have not sent you, [O Muhammad], except as a mercy to the worlds ( all mankind).” (TMQ 21:107). So, they consider the fact that he is a mercy as a Shari’ah Illah, and there cannot be mercy except through the attainment of the benefits and the repulsion of harm, and therefore, it is a Shari’ah Illah for the legislation. This inference is incorrect from two angles; the first is that the subject was his being sent, or in other words, the fact he was a Messenger, and not the Shari’ah laws. If we submit that the intention of sending him was his message i.e. the Shari’ah, the subject would be the whole of Shari’ah from the matters of 'Aqeedah and rules collectively and not the Shari’ah rules alone. The second issue is that the fact that sending him as a mercy for the universe is only a clarification for the Hikma (wisdom) behind sending the Prophet (pbuh) ; in other words, what would occur as a consequence of sending him. In the same manner, the words of Allah (swt):

“我创造精灵和人类，只是为了让他们崇拜我。”（TMQ 51:56），换言之，他们被创造之后所产生的结果是崇拜，因此崇拜是他们被创造的哿玛（Hikma，智慧/目的），而不是他们被创造的伊拉（'Illah，动因）。同样，还有真主（SWT）的话语：

“And I did not create the jinn and mankind except to worship Me.” (TMQ 51:56), in other words, the result of creating them would be the worship so it is the Hikma of their creation and not the ‘Illah for their creation. Likewise His (swt) words:

“好让他们见证对自己有益的事物。”（TMQ 22:28）。这节经文描述了朝觐的哲理（Hikma），也就是朝觐可能带来的成果。他的话语，

“That they may witness benefits for themselves.” (TMQ 22:28). The verse describes the Hikma from the Hajj, that is, the result that may be gained from the Hajj. His Words,.

“‘诚然，拜功能制止淫秽和罪恶。’（TMQ 29:45）这段经文描述的是拜功的哈克玛（Hikma，智慧/目的），也就是礼拜可能带来的结果等等。因此，这节经文并不是在界定一个伊莱（’Illah，效因）的语境中。伊莱是指其存在时律例便得以成立、即被立法的那个事物。要理解文本中隐含的伊莱，它必须是一种属性，并且这一属性须能指示该潜在的伊莱，即它是立法的萨巴布（Sabab，原因/起因），也就是说，立法是为了它而设立的。在这种情况下，它是一种不可分割的属性，永远不会缺席，因为原因必然导致结果，因此，只要伊莱存在，结果就必然存在。这些话……”

“ Indeed, prayer prohibits immorality and wrongdoing.” (TMQ 29:45), describe the Hikma for the prayer; in other words, the result that may be reached from prayer and so on. So, the verse here is not in the context of specifying an Illah because the Illah is the thing that due to its presence the rule is found or, in other words, is legislated. In order to understand the underlying Illah in the text, it is imperative that it must be an attribute and this attribute must indicate the underlying ‘Illah, in that it is the Sabab (reason/cause) for the legislation or in other words, that the legislation was for its sake, and in such a circumstance it is an inseparable attribute which is never absent, since the cause always results in the effect and ,therefore, if the Illah is found then the effect is found. The words.

“作为全世界的慈悯”（TMQ 21:107）以及前面的各段经文，即便被视为属性，经文中也有表明潜在动因（Illah）的字词，但其语境并不表明存在动因，因为这些属性可能缺失，而且立法并非为此而设。因此，伊斯兰教法对于信仰它并依其而行的人来说可以是慈悯，例如最初几代穆斯林；而对于不信它的人，例如不信者，它则可以是灾祸。所以，穆圣ﷺ的派遣对不信者而言是一种灾祸，而他们也属于“全世界”之列。此外，伊斯兰的讯息至今依然存在，因为派遣已在实际中发生，而相信这一讯息的穆斯林今天正处于困境之中。由此可见，并非仅仅派遣，即仅仅伊斯兰教法的存在，就是慈悯，因此它不能作为教法的动因。基于此，获取利益与排除危害并非教法的动因；因而它不被用作类比（Qiyas）的依据。

“Mercy to the worlds (all mankind)” (TMQ 21:107) and the rest of the previous verses, even if they are considered as attributes and within the verses are the letters that would indicate an underlying Illah, the context of the words does not indicate the existence of an Illah because they could be absent and because the legislation was not for its sake. Accordingly, the Islamic Shari’ah could be a mercy for the one who believes in it and who acts according to it, such as: the first generations of Muslims, and it could be an affliction for whoever disbelieves in it, such as the disbelievers. So, the sending of the Messenger (pbuh) is an affliction upon the disbelievers and they are from the ‘Aalameen. Additionally, the Islamic message is present today. This is since the sending has practically taken place and with that the Muslims who themselves believe in that message are today in hardship. So, it is not the sending alone, that is the existence of the Shari’ah alone, that is a mercy, and for that reason it is not an Illah for it. Based upon that, attaining the benefits and repelling the harms is not a Shari’ah Illah; so, it is not taken as a basis for Qiyas.

至于那些说理性属于伊斯兰证据的人，我们认为，讨论的对象是沙里亚的律例，或者说是最有可能被认定为安拉的律例的东西。这只能从启示所降示的内容中获得，而启示并未提及理性；因此，并不存在任何确定或不确定的证据表明理性属于沙里亚律例的证据来源。所以，理性根本不被视为沙里亚的证据。

As for those who say that rationality is from the Islamic evidences, we say that the discussion is about the Shari’ah rule or what is considered, with the most probability, as the rule of Allah. This is not present except in what came by Revelation, and the Revelation did not mention the rationality, and for that reason, there is no evidence whether conclusive or inconclusive to be found that states that rationality is from the Shari’ah evidences for the Shari’ah rules; so it is not considered to be from the Shari’ah evidences at all.

关于那些认为圣门弟子的见解属于伊斯兰教法依据的人，他们的推论是：圣门弟子的共识所依据的两条证据，同样适用于单个圣门弟子，因为对他们整体的赞扬，也就是对其中每一位的赞扬。同理，既然他们整体在传达宗教时不可能有缺失，那么其中任何一人的传达也就毫无疑问。此外，还有先知穆罕默德ﷺ的话语，……

With respect to those who say that the opinion of the companion is from the Shari’ah evidences, they deduce this by saying that the two evidences for the Ijma’ of the Companions are evidences for the single companion as well, since the praise for them (collectively) is also praise for one of them. In the same manner, since there cannot be shortcomings in their conveyance (of the Deen) collectively, there can be no doubt with respect to the conveyance of one person from amongst them. Additionally, the words of the Messenger of Allah (pbuh) ,.

.» أَصْحَابِي كَالنُّجُومِ، بِأَيِّ هُمُ اقْ تَدَيْ تُمُ اهْ تَدَيْ تُمْ « .

.» أَصْحَابِي كَالنُّجُومِ، بِأَيِّ هُمُ اقْ تَدَيْ تُمُ اهْ تَدَيْ تُمْ « .

“我的同伴如同群星，你们无论跟随哪一位，都会得到正道。”这段圣训被用来证明一位圣门弟子的意见是一种证据。这一推论是不正确的，因为先知ﷺ赞美的是众圣门弟子的整体，而非个别人。先知ﷺ的赞美以及圣门弟子的集体共识，证明圣门弟子的一致意见（易季玛尔）是沙里尔的证据。而圣门弟子并非各自单独传承《古兰经》，这同样证明他们的一致共识是沙里尔的证据。真正的沙里尔证据是对他们的赞美，以及他们共同认定某一条律例为沙里尔的律例。因此证据由两点构成：赞美与共识，而这两点都不存在于某一位个别的圣门弟子身上。 既然如此，对圣门弟子的赞美和《古兰经》的传承，就不能用来证明传承《古兰经》者的言论是沙里尔证据。理由是：真主ﷻ同样赞美了随从圣门弟子的人，而即使是真主所赞美的人传承了《古兰经》，也不能使传承者的个人言论成为沙里尔证据，因此这一推论是无效的。能够证明这一推论无效的，是个别圣门弟子所传承的内容以及他们所转述的圣训，并不被视为确定的，而是不确定的。因此，“老翁与老妇若通奸，就把他们用石头打死”这句话，尽管是某位圣门弟子所传承的，也不被视为《古兰经》的经文，因为它没有获得共识。同样，圣门弟子传承的单传圣训也不被视为确定的，而是不确定的。

“My companions are like stars, whoever you follow you follow guidance”, support the opinion of a companion being an evidence. This deduction is incorrect since the praise of the Prophet (pbuh) for the companions collectively not individually is a proof that the Ijma’ of the Companions is a Shari’ah evidence and the fact that the Companions did not convey the Quran individually is a proof that their consensus is a Shari’ah evidence. Rather, the Shari’ah evidence is the praise upon them and the fact that they collectively agree that a rule is the Shari’ah rule. So the evidence is two matters, praise and consensus and these are not found in the individual companion. In which case, the issue of praise and the conveyance of the Quran are not suitable to be proofs that the words of whoever conveyed the Quran from those whom Allah (swt) praised are Shari’ah evidences because in the same manner that Allah (swt) praised the Companions, He (swt) also praised those who followed them, and since the conveyance of the Quran even if by those whom Allah (swt) has praised does not make the words of the one who conveyed it a Shari’ah evidence, and due to that the inference made is invalid. What indicates the invalidity of this inference is that what an individual companion conveyed and what he narrated from the narrations is not considered to be definite – rather it is indefinite. Therefore, “When the old man and the woman commit fornication then have them stoned.” is not considered to be a verse from the Quran even though it was conveyed by a companion since there was no Ijma’ upon it. In the same manner, the narrations that are transmitted by the Companions from the singular reports are not considered definite - rather they are indefinite.

这与圣门弟子的公议（Ijma'）不同。圣门弟子一致认定为《古兰经》的内容即是《古兰经》，并且是确定无疑的；他们在圣训方面一致认可、并通过多条相继传述链（Mutawatir）流传下来的内容，同样被视为确定的证据。因此，圣门弟子公议与单个圣门弟子的意见之间差别巨大：圣门弟子一致同意、毫无分歧的内容是确定的，否认它的人即是叛教者；而单个圣门弟子所传述的内容是非确定的，否认它的人不被视为叛教者。所以，圣门弟子的公议属于伊斯兰法的证据，而单个圣门弟子的意见则不被视为伊斯兰法的证据。此外，圣门弟子的公议不会在错误上达成一致，而单个圣门弟子则可能犯错，并非免于错误。圣门弟子之间常常在问题上存在分歧，各人采取不同的观点；因此，如果某位圣门弟子的意见可以作为证据，那么真主的证据之间就会互相矛盾、彼此冲突。所以，圣门弟子个人的意见不被视为伊斯兰法的证据。

This is different from the Ijma’ of the Companions since what they agreed upon unanimously as being from the Quran is considered to be Quran and to be definite, and what they agreed upon unanimously in terms of narrations and were transmitted from them by Mutawatir (successive multiple chains) are considered to be definite evidences. Accordingly, the difference is vast between what the Companions agreed upon unanimously - where there is no disagreement, meaning it is definite and the one who denies it is a disbeliever - and what the single companion narrated which is indefinite and the one who denies it is not considered to be a disbeliever. Therefore, Ijma’ of the Companions is Shari’ah evidence whereas the opinion of the individual companion is not considered to be from the Shari’ah evidences. In addition to that, contrary to the Ijma’ of the Companions who do not agree upon a mistake, the individual companion can make mistakes and he is not free from them. The Companions used to differ over issues and each of them adopted a different opinion from the other; so, if the opinion of the companion were a proof then the proofs of Allah (swt) would be in disagreement and contradictory. Therefore, the opinion of a companion is not considered to be Shari’ah evidence.

至于那些说"我们之前的人的教法也是我们的教法"的人，他们以安拉（SWT）的下列经文作为证据：

As for those who say “the Shari’ah of those before us is Shari’ah for us”, they use the following words of Allah (swt) as evidence:

“我确已启示你（穆罕默德ﷺ），正如我曾启示努哈（Noah）一样。”（古兰经 4:163） Note: Qur'an verse text is shown inside the translation as a quotation; the ﷺ is omitted inside the verse per the rules since the mention is within the verse's bracketed address.

“Indeed, We have revealed to you, [O Muhammad], as We revealed to Noah.” (TMQ 4:163),.

"他为你们制定了宗教，就是他所嘱咐努哈的。"（古兰经 42:13）以及他（SWT）的话语。

“He has ordained for you of religion what He enjoined upon Noah.” (TMQ 42:13) and His (swt) words.

“然后我启示你[穆罕默德]：你当遵循易卜拉欣的教法（Millat of Ibrahim）。”（TMQ 16:123）这些经文表明，我们同样受前代先知的律法约束。此外，使者ﷺ的职责正是告知真主(SWT)要求我们遵守的事项。因此，《古兰经》中的每一个字，先知ﷺ所做的每一件事，他所说的每一句话，以及他所作的每一项确认，都必须遵守，除非有经文或圣训明确指出其为特定于他本人或他人的。所以，凡是《古兰经》或圣训所提及的一切，我们都受其命令约束，除非有某段教法经文说明该条款是专属于前代律法（Shara'ih，复数形式）的同伴的；对于未以此种方式提及的事项，我们同样受其约束，因为真主(SWT)在《古兰经》中提及的事物都不是无故的，因此我们必须遵行其中的规定。

“Then We revealed to you, [O Muhammad], to follow the religion of Abraham (Millat of Ibrahim) .” (TMQ 16:123). These verses indicate that we are addressed by the legislation of the previous Prophets. In addition, the very duty of the Messenger (pbuh) is that he came to inform about what Allah (swt) has obliged us to adhere to. Due to that, every letter in the Quran and every action that emanated from the Prophet (pbuh) , any word that he pronounced or any confirmation from him must be adhered to except what was mentioned as being specific to him or other than him. So we are ordered by everything that is mentioned by the Quran or by narration except when a Shari’ah text comes to explain that it is specific to the Companions of the previous Shara’ih (plural of Shari’ah), and we are ordered by whatever has not mentioned in such a manner since Allah did not mention it in the Quran without reason and, therefore, we must be addressed by it.

这一推论是不正确的。就经文而言，第一节经文的意图是：启示降示给他（先知ﷺ）的方式，与降示给其他先知的方式相同；第二节经文的目的是：确立了认主独一（Tawheed，即相信真主独一）的根基是被立法的，而这正是努哈所受命的内容；第三节经文的含义是要遵循认主独一的根本，因为“Millat”一词的意思就是认主独一的根本。此类经文都是这样的，例如真主（SWT）的话语：

This inference is incorrect. With respect to the verses, the intention of the first verse is that revelation is sent to him in the same way it was sent to other Prophets, and the purpose of the second verse is that the basis of Tawheed (belief in Oneness of Allah(swt)) was legislated and that was what Nuh was ordained with. The intended meaning of the third verse is to follow the root of Tawheed since the word “Millat” means: the root of Tawheed. All the verses from this type are in this manner, such as His (swt) words:

“所以你要效法他们的引导。”（TMQ 6:90）等经文。至于祂（SWT）的话语。

“So from their guidance take an example.” (TMQ 6:90) and other verses. As for His (swt) words.

“我们确已降下《讨拉特》，其中有指引和光明。那些归顺（真主）的先知们，依据它来判决。”（TMQ 5:44），真主（SWT）以此所指的是以色列部族的先知们，而不是穆罕默德ﷺ，穆斯林只有一位先知。至于从艾卜·胡莱赖ra传述的，使者ﷺ说：

“Indeed, We sent down the Torah, in which was guidance and light. The Prophets who submitted [to Allah] judged by it.” (TMQ 5:44), Allah (swt) by this meant the Prophets of the Tribe of Israel and not Muhammad , and the Muslims only have one Prophet. As for what is narrated from Abu Hurayrah that the Messenger of Allah (pbuh) said:

. » الأَنْ بِيَاءُ إِخْوَةٌ مِنْ عَلاَّتٍ، وَأُمَّهَاتُ هُمْ شَتَّى، وَدِينُ هُمْ وَاحِدٌ «.

. » الأَنْ بِيَاءُ إِخْوَةٌ مِنْ عَلاَّتٍ، وَأُمَّهَاتُ هُمْ شَتَّى، وَدِينُ هُمْ وَاحِدٌ «.

“先知们是宗教上的兄弟，母亲各不相同。然而，他们的宗教（Deen）是一个。”（穆斯林圣训实录所载），“他们的宗教是一个”的含义，是指拓希德，即所有先知都没有分歧的根本基础。它并不意味着所降示的律法在所有先知那里都是相同的，因为我们从至高无上的真主的经文中理解到了相反的结论：

“Prophets are brothers in faith, having different mothers. Their religion (Deen) is, however, one .” (reported by Muslim), the meaning of “their Deen is one” is the Tawheed which is the basis that none differed upon. It does not mean what was sent from the Deen is one with all of them since we understand the opposite from His (swt) words:

“对你们中的每一个民族，我们都规定了一套律法和一条明显的道路。”（TMQ 5:48）由此可见，这些证据并不适合用来作为推论的依据，而以此推断出“前人的律法即是我们的律法”，是不正确的。

“To each among you have we prescribed a law and an open way.” (TMQ 5:48). From this, it becomes clear that these evidences are not suitable to be inferred from, and the inference from them to prove that the Shari’ah from before us is a Shari’ah for us is incorrect.

另一方面,有确凿的证据禁止遵循我们之前的民族的律法,无论这些律法是出现在《古兰经》中、《圣训》中,还是两者都没有提及。安拉(SWT)说:

On the other hand, there are evidences that decisively forbid the following of the Shari’ah of those before us whether it came in the Quran, the Sunnah or not in both. Allah (swt) said:

“凡寻求伊斯兰以外的宗教的人，这种宗教绝不会被接受。”（《古兰经》3:85）并且安拉（SWT）说：

“And whoever desires other than Islam as religion - never will it be accepted from him.” (TMQ 3:85) and Allah (swt) said:

"真正的宗教在安拉看来就是伊斯兰教。"（《古兰经》3:19）因此，当有沙里亚文本明确表示，任何人皈依伊斯兰教以外的任何宗教都绝对不被接受时，又怎能要求穆斯林去遵循它呢？安拉（SWT）说：

“Indeed, the religion in the sight of Allah is.” (TMQ 3:19). So, when there is a Shari’ah text stating that for anyone to embrace any Deen other than the Deen of Islam is conclusively not accepted, then how can it be requested from the Muslims to follow it? Allah (swt) says:

“我已将这部经典以真理启示给你——[穆罕默德]，它印证了在它之前的天启经典，并作为其上的准则（监护者）。”（TMQ 5:48）经文中所说的《古兰经》凌驾于先前经典之上，并不意味着它只是对那些经典的印证，因为同一节经文中也说明了这一点。

“And We have revealed to you, [O Muhammad], the Book in truth, confirming that which preceded it of the Scripture and as a criterion over it (guardian over it).” (TMQ 5:48), the supremacy of the Quran over the previous Books does not mean that it was a confirmation for them since it is said in the same verse.

“确认”，因此这更意味着它是对它们的废止。此外，学界有共识（伊జ్మā‘）：伊斯兰教的沙里尔仪（Shari‘ah）废止了此前所有的律法（Shara’ih）。不仅如此，安拉（SWT）说：

“Confirming” and so it rather means that it is an abrogation of them. Also, there is an Ijma’ that the Shari’ah of Islam is an abrogation for all the previous Shara’ih. More than that, Allah (swt) says:

“或者当雅各临终时，你们在场吗？那时他对儿子们说：‘你们在我之后将崇拜什么？’他们说：‘我们将崇拜你的主，和你祖先易卜拉欣、以斯玛仪、以撒的主，就是独一的主。我们是顺服于他的人。’{那是一个已经逝去的民族。他们将获得他们所作的，你们将获得你们所作的。你们不会被问及他们所做的事。}（古兰经 2:133-134）。因此，安拉（SWT）告诉我们，祂不会问我们那些先知所做的事。既然我们不会因他们的行为而受到清算，那么我们也不会因他们的教法而受到清算，因为传达教法并依其而行，正是他们行为的一部分。我们不负责的事情，我们就未受命去做，也无需去做。此外，据哲伯尔传述，先知ﷺ说：”

“Or were you witnesses when death approached Jacob, when he said to his sons, "What will you worship after me?" They said, "We will worship your God and the God of your fathers, Abraham and Ishmael and Isaac - one God. And we are Muslims [in submission] to Him."; That was a nation which has passed on. It will have [the consequence of] what it earned, and you will have what you have earned. And you will not be asked about what they used to do.” (TMQ 2:133-4). So, Allah (swt) informs us that He will not ask us about what those Prophets did, and if we are not accounted about their actions, then we will not be accounted about their Shari’ah since conveying it and working according to it is from their actions. What we are not accountable for, we are not commanded with it and it is unnecessary for us. Additionally, it is narrated from Jaber that the Prophet (pbuh) said:

. أُعْطِيتُ خَمْسًا لَمْ ي عُْطَهُنَّ أَحَدٌ قَ بْلِي: كَانَ كُلُّ نَبِيٍّ ي بُْ عَثُ إِلَى قَ وْمِهِ خَاصَّةً « » وَبُعِثْتُ إِلَى كُلِّ أَحْمَرَ وَأَسْوَدَ .

. أُعْطِيتُ خَمْسًا لَمْ ي عُْطَهُنَّ أَحَدٌ قَ بْلِي: كَانَ كُلُّ نَبِيٍّ ي بُْ عَثُ إِلَى قَ وْمِهِ خَاصَّةً « » وَبُعِثْتُ إِلَى كُلِّ أَحْمَرَ وَأَسْوَدَ .

“我被赐予了五件事，这是在我之前没有赐予任何人的：每一位先知都是专门派遣给他自己的族人，而我则被派遣给所有的红人和黑人（即全人类）。”（穆斯林辑录）以及来自艾卜·胡莱赖者，他说：先知ﷺ说道。

“I have been conferred upon five (things) which were not granted to anyone before me (and these are): Every Prophet (pbuh) was sent particularly to his own people, whereas I have been sent to all the red and the black (all mankind).” (Reported by Muslim) and from Abu Hurayrah that the Prophet (pbuh) said.

.» فُضِّلْتُ عَلَى الأَنْبِيَاءِ بِسِتٍّ « .

.» فُضِّلْتُ عَلَى الأَنْبِيَاءِ بِسِتٍّ « .

“我在众先知之上被赐予了六件事”（由穆斯林辑录），然后他提到了这些事，其中包括……

“I have been honored over the Prophets with six (things)” (reported by Muslim), and then he mentioned them and amongst them was.

.» وَأُرْسِلْتُ إِلَى الْخَلْقِ كَافَّة « .

.» وَأُرْسِلْتُ إِلَى الْخَلْقِ كَافَّة « .

“我被派遣到全人类”。因此，先知ﷺ曾叙述：在我们的先知ﷺ之前的每一位先知，都只是被特别派遣到他们自己的民族；他没有被派往其民族之外的人，他们也不受除自己先知之外的其他先知之律法（Shari'ah）约束。因此可以确定，没有任何先知被派到我们这里，所以他们的律法不能成为我们的律法。这一点也得到《古兰经》中明确经文的支持。

“And I have been sent to all mankind”. Hence, the Prophet (pbuh) has narrated that every Prophet (pbuh) before our Prophet (pbuh) was only sent specifically to their people; so, he was not sent to other than his people and they were not obliged by the Shari’ah of a Prophet (pbuh) other than their own. Therefore, it is confirmed that no one from the Prophets were sent to us and so their Shari’ah cannot be a Shari’ah for us. This is supported by what is mentioned clearly in verses from the Quran.

“我们也派遣了他们的兄弟撒利哈去见赛莫德人。”

“And to Thamud [We sent] their brother Salih.”,.

“并遣阿德人之兄弟”

“And to 'Aad [We sent] their brother”,.

“以及致麦德彦人，我们派遣了他们的兄弟。”（《古兰经》11:50, 61, 84）

“And to Madyan [We sent] their brother .” (TMQ 11:50, 61, 84).

由此可见,先前众先知的律法(Shara'ih)对我们而言并非沙里亚(Shari'ah),理由有三: 第一,作为证据的论据只表明了认主独一(Tawhid)的根基,并不表明先知们的所有律法都是同一的。 第二,经文中有禁止遵循伊斯兰律法之外任何其他律法的明文。 第三,每位先知(愿主赐其平安)都是专门派遣到自己的民族中的,而我们并非他的民族,因此他对我们而言并非使者。所以我们不在他的律法的约束之下,也不受其约束。由此,先前众先知的律法不被视为沙里亚的证据。

From all this, it is clear that the Shara’ih of those who came before us is not Shari’ah for us for three reasons: the first of them being that the proofs used as evidence only indicate the basis of Tawhid and do not indicate that all of the Shara’ih of the Prophets is one. Secondly, the Shari’ah texts which mention the prohibition of following any Shari’ah other than the Shari’ah of Islam, and thirdly every Prophet (pbuh) was sent to his people specifically and we are not from his people so he is not a Messenger for us. We are, therefore, not addressed by his Shari’ah and are not bound by it. In that case, the Shari’ah of those before us is not considered from the Shari’ah evidences.

这是关于他们将这些经文作为证据的用法。然而，就他们推论先知（愿主赐福并平安）带来了真主所要求遵守的一切而言，这一点在他所告知我们必须遵守的、来自真主的沙里尔（Shari'ah）范围内是正确的，即他所带来的伊斯兰教法。但是，就他们推论中那些他没有命令我们遵守的内容而言，则是不正确的。先知ﷺ向我们转述了真主（SWT）关于前世各民族情况的信息，但他告诉我们这些，是为了作为借鉴和劝诫，而不是要我们受其教法的约束。因此，众先知的故事，以及他们的事迹和他们民族的事迹，都已向我们叙述，他们的情况以及他们所遵循的律法也已向我们阐明。此外，所有这些都仅仅是为了作为借鉴和劝诫，别无其他，并不是为了让我们受他们教法的约束。

This is with regards to their use of the verses as proof. However, with respect to their inference that the Messenger (pbuh) came to convey from Allah everything that must be adhered to, this is correct as to what he informed us that we must adhere to from Allah which is the Shari’ah that he came with. However, it is not correct (their inference) with respect to what he did not order us to adhere to. So, the Prophet (pbuh) conveyed to us from Allah (swt) about the circumstances of those before us from the previous nations, but he informed us of that for the sake of example and admonition and not for us to be bound by their Shari’ah. So, the stories of the Prophets, as well as their affairs and the affairs of their nations, were narrated to us and their circumstances and what rules they used to follow were made clear to us. In addition, all of that was only for the sake of example and admonition and nothing else and it was not in order to be bound by their Shari’ah.

关于故事和叙述（Akhbaar，即圣训中的记载），显然它们是为了劝诫和教训而来的，这一点无需证据。至于先前民族的状况以及他们所遵循的律例，这些是以叙述其情况的方式提及的，并不是从他们所遵行的律例对我们具有约束力的角度提及的。它们就像是为说明先前众先知和先前民族的情形而叙述的故事。

With respect to the stories and to the news (Akhbaar), it is apparent that they came for admonition and lessons and this does not need any proof, and as for the conditions of the nations and what they used to follow in terms of rules, this was mentioned in way of reports about them and they were not mentioned from the perspective of being bound by them. They are like stories that came to explain the circumstances of the previous Prophets and the previous nations.

此外，这些规则中有几条在细节上与伊斯兰教法相抵触；因此，如果我们接受其中任何一条的约束，那就等于接受了两套不同的教法，而这是不可能的。以苏莱曼（Sulayman）的律法为例，安拉（SWT）说：

Above and beyond this, several of these rules contradict the Islamic Shari’ah in their details; therefore, if we were addressed by them, we would have been addressed by two different Shara’ih and this is not possible. As an illustration from the legislation of Sulayman, Allah (swt) said:

“他检查了群鸟，说：‘我怎么看不见戴胜鸟？难道它是缺席的吗？{我必定严厉惩罚它，或者宰杀它，除非它给我拿来明确的证据。}’”（《古兰经》27:20-21）穆斯林之间对于惩罚这只鸟的禁止并无分歧，即便它是违抗的；实际上，对于惩罚任何动物是否有效，也无分歧，并且有关此事的沙里亚经文已有明确记载。先知ﷺ说：

“And he took attendance of the birds and said, "Why do I not see the hoopoe - or is he among the absent?; I will surely punish him with a severe punishment or slaughter him unless he brings me clear authorization."” (TMQ 27:20-1) and there is no difference amongst the Muslims regarding the prohibition of the punishment of the bird and even if it was disobedient; rather, there is no difference even regarding the invalidity of punishing any animal and there are Shari’ah texts that came regarding this. The Prophet (pbuh) (saw) said:

.» الْعَجْمَاءُ جَرْحُهَا جُ بَارٌ «.

.» الْعَجْمَاءُ جَرْحُهَا جُ بَارٌ «.

“野兽所造成的伤害不负赔偿责任”（由艾布·胡莱赖（Abu Hurayrah）传述，获得共识）；《Al-Muheet》辞典中提到：“Jubaar（无偿损失）如同摧毁懦弱者的云，Jubaar即损失，且无效。”因此，牲畜以及飞禽所造成的损害不予赔偿（即其主人不负责任）。关于穆萨（Musa）的律法，安拉（SWT）说：

“The injuries caused by the beast are without liability” (agreed upon through Abu Hurayrah); it is mentioned in Al-Muheet dictionary: “The Jubaar is like the cloud which destroyed the cowardly, and Jubaar is loss and invalid”. Therefore, the damage caused by livestock, as well as the bird, is not indemnified (i.e. the owner is not liable). With respect to the Shari’ah of Musa, Allah (swt) says:

“而对犹太教徒，我禁止了一切无蹄的动物；在牛和羊中，我也禁止了他们食用其脂肪，除非是附着在背上的、在肠子上的，或与骨骼相连的部分。”（TMQ 6:146），而在伊斯兰教的沙里亚中，这一切都已通过祂（SWT）的话语被允许给穆斯林。

“And to those who are Jews We prohibited every animal of uncloven hoof; and of the cattle and the sheep We prohibited to them their fat, except what adheres to their backs or the entrails or what is joined with bone.” (TMQ 6:146), and in the Shari’ah of Islam all of that has been made permitted for the Muslims by His (swt) word:

“且你们的食物对他们是合法的。”（《古兰经》5:5），而这种脂肪属于我们的食物，所以对他们来说是允许的。《古兰经》中玛利亚之母（Umm Maryam）的话：

“And your food is lawful for them.” (TMQ 5:5), and this fat is from our food so it is permitted for them. The words of Umm Maryam in the Quran,.

“[请说，穆罕默德啊]，当伊姆兰的妻子说：‘我的主啊，我已将我腹中的胎儿献给你，使其专为你的服务而奉献。’”（TMQ 3:35）这些内容属于撒迦利亚时代民众的沙里亚，而这在伊斯兰教中原本是不被允许的。这些话——

“[Mention, O Muhammad], when the wife of 'Imran said, "My Lord, indeed I have pledged to You what is in my womb, consecrated [for Your service].” (TMQ 3:35), are part of the Shari’ah of the people at the time of Zakariyyah and this is not permitted in Islam in origin. The words,.

“除了以色列自己所禁戒的以外，所有食物对以色列的后裔都是合法的。”（TMQ 3:93）这些是雅库布的律法（Shari'ah）的一部分，而在伊斯兰教中，人不得自我禁戒真主所允许的事物。真主（SWT）说：

“All food was lawful to the Children of Israel except what Israel had made unlawful to himself.” (TMQ 3:93), are part of the Shari’ah of Ya’qub and in Islam it is not permitted to prohibit oneself from what Allah (swt) allowed; He (swt) says:

“{哦，先知啊！你为什么要禁止自己享用安拉为你所合法的东西？}”（TMQ 66:1）。在洞穴同伴时代的有经人的沙里亚中，包括……

“O Prophet, why do you prohibit [yourself from] what Allah has made lawful for you.” (TMQ 66:1). The Shari’ah of the People of the Book at the time of the companions of the Cave includes,.

“胜利者说：‘我们要在他们的洞穴上建一座礼拜场所。’”（TMQ 18:21），而这在伊斯兰教中是被禁止的；先知ﷺ说。

“The ones who won said “we shall build a place of worship over them”.” (TMQ 18:21), and this is prohibited in Islam; the Prophet (pbuh) said.

. إِنَّ أُولَئِكَ إِذَا كَانَ فِيهِمُ الرَّجُلُ الصَّالِحُ فَمَاتَ بَ نَ وْا عَلَى قَ بْرِهِ مَسْجِدًا وَصَوَّرُوا « » فِيهِ تِلْكَ الصُّوَرَ، فَأُولَئِكَ شِرَارُ الْخَلْقِ عِنْدَ اللَّهِ ي وَْمَ الْقِيَامَةِ .

. إِنَّ أُولَئِكَ إِذَا كَانَ فِيهِمُ الرَّجُلُ الصَّالِحُ فَمَاتَ بَ نَ وْا عَلَى قَ بْرِهِ مَسْجِدًا وَصَوَّرُوا « » فِيهِ تِلْكَ الصُّوَرَ، فَأُولَئِكَ شِرَارُ الْخَلْقِ عِنْدَ اللَّهِ ي وَْمَ الْقِيَامَةِ .

“当他们中间有虔诚的人去世时，他们便在其坟墓上建造礼拜场所，并以这类图画加以装饰。他们在复活日的真主看来是最恶劣的被造物。”（双方共同认可的圣训）这是穆萨的教法中的内容。

“When a pious person amongst them (among the religious groups) dies they build a place of worship on his grave, and then decorate it with such pictures. They would be the worst of creatures on the Day of judgment in the sight of Allah.” (agreed upon). Part of the Shari’ah of Musa are the words.

“我们在《讨拉特》中为他们规定：生命对生命，眼睛对眼睛，鼻子对鼻子，耳朵对耳朵，牙齿对牙齿，各种伤口都要以同等的报复相还。但谁以施舍的方式放弃自己的权利，那对他就是一种赎罪。谁不依照真主所降示的来裁决，谁就是不义的人。”（TMQ 5:45），而我们不以此为据，因为我们并未被命令这样做，只有在我们之前的人被命令这样做。伊斯兰只使我们负有对这一切以及其他事项进行同等报复的义务，依据祂（swt）的经文：

“And We ordained for them therein a life for a life, an eye for an eye, a nose for a nose, an ear for an ear, a tooth for a tooth, and for wounds is legal retribution. But whoever gives [up his right as] charity, it is an expiation for him. And whoever does not judge by what Allah has revealed - then it is those who are the wrongdoers.” (TMQ 5:45), while we do not take from this because we are not ordered with it and only other than us were ordered by it. Islam only obligated us with retaliation from all of these and in other issues by His (swt) words:

“所以，无论谁侵犯了你们，你们就照他侵犯你们的方式去回击他。”（TMQ 2: 194），他（SWT）说：

“So whoever has assaulted you, then assault him in the same way that he has assaulted you.” (TMQ 2: 194), His (swt) saying,.

“{وَإِنْ عَاقَبْتُمْ فَعَاقِبُوا بِمِثْلِ مَا عُوقِبْتُمْ بِهِ}”（ﷺ无关，此处为古兰经引文） Correction: the Qur'an verse is set off in braces and contains no Prophet mention, so it should carry no ﷺ. Corrected translation: “{وَإِنْ عَاقَبْتُمْ فَعَاقِبُوا بِمِثْلِ مَا عُوقِبْتُمْ بِهِ}”（TMQ 16:126）以及他的（SWT）的话语。

“And if you punish, O believers, punish with an equivalent of that with which you were harmed.” (TMQ 16:126) and His (swt) words.

“且报应恶行，必以同样的恶行。”（《古兰经》42:40）此外，他（SWT）的经文说：

“And the retribution for an evil act is an evil one like it.” (TMQ 42:40). In addition, His (swt) words.

“And for wounds is legal retribution.” (TMQ 5:45) 与伊斯兰教的“格萨斯”（等值报复）相矛盾，因为伊斯兰教中的“格萨斯”指的是赔偿金，而《讨拉特》中并没有接受赔偿金的规定。相反，赔偿金只存在于伊斯兰教法中，而对于未致人死亡的伤害所应支付的赔偿，称为“迪亚”（血金）。同样，关于先知和以往民族的故事中所叙述的许多“格萨斯”规定，说明了他们的情况以及他们遵循的法律，这些规定与伊斯兰教的律法相矛盾；那么，我们怎能以它们作为约束呢？

“And for wounds is legal retribution.” (TMQ 5:45) conflicts with Qisas (recompense) in Islam since the Qisas in Islam is the fine, and there is nothing in the Torah about accepting the fine. Rather, the fine is only in Islamic law and the fine is the blood money; so, the blood money for what falls short of life is called the fine. Likewise, many rules about Qisaas in the stories that have been narrated about the previous Prophets and nations, explaining their circumstance and what they used to follow from laws, contradict the laws of Islam; so how can we be addressed by them?

不能说这些律例已被伊斯兰教法废止,因为它们是无限制地被叙述的,而传到我们这里的律例并非作为对前人律例的废止而来。相反,它们是为我们而立的教法,这些律例之间并无关联。因此,不存在废止的问题,关于废止的主张是没有依据的主张,因为废止是指以后来的经文废除从前一部教法经文中所理解的律例,例如先知ﷺ的话语:

It cannot be said that these laws have been abrogated by the Islamic Shari’ah since they were narrated without restriction and the laws which have come to us did not come as abrogation for laws before us. Rather they came as a Shari’ah for us and there is no relationship between these laws. Accordingly, the issue of abrogation is not found and the call regarding it is a claim that has no backing since abrogation is the nullification of the rule which is understood from a previous Shari’ah text by a subsequent one, such as the words of the Messenger (pbuh) :

.» نَ هَيْتُكُمْ عَنْ زِيَارَةِ الْقُبُورِ، فَ زُورُوهَا « .

.» نَ هَيْتُكُمْ عَنْ زِيَارَةِ الْقُبُورِ، فَ زُورُوهَا « .

“我曾禁止你们探访坟墓，现在你们可以去探访了。”（穆斯林圣训实录集，经布赖代传述），以及拉比尔在其《穆斯奈德》中经伊本·阿拔斯传述的记载。

“I forbade you to visit graves, but you may now visit them.” (reported by Muslim through Buraydah), and the report of Al-Rabi’ in his Musnad through Ibn Abbas,.

.» كُنْتُ نَ هَيْتُكُمْ عَنْ زِيَارَةِ القُبُورِ، أَلاَ فَ زُورُوهَا « .

.» كُنْتُ نَ هَيْتُكُمْ عَنْ زِيَارَةِ القُبُورِ، أَلاَ فَ زُورُوهَا « .

“（过去）我曾禁止你们探访坟墓，现在你们可以去探访了。”因此，后来的一条伊斯兰教法经文取消并解除了先前的规定，这就是停止（Naskh）。停止的成立，必须具备三个条件：被停止的规定须先于停止性的规定而降示；停止性的经文中须有迹象表明它是针对某一特定规定的停止；除此之外的情形都不能称为停止。仅仅两条规定之间存在差异或矛盾，并不能使其中一条成为另一条的停止，而必须在停止性的经文中有明确迹象，表明它是针对某一具体规定的停止。据此，这些从先前教法中转述而来的规定，并不会因伊斯兰教中与之不同或相矛盾的规定而被停止，因为没有任何迹象表明这一点。此外，它们与伊斯兰教法的立法之间也没有关联，因此，它们是通过伊斯兰教法对先前教法的废止而被废止的，而不是通过专属于它们的、用来废止它们的法律而被废止的。由此可以清楚地看出，认为我们受到穆圣ﷺ所带来的内容的约束，并以此为限，这种推论是不成立的，因为我们受约束的，是他ﷺ带给我们的伊斯兰教立法，并以此为限；而我们并不受他ﷺ向我们转述的先知们的故事及其记载所约束，也不受他ﷺ向我们阐明的先前民族的情况及其所遵循的律法所约束。由此，已经清楚地表明：先前民族的立法对我们而言不是立法，而将其视为伊斯兰的证据，这种看法也是站不住脚的。

“(In the past) I forbade you from visiting graves, but visit them now.”; therefore, the nullification and raising of the previous rule by a subsequent Shari’ah text is abrogation. Therefore, for abrogation to take place there must be an abrogated rule that was revealed before the abrogating rule, and for an indication to be present in the abrogating text that it is an abrogation for that rule, and anything other than this is not considered to be abrogation. The mere difference between two rules or contradiction between them does not make one of them an abrogation for the other; rather, there must be an indication in the abrogating text which indicates that it is an abrogation for a specific rule. Accordingly, these rules, narrated from the previous Shara’ih, are not abrogated by the rules of Islam which differs with them or contradicts them since there is nothing which indicates that. Furthermore, there is no relationship between them and the rules of Islam in legislation; so, they are abrogated by the abrogation of the previous Shara’ih by the Shari’ah of Islam and not by laws specific to them that came to abrogate them. With this, it is clear that the inference that we are addressed by what the Messenger (pbuh) came with and are restricted by it as being an invalid inference since we are addressed by what came to us with him from the legislation of Islam and restricted by that, and we are not addressed by what he related to us from the stories of the previous Prophets and their narrations, and neither are we addressed by what he explained to us from the circumstances of the previous nations and what laws they used to follow. Accordingly, it has become apparent with clarity that the legislation of those before us is not legislation for us and the invalidity of considering it being from the Islamic evidences is also apparent.

然而,如果发现另有一段沙里亚文本,表明前人沙里亚中的某些律例也是对我们的要求,那么在这种情况下,该条律例便成为《古兰经》或圣训中的规定;与此同时,会有另一段沙里亚文本表明它在我们的沙里亚中也是对我们的要求,立法者(SWT)对我们的训令就在那里,表明它是为我们而设,因此此时便有义务去遵行。但这并不是因为它是前人的沙里亚,而是因为同一条律例中存在针对我们的训令;换言之,是因为安拉(SWT)以它来命令我们,而先知ﷺ告知我们,它属于他所带来的沙里亚,即伊斯兰的律例。

However, if another Shari’ah text is found with the laws from the Shari’ah of those before us which indicates that we are addressed by them, then, in that case, this rule would become found in the Book or in the Sunnah, and alongside it a Shari’ah text would be found that indicates that we are addressed by it in our Shari’ah and the address of the Legislator (swt) for us existed there which indicates that it is for us and so it would be obligatory to take action upon it then. However, this would not be because it was a Shari’ah of those before us but because of the address found in the same rule that is for us; in other words, because Allah (swt) addressed us by it and the Messenger (pbuh) informed us that it was from the Shari’ah which he had come with, i.e. the laws of Islam.

对于遵循《古兰经》、《圣训》（逊奈）以及此前诸律法（沙拉伊戛）中所载条文的人而言，可以明显看出：凡是出现的、表明我们也在其所指范围之内、属于我们沙利亚（教法）的经文，大致可能出现在以下三种情况之中：

It becomes apparent to the one who follows the laws that have come in the Book, the Sunnah and the previous Shara’ih that the text that comes indicating that we are addressed by it, that it is from our Shari’ah, could come in three circumstances:

首先，当该规定所附的经文以直接向我们发出的呼语开头时，例如关于“库藏”（窖藏财富）的经文，安拉（SWT）说：

Firstly, when the verse which the rule came with begins by directing the address towards us such as the verse regarding Kanz (hoarded wealth), Allah (swt) says:

“噢，信道的人们啊！学者和修士中确有许多人不义地侵吞人们的财产，并阻止人们走真主的大道。那些积藏金银而不用于真主之道的人，你要向他们报告痛苦的刑罚。”（古兰经 9:34）真主（SWT）以此节经文对我们发出训谕；因此，经文所提及的内容对我们而言就是沙里亚（教法）。据此，在我们的沙里亚中，积藏（Kanz）是被禁止的，尽管该节经文中禁止积藏的部分，是在阐述犹太拉比和修士的情况。

“O you who have believed, indeed many of the scholars and the monks devour the wealth of people unjustly and avert [them] from the way of Allah. And those who hoard gold and silver and spend it not in the way of Allah - give them tidings of a painful punishment.” (TMQ 9:34). Allah (swt) has addressed us with this verse; so, whatever it mentioned is a Shari’ah for us. Accordingly, Kanz is prohibited in our Shari’ah even though part of the verse that prohibited it was explaining the circumstances of the rabbis and monks.

其次，当与某条规定一同降示的经文带有表示普遍性的词语时，例如那些提到不依照安拉所降示的（律法）来判决的经文。安拉（SWT）说：

Secondly, when the verse which came with the rule has come with a word which indicates generality, such as the verses which mention ruling by other than what Allah has revealed. Allah (swt) says.

“且凡不依照安拉所降示的而裁决的人，他们就是不信道者。”（TMQ 5:44）因此，“凡”一词表示普遍性，这意味着它涵盖了我们，所以我们也在其所指之列。同样，安拉（SWT）说：

“And whoever does not judge by what Allah has revealed - then it is those who are the disbelievers.” (TMQ 5:44). So, the word “whoever” indicates generality and this means that it encompasses us and thus we are addressed by it. Similarly, Allah (swt) says:

“以及不依照安拉所降示的来判决的人——那些人便是不义的人。”（TMQ 5:45），以此类推。

“And whoever does not judge by what Allah has revealed - then it is those who are the wrongdoers.” (TMQ 5:45), and in the same way.

“且凡不依照真主所降示的（法律）判决的人，他们就是悖逆者。”（TMQ 5:49）

“And whoever did not judge by what Allah revealed, those are they that are the transgressors.” (TMQ 5:49).

第三，如果经文以某种能引起我们注意其中所含律例的内容结尾，例如提到古伦（Qarun）的故事那段关于伽撒斯（Qisas）的经文，安拉（SWT）说：

Thirdly, if the verse ends with something that draws our attention to the laws which are within it, such as the verse of Qisas where Qarun was mentioned; Allah (swt) says:

“诚然，古伦是穆萨的族人，但他欺压他们。我赐给他的财宝，其钥匙都要让一群大力士吃力。”直到（至圣）的话语：

“Indeed, Qarun was from the people of Moses, but he tyrannized them. And We gave him of treasures whose keys would burden a band of strong men.” until His (swt) words:

“哎呀，不信道的人永不成功！”（TMQ 28:76-82）此节经文之后，紧接着是祂（SWT）的话语：

“Oh, how the disbelievers do not succeed!” (TMQ 28:76-82). This verse is followed directly afterwards by His (swt) words:

“那后世的住所，我只为不欲在地上自高、也不欲作恶的人而设。善果属于敬畏者。”（《古兰经》28:83）谁带着善行而来，必得比它更好的报酬。因此，这些经文便成为对使者ﷺ和信士们的劝勉。这也提醒人们注意其中所包含的律例，故经文说：

“That home of the Hereafter We assign to those who do not desire exaltedness upon the earth or corruption. And the [best] outcome is for the righteous; Whoever comes [on the Day of Judgement] with a good deed will have better than it.” (TMQ 28:83), and so the verses became an address to the Messenger (pbuh) and to the believers. This draws attention to the laws which came (within them) when it is said:

“那些不欲在地上自高的人”。

“Those who do not desire exaltedness upon the earth”.

这些规定是针对想要在大地上显赫的古伦（Qaroon）的，但有迹象表明，我们也同样受这些律法的约束。

and these were rules regarding Qaroon who wanted grandeur in the land but there is what indicates that we are addressed by these laws.

在以下三种情况下,前人经文中的律法将被视为伊斯兰教法的律法,因为有某种迹象表明我们也在其被指向的范围之内,并且我们是以伊斯兰教法律法的身份采纳它们,而不是以其属于我们之前某个教法的身份采纳,因为我们之前的教法对我们而言并不是教法。

In these three circumstances, laws of the verses of previous people will be considered as laws from the Islamic Shari’ah since there is something that indicates that we are addressed by them and we adopt them in their characteristic as laws from the Islamic Shari’ah and not from the characteristic that they were from a Shari’ah of those before us since the Shari’ah of those who came before us is not a Shari’ah for us.

关于那些认为伊斯提哈桑（运用个人判断以作出法律裁决）属于伊斯兰教法依据的人，他们无法提出单独的或哪怕是不确定的伊斯兰教法证据来支持其主张。那些将其视为伊斯兰教法依据的人对它的解释是：它是一种在穆占泰希德（法学家）身上出现的证据，而他或她因缺乏表达的帮助而无法将其明确表述出来。也有人解释说，它是在诸多求索（伊杰提哈德）的方面中放弃某一方面，而不完整地保留其措辞，以便另一个比它更强的方面得以体现，这就像第一个方面上出现的一个意外因素。同样，也有人解释说，它是在某个问题上，由于存在更强的理由促使这样做，从而放弃与之类似的规则，转而适用另一条规则。此外，还有人解释说，它是将某一问题从与之相似的问题中割裂出来。

With regards to those who say that Istihsaan (application of discretion in a legal decision) is from the Shari’ah evidences, they are not able to come with single or even indefinite evidence from the Shari’ah that supports their claim. Istihsaan can be explained by those who take it as a Shari’ah evidence that: it is evidence which occurs to the Mujtahid when he or she is unable to make it apparent due to the lack of help to express it. It is also explained that it is to leave an aspect from amongst the aspects of Ijtihad without the completeness of the words for another aspect which is stronger than it and which would be like an unexpected factor on the first. In the same manner, it is explained that it is in an issue to abandon the rule comparable to it to another rule due to a stronger aspect that necessitates this move. Additionally, it is explained that it is to cut off an issue from comparable ones.

istihsaan 分为两类：第一类是“istihsaan qiyasi”（基于类比的istihsaan），第二类是“istihsaan 因需要而定”（基于必要性的istihsaan）。istihsaan qiyasi 是指放弃一条表面上显而易见的类比推理所得出的规定，转而采用另一条更为精微、隐蔽但证据更强、观点更能令人信服、推导更为正确的类比所得出的规定。例子如下：某人与两个人在同一份契约中从他们二人那里购买了一辆车，作为借来的债务。随后，二人中的一名债权人收到了这笔债务的一部分。然而，他没有权利专门取走这笔钱；相反，他的债务合伙人有权要求分得他那一份收款，因为他（第一位债权人）是从同一笔买卖的合并价款中拿走了这笔钱。而且，二人中任何一方从两人合并的买卖价款中的所得，都等同于两个合伙人的所得，换言之，这是为合伙关系而取得的，并非任何一方可以专门据为己有。因此，如果被取走的那部分在第一位接收者手中于第二位合伙人取得其份额之前被毁损，那么依照类比的推理，损失应从二人的总额中扣除，也就是从合伙关系的总额中扣除。然而，依照istihsaan，损失只应由接收者一方承担，而不应计入第二位合伙人的账上，因为从本质上讲，他并不与接收者的合伙关系不可分割；相反，他能够放弃由取得者所收到的部分，并单独地与债务人建立联系。其他例子也以同样的方式推进。这就是 istihsaan qiyasi。

Istihsaan is divided into two categories; the first is Istihsaan Qiyasi and the second is Istihsaan of necessity. Istihsaan Qiyasi is to abandon the rule of an apparent Qiyas that comes to fore for a different rule by another Qiyas which is more subtle and hidden, but is a stronger proof, with a more satisfying viewpoint and a more correct derivation. An example of this is: if a person bought a car from two people in one agreement as a loan from them. Then, one of the two creditors was given part of this debt. However, he didn’t have the right to take it specifically; rather, his partner in the debt has a right to claim his part of the receipt since he (the first creditor) has appropriated it from the combined sale price in the single sale. Moreover, the appropriation of either of the two partners from the price of the combined sale between them is the appropriation of both the partners, in other words, it is an appropriation for the partnership and it is not for either of them to take specifically. So, if whatever was taken is destroyed while it is in the possession of the one who received it before the second partner took his share from it, then the deduction from the Qiyas is that it would be taken away from the total sum of the two, or in other words, from the total sum of the partnership. However, in Istihsaan the loss would be considered to be taken only from the one who had received it and the loss would not be counted against the second partner according to Istihsaan since in origin he is not inseparable from the partnership of the one who received it; rather, he is able to leave what is received by the appropriator and become attached to the debtor by himself specifically. The other examples follow in the same manner. This is Istihsaan Qiyasi.

关于为了必要而运用的Istihsaan（istihsaan，公益/优选），它是指以考虑迫切的必要或所需的利益来对抗Qiyas（类比推理）的规定，从而满足需要或消除困难。当Qiyas的规定在某些问题上导致困难或弊端时，便会在此时舍弃它，改用能够消除困难、排除弊害的另一规定。例如雇工的情况：雇工对其所受雇之物的占有被视为一种委托（Amanat）；因此，若所雇之物在其手中受损，只要他没有疏忽，便无需赔偿。 据此，若有人雇用一人在自己家中工作，为别人缝制衣物，为期一个月，此人即被视为私人雇工。此后，若衣物在雇工手中受损，而他并无任何过失，则无需赔偿，因为他是以委托的方式占有这些衣物。另外，若有人雇用一人在自己的店铺中为众人缝制衣物，而此人为所有人缝衣，则他是公共雇工。因此，若衣物在此雇工手中毁坏，而他并无任何过失，同样不需赔偿，因为他以同样的方式以委托身份持有这些衣物。 然而，依据Istihsaan，私人雇工无需赔偿，而公共雇工则需赔偿，目的是使公共雇工不会接受超出其能力范围的工作，以免毁损民众的财产。

As for Istihsaan of necessity, it is what contradicts the rule of Qiyas by taking into account an incumbent necessity or a required benefit in order to fulfil the need or prevent the hardship. This occurs when the rule from the Qiyas leads to a hardship or a problem in some issues and so it is abandoned at that time by Istihsaan for another rule which would remove the hardship and repel the problem. This is like the example of the employee since his possession with respect to what he is employed upon is considered to be an Amanat (trust); so there is no liability (to be paid) if it is damaged while it is with him as long as he was not negligent. Therefore, if someone employed a person to work in his house to sew clothes for someone else for one month, he is considered a private employee. Then, if the clothes were damaged while they are in the employee’s possession without any transgression from him, there is no payment of liability because he possessed it as a trust. Additionally, if someone employed someone to work in his shop to sew clothes for others and he used to sew clothes for all the people, then he is a general employee. So, if the clothes are destroyed while they are in this employee’s possession without any transgression from him then there is no liability since he held them as a trust in the same manner. However, according to Istihsaan, there is no liability upon the private employee while there is for the general employee so that he (the general employee) would not accept more work than he is able to do since he might destroy the peoples’ wealth.

这是关于伊斯蒂哈桑（Istihsaan）及其证据的概述。显然，这些并非证据；它们只是理性上的修正，既不出自《古兰经》，也不出自圣行（Sunnah）。它们甚至达不到被视为或然证据的程度，更不用说确定性证据，以证明伊斯蒂哈桑属于沙里阿证据之列。这是从一个角度来看；从另一个角度来看，凡出于理性修正者皆属无效。

This is the summary of Istihsaan and its evidences. It is apparent that they are not evidences; rather, they are simply rational amendments that are neither from the Book nor from the Sunnah. They do not even reach the level of being considered indefinite proofs let alone conclusive proofs that Istihsaan is from the Shari’ah evidences. This is from one angle and from another angle; whatever comes about from rational amendment is void.

关于对伊斯提哈桑（Istihsaan）的各种解释，它们都是站不住脚的。至于第一种解释，即证据存在于穆扎希德（Mujtahid）的内心之中，而他并不知道它是什么，这种说法是不允许的：一件事物只要仍然未知，就不能被视为证据，因为无法将其阐明、使其显现，这恰恰证明它对穆扎希德而言并不清楚，他也并不了解它，因此它不能算作沙里阿（Shari'ah）的证据之一。至于其他的解释，它们的含义都是相同的，即为了另一个更强的观点而放弃与当前问题相类似的问题，换言之，就是为了更强的证据而放弃类比（Qiyas）。如果这些解释所说的“更强的证据”指的是《古兰经》或《逊奈》中的经文，那么这就不是伊斯提哈桑，而是对经文的优先选择，因此这是从经文中进行推导，属于依据《古兰经》或《逊奈》的推导，而不是依据伊斯提哈桑的推导。如果“更强的证据”指的是理智根据它所认为的利益而作出的判断，并且这才是其真正含义，那么这种说法同样无效，因为类比是建立在沙里阿的伊拉（'Illah，即效因）之上的，而这个效因是由经文确定的，它是立法者（swt）对我们的训示。理智和利益并不是沙里阿的经文，也不是比经文更强的另一个效因；理智和利益与沙里阿的经文（即启示所降下的内容）之间并无关联。因此，这种放弃类比的做法是无效的。

With respect to the explanations of Istihsaan, all of them are invalid. As for the first explanation that the evidence is sensed in the mind of the Mujtahid and that he or she does not know what it is, it is not permitted to consider something an evidence as long as it remains unknown since the lack of ability to make it clear and apparent proves that it is not clear to the Mujtahid and that he or she lacks knowledge of it; so, it is not correct to be from amongst the Shari’ah evidences. As for the other explanations, all of their meanings are the same, i.e. to abandon similar issues to the issue at hand for another stronger view, in other words, to abandon Qiyas for stronger evidence. If these explanations intend by the “stronger evidence”, a text from the Book or the Sunnah, then this is not Istihsaan; it is rather preference of the text, so it is deducing from the text which would be deduction by the Book or the Sunnah and not deduction by Istihsaan. If the “stronger evidence” is the mind by what it considers as benefit and this is the intended meaning, then this is invalid since Qiyas is built upon the Shari’ah ‘Illah which is determined by the text and it is the address of the Legislator (swt) to us. The mind and the benefit are not Shari’ah texts and nor are they another ‘Illah stronger than the text; rather, there is no relationship between the mind and benefit with the Shari’ah text (i.e. what came as Revelation). For that reason, this abandonment is invalid.

关于这些解释，我们要说明：对伊斯提哈桑（Istihsaan）作“伊斯提哈桑格亚西”（Istihsaan Qiyasi）的分类是无效的，这一点已经从第二种解释的无效中清楚地显现出来，那种解释是放弃与该问题相似的问题。另外，他们认为这是一种隐蔽的类比，也是无效的，因为它与类比毫无关系；它实际上只是以利益作为推理依据（即把利益当作“伊拉”，即起因）。 至于一个合并买卖的例子，即在一次契约中出售的组合物品的价款，主张在以下规定上存在分歧是不正确的：合伙人之一所侵占的财物的损失，应被视为合伙财产的损失，因为合伙人之一从财物中侵占的部分，就是对合伙财产的侵占。因为这笔财物，无论是已售出的汽车还是其价款，都属于合伙财产，而不是某一合伙人的财产；因此，它的损失就是公司财产的损失，正如它被侵占就是对公司财产的侵占一样。所以，这种基于公益（Maslahi）的放弃毫无依据，并且与伊斯兰教法相违背。

This is regarding the explanations. As for the categorisation of Istihsaan, the invalidity of Istihsaan Qiyasi has become clear from the invalidity of the second explanation, which was to abandon the similar issues to the issue. Also, their consideration that it is a hidden Qiyas is invalid because it has no relationship with Qiyas; rather, it is simply reasoning by benefit (making the benefit an ‘Illah). Regarding the example of the price of a combined sale which was sold in one agreement, it is not correct to differ in the rule, the loss of the wealth which one of the two partners appropriated, that it is a loss from the wealth of the partnership, for what one of the two partners appropriated from the wealth is from the appropriation of the partnership. Because the wealth, irrespective of whether it was the sold car or its price, is the wealth of the partnership and not the wealth of one of the partners; so its loss is the loss of the wealth of the company just like its appropriation is an appropriation of the wealth of the company. So, this beneficial (Maslahi) abandonment has no place and it contradicts the Shari’ah.

至于因需要而运用的“istihsaan”（相对便利原则），其无效是显而易见的，因为它依据的是理性及理性所认为的利益；它不是一项沙里亚经文，而且所采用的效因（‘Illah）被置于沙里亚经文之上（即对沙里亚经文的理解之上）。所有这些都是无效的，无需任何必要的讨论。接着，使共同雇员承担责任而使私人雇员不承担责任，就是在没有证据的情况下偏向某一方使其更为优先，并且与沙里亚经文相矛盾。拜哈基在《大圣训集》（Sunan Al-Kubra）中引用，来自‘Amr B. Shu’ayb，从他的父亲，再从他的祖父，先知ﷺ说：

As for the Istihsaan of necessity, its invalidity is clear in that it is ruled by the mind and what the mind perceives as benefit; it is not a Shari’ah text and the adopted reason (‘Illah) is preferred to the Shari’ah text (that is, the comprehension of Shari’ah text). All of this is invalid without any necessary discusssion. Then, to make the shared employee liable and the private employee not liable is to prefer something without evidence to make it preferred and it contradicts with the Shari’ah text. It was reported by Al-Bayhaqi in Sunan Al-Kubra from ‘Amr B. Shu’ayb from his father from his grandfather that the Messenger (pbuh) said:

.» ثُمَّ لاَ ضَمَانَ عَلَى مُؤْتَمَنٍ « .

.» ثُمَّ لاَ ضَمَانَ عَلَى مُؤْتَمَنٍ « .

“那么，受托者不承担责任。”同样，通过阿勒-嘎辛·本·阿卜杜·拉赫曼的传述，阿里和伊本·麦斯欧德说：“受托者不承担责任。”在他的《逊南·拜哈给》中，传述者贾比尔传述，艾卜·伯克尔裁定，存放在袋中的寄存物被焚毁而遭毁坏，不应因此获得任何赔偿；因此，任何受托者都不承担责任，因为该传述中的“不”字否定的是整个类别。

“then there is no liability upon the one who takes a trust”. Similarly, through Al-Qasim Bin Abdul Rahman that ‘Ali and Ibn Mas’ud said: “there is no liability upon the one who takes a trust”, and in his Sunan Al-Bayhaqi reports from Jaber that Abu Bakr ruled that a deposit which had been kept in a bag, which was burnt and so was destroyed, was not to receive any liability in exchange; so, there is no liability upon anyone given a trust at all since the expression of the narration “no” is a negation of the genus.

. "لا ضَمانَ " .

. "لا ضَمانَ " .

“没有责任”这一表述表明其具有普遍性，因此它涵盖每一位持有信托的人，无论他是私人雇员还是一般雇员。

“no liability/responsibility” which indicates generality, and so it encompasses every one holding a trust whether they were a private employee or a general employee.

由此可见,istihsaan(istihsān,即"求善"的法理)并不属于沙里亚的证据,也不能将其视为沙里亚证据之一,因为无论是确定的还是不确定的证据,都找不到任何一条来自《古兰经》、《圣训》(逊奈)或同伴的一致意见(伊检玛)能表明它属于证据。除此之外,它以理性作为证据,这使其无效;而且它的一些例子与沙里亚经文相抵触。

By this it is apparent that Istihsaan is not from the Shari’ah evidences, and it is not correct to consider it from the Shari’ah evidences since there is no proof at all, definite or indefinite, whether from the Quran, from the Sunnah or from the Ijma’ of the Companions that indicates that it is from the evidences. This is besides the fact that it is using the mind as evidence which makes it invalid and that some of its examples contradicts Shari’ah texts.

至于那些主张“马索利哈·穆尔赛莱”（Al-Masalih Al-Mursalah）属于沙里尔证据的人，他们同样无法为此提出任何证明；然而，他们认为整个沙里尔的理由在于获取利益和排除危害。同样，他们也认为每一条具体沙里尔律例的理由在于获取利益或排除危害。不过，其中一些人将此设为条件：某事本身即是利益，其被视为利益的依据须见于沙里尔的文本，或文本中提及它属于某种利益；而另一些人则不以此为条件，而是认为，即便沙里尔文本中没有提及对其或其类别的考虑，马斯莱哈（利益）本身仍可作为沙里尔的证据。这是因为它属于一般的“马萨利哈”范畴，即通过它们追求利益、避免危害。

As for those who say that Al-Masalih Al-Mursalah are from the Shari’ah evidences, in the same manner they are also unable to bring any proof for it; however, they consider the reasons behind the whole of the Shari’ah to be the obtaining of interests and the repulsion of harms. In the same way, they consider the reason behind each specific Shari’ah rule to be the obtaining of the interest or the repulsion of the harm. However, some of them make it a condition that the consideration that something is itself a benefit needs to be found mentioned in a text from the Shari’ah or mentioned that it is a type of interest but some of them do not make this a condition; rather, they consider the Maslahah (benefit) a Shari’ah evidence even if there is no mentioning of the consideration of it or its type in a Shari’ah text. This is because it comes under the general Masalih by which the benefits are sought and the harms are avoided.

所谓“al-Maṣāliḥ al-Mursalah”（麦绥利哈·穆尔赛莱，即无经文依据的公益），可以定义为：凡是在伊斯兰教法中既没有针对它本身、也没有针对其类别的经文记载的利益。因此，“Mursalah”的含义就是它没有在证据中被提及。 他们说，如果某项公益本身就在某段具体经文中被提及，例如教授、阅读和书写；或者它出自某段概括性的经文，而该经文提到了其类别并证实了其应被考虑，例如命人行一切善事、禁止一切恶行，那么在这两种情况下，它都不属于“麦绥利哈”。确切地说，“麦绥利哈”是指从证据之外推出的利益，也就是说，在它之上找不到任何证据；相反，它是从伊斯兰教法的总体旨意中推导出来的，因为教法的本意就是获取利益、排除损害。 然而，教法所认可的利益与不合法的利益之间存在区别：教法认可的利益是与教法的宗旨（Maqāṣid）相一致的利益，而不合法的利益则是与教法宗旨相违背的利益。因此，能够作为教法证据的“麦绥利哈”，是那些与教法宗旨相一致的利益；而与教法宗旨相违背的，则不被视为“麦绥利哈”，因此也就不能作为教法的证据。 由此可见，“麦绥利哈”是指教法经文以概括的方式表明其应被考虑的利益。因此，当某一事件或与之类似的事情没有相应的教法经文时，便可以在这一利益的基础上建立具体的教法规定，此时该利益本身即成为教法的依据。

Al-Masalih Al- Mursalah may be defined as: every interest which has no text narrated in the Shari’ah with respect to it or its type. So, the meaning of Mursalah is that it is not mentioned in evidence. They said that if the Maslahah was itself mentioned in a specific text, such as teaching, reading and writing, or was from a general text which mentioned its type which confirmed its consideration, such as the enjoining of every type of good and the forbiddance of all the acts of evil, then in these two situations it is not considered to be from Al-Masalih Al-Mursalah. Rather, Al-Masalih Al-Mursalah is forwarded from the evidence, in other words, there is no evidence found upon it; instead, it is derived from the generality of the Shari’ah being sent to gain the interests and repel the harms. However, there is a difference made between the Shari’ah interests and those which are not legitimate since the Shari’ah interests are those that agree with the intentions (Maqasid) of the Shari’ah, and the interests that are illegitimate are those which contradict the intentions of the Shari’ah. So, Al-Masalih Al-Mursalah that are considered to be a Shari’ah evidence are those which agree with the intentions of the Shari’ah, and those which contradict with the intentions of the Shari’ah are not considered to be from Al-Masalih Al-Mursalah; consequently, it is not a Shari’ah evidence. Hence, Al-Masalih Al-Mursalah are those that the Shari’ah texts indicate its consideration in a general manner, and accordingly, specific Shari’ah rules are built upon its basis when there is no Shari’ah text regarding the event or anything which is comparable to it, in which case the interest would be the Shari’ah proof.

这是对《Al-Masalih Al-Mursalah》的总结，从两个角度来看是无效的：

This is the summary of Al-Masalih Al-Mursalah and it is invalid from two angles:

首先:《古兰经》和《圣训》中的沙里亚经文与信士的具体行为相关联,它们是该行为上沙里亚律例的沙里亚证据;而它们与利益并无关联,也没有任何证据针对利益而来。当安拉{说}时(SWT)

Firstly: the Shari’ah texts from the Quran and the Sunnah are connected to specific actions of the worshipper; so, they are the Shari’ah evidence for the rule of the Shari’ah in that action, and they are not connected with the interests and no evidence came for the interest. When Allah (saw) said:

“如果你们在旅途中而找不到书写的人，那就应当取得抵押品。”（TMQ 2:283），以及当他（SWT）说：

“And if you are on a journey and cannot find a scribe, then a security deposit [should be] taken.” (TMQ 2:283), and when He (swt) said:

“{哎，信道的人们！你们相互间因定期的债务而缔约的时候，你们应当把它写下来。}”（《古兰经》2:282），以及当祂说：

“O you who have believed, when you contract a debt for a specified term, write it down.” (TMQ 2:282), and when He said:

“当你们订立契约时，你们应当请两个见证人。”（古兰经 2:282）他（subhanahu wa ta'ala）所阐明的只是抵押、书面记录债务以及见证买卖的规定。他（subhanahu wa ta'ala）既未通过明文，也未通过暗示，表明这一规定是否属于利息；经文无论从近处还是远处，无论从其各个层面的任何角度，都没有说明这一规定是否涉及利息。那么，从什么角度可以说，伊斯兰教法指明了这些利息，从而使这种利息被视为应予考虑，并进而被当作教法证据呢？

“And take witnesses when you conclude a contract.” (TMQ 2:282), He (swt) was explaining only the rules of mortgaging, writing down debts and witnessing the sale. He (swt) did not make it evident whether this was an interest or not, neither by expression nor by indication, and the text does not convey whether this rule was an interest or not, neither from close nor far or by any aspect from its various angles. So, from what angle is it said that these interests are indicated by the Shari’ah in order for this interest to be considered and subsequently to be considered as Shari’ah evidence?

此外,沙里亚的伊拉(Illal,即 Illah 的复数)与沙里亚经文一样,是与信徒的行为相关联的,是对该行为上沙里亚律例所指示之内容的证据;它们并非用来解释利益本身,也不是用来说明利益的指向。因此,当安拉(SWT)说:

Additionally, the Shari’ah Illal (plural of Illah) came in the same manner as the Shari’ah texts; connected to the actions of the worshipper and as evidence upon the indication of the Shari’ah rule in that action, and did not come to explain the interest nor the indication of the interest. So, when Allah (swt) says:

“这样财富就不会只在你们中间富人之间流转。”（TMQ 59:7）。

“So that it will not be a perpetual distribution among the rich from among you.” (TMQ 59:7),.

“为使信士们在收养之子的妻子方面不再有任何困扰。”（《古兰经》33:37）以及当真主（SWT）说：

“In order that there not be upon the believers any discomfort concerning the wives of their adopted sons.” (TMQ 33:37) and when He (swt) says:

“以及心被争取的人们。”（TMQ 9:60）他（SWT）只是在阐明“illah”：将财富分给穷人而非富人，是为了防止财富在富人之间流转；他也在阐明，穆圣ﷺ与宰乃卜（Zaynab）结婚的“illah”，是为了说明人可以娶其养子之妻的合法性；他还阐明，为了争取人心而给予财物的“illah”，是国家需要将人心凝聚在一起。因此，他（SWT）并未将此解释为利益；相反，这些解释只是说明某一特定事项是某一特定律例的“illah”，完全不考虑其中是否有利益，也绝不予以任何顾及。那么，从什么角度可以说，沙里亚指明了这些理由，从而使利益可以被视为沙里亚的证据呢？如果沙里亚经文没有指明沙里亚是为了利益而降，无论是在对律例的指示上，还是在对律例之“illah”的指示上，那么就不可能说经文指明了特定的利益或其类别，因为沙里亚经文中对此根本没有任何记载。由此可见，所谓沙里亚经文是作为特定利益或其类别之证据的说法是站不住脚的；并且由更进一步的推理可知，那些未被沙里亚经文提及、表明其属于沙里亚证据的利益，同样不被视为有效。

“And those whose hearts are to be conciliated.” (TMQ 9:60), He (swt) is only clarifying the ‘Illah distributing the wealth amongst the poor rather than the rich in order to prevent the circulation of the wealth amongst the rich, and clarifying that the ‘Illah of marrying the Messenger (pbuh) to Zaynab is to be an explanation of the permissibility for someone to marry his adopted son’s wife, and clarifying that the Illah for giving (money) in order to attract the hearts is the need for the State to bind the hearts together. So, He (swt) did not explain that this was benefit; rather, the explanation was that a specific issue was the Illah of a specific rule without any regard given to the interest or its absence and absolutely without any consideration to it. So, from what angle then, can it be said that the Shari’ah indicates these reasons such that the interests can be considered Shari’ah evidence? If the Shari’ah texts did not indicate that the Shari’ah came for the interest, neither in its indications upon the rule nor in its indications for the Illah of the rule, then it is not possible for it to be said that the texts indicate specific interests or by their type since nothing at all came regarding this in the Shari’ah texts. Accordingly, the invalidity of the claim that the Shari’ah texts came as a proof for specific interests or by their type has become clear, and from greater reasoning, the interests that were not mentioned by a text from the Shari’ah that indicates that they are from the Shari’ah evidences are also not considered.

其次,他们对"Al-Masalih Al-Mursalah"(不受限定的公益)附加了一个条件:要使其成为"Mursalah",就不能有任何来自伊斯兰教法的文本表明它被考虑在内,无论是具体地,还是就其类别而言。因此,他们的规定是:它不应有来自伊斯兰教法的具体证据,而只能从伊斯兰教法的目的中领会。仅此一点,在伊斯兰教法看来就足以使其无效,因为缺乏表明其合法性的证据,便足以否定它,因为所寻求的是伊斯兰教法的裁定,而非理性的裁定。因此,要将其视为出自伊斯兰教法,就必须有证据表明它包含在启示所降之物中,即《古兰经》和圣训之中。所以,"没有伊斯兰教法文本表明其被考虑"这一规定,足以使其被否定为出自伊斯兰教法。

Secondly, they made a condition for Al-Masalih Al-Mursalah that for them to be Mursalah, there must be no narration of a text in the Shari’ah that indicates that they are considered, neither specifically nor by their type, and so their stipulation is that there should not be a specific proof for it from the Shari’ah and it is rather understood from the intentions of the Shari’ah. This alone is enough to make it void in the view of the Shari’ah because the lack of a proof which indicates it is enough to reject it since the rule sought is the rule of the Shari’ah and not the rule from the mind. Therefore, in order to consider it as being from the Shari’ah, it is imperative that there is a proof which indicates that it is found in what came with the Revelation, i.e. the Book and the Sunnah. So, the stipulation that there is no text from the Shari’ah that indicates it is sufficient to reject it as being from the Shari’ah.

关于以“马沙利哈穆尔赛拉”（Al-Masalih Al-Mursalah）从沙里阿的意图中推导而来的问题：沙里阿的意图并不是可以被直接理解的沙里阿经文，因此从中所理解的内容不能被视为证据，故而以之作为沙里阿律例的依据并无价值。此外，所谓沙里阿的意图究竟指什么？如果其所指的是经文所表明的内容，例如禁止通奸、偷窃、杀人、饮酒以及叛教，那么这并不是沙里阿的意图，而是对信徒行为的律例，除经文的字面指示之外，不必再作延伸。因此，从经文中所理解出的这一律例不能被视为沙里阿证据，而只是一条沙里阿规定。由此推论，人心凭想象所设定的、所谓沙里阿的目的，更不能被视为沙里阿证据。那么，又怎能把仅凭想象而构想出的沙里阿目的当作沙里阿证据呢？基于此，从沙里阿意图中所理解出的内容，其有效性是完全无效的。

With respect to Al-Masalih Al-Mursalah being understood from the intentions of the Shari’ah, the intentions of the Shari’ah are not a Shari’ah text which can be understood such that what is understood from them can be considered a proof, and so there is no value in what is understood from them as far as using them as evidence for Shari’ah law. Furthermore, what is meant by the intentions of the Shari’ah? If what is intended by it is what the texts indicate, such as the prohibitions of fornication, stealing, murder, alcohol and apostasy from Islam, then this is not an intention of the Shari’ah; rather, it is the law for the actions of the worshipper and there is no looking beyond the indication of the text. So, there is no place to consider that this law which was understood from the text is Shari’ah evidence; rather, it is a Shari’ah rule. By greater reasoning, there is no account given to what the mind imagines from that law as being the purpose of the Shari’ah to be from the Shari’ah evidences. So, how would you consider that which is conceived from the mere imagination as a purpose of the Shari’ah to be a Shari’ah evidence?!! Based upon this, the validity of what is understood from the intentions of the Shari’ah is completely and utterly void.

至于从伊斯兰教法的一切智慧（Hikma）中所理解的意图，即派遣使者（愿主赐予他平安）的智慧，以及他是全体受造物的慈悯这一事实，那么这属于智慧（Hikma），而不是动因（Illah）。智慧可能达成，也可能不达成。因此，它不能被当作用作证据的依据，因为它可能缺失；由此推论，更有理由说，从智慧中所理解的内容不能被当作用作证据的依据。

As for what is intended by what is understood from all the wisdom (Hikma) of the Shari’ah, i.e. the wisdom behind sending the Messenger (pbuh) and the fact that he was a mercy for all creation, then this is a Hikma not an Illah, and the Hikma may or may not be attained. Accordingly, it is not taken as a basis used as evidence due to the possibility of its absence; therefore, by greater reasoning, what is understood from the Hikma cannot be taken as a basis that is used for evidence.

因此,将所谓"沙里尔特(Shari'ah)意图"中所理解的内容视为沙里尔特证据,是不正确的。从这个角度来看,认为对沙里尔特目的的理解可以作为沙里尔特证据的观点也完全站不住脚。据此,认为"马萨利哈·穆尔赛莱(Al-Masalih Al-Mursalah)"属于沙里尔特证据的说法是无效的,这一点已经很清楚了。

Due to this, it would be incorrect to consider that what is understood from what is known as the intentions of the Shari’ah as being from the Shari’ah evidences. It is also the case from this angle that the notion that what is understood to be from the purpose of the Shari’ah to be Shari’ah evidence is completely void. Accordingly, the invalidity of the notion that Al-Masalih Al- Mursalah is from the Shari’ah evidences has become clear.

这是从促使他们认为"马斯莱哈·穆尔赛莱"（公益原则）属于伊斯兰教法依据的原因角度而言的。至于它属于伊斯兰教法依据的论证角度，无论是从《古兰经》还是从《圣训》来看，都完全没有任何教法证据：既没有确定性的证据，也没有不确定性的证据。因此，将"马斯莱哈·穆尔赛莱"视为教法依据之一是不正确的。

This is from the angle of the causes that made them consider that Al-Masalih Al-Mursalah is Shari’ah evidence. As for the angle of the Shari’ah proof that they are from the Shari’ah evidences, there is absolutely no Shari’ah proof for that at all whether from the Book or the Sunnah; neither a conclusive proof nor an indefinite one. For this reason, it is incorrect to consider Al-Masalih Al-Mursalah as being from the Shari’ah evidences.

由此可见,真主(swt)所降的启示所依据的、经确凿证据确认的证据,只有这四种,别无其他,它们是:经典、圣训(逊奈)、圣门弟子的公议(伊吉玛尔)以及以来自沙里尔的法理为依据的类比推理(盖雅斯)。除这四种证据之外,没有任何确凿证据可以证明其他证据。因此,可以清楚地看出,伊斯兰教法的证据只有这四种。

From all of this, it becomes clear that the evidence that the Revelation came with from Allah (swt), which are confirmed with definite proof, are the four evidences and nothing else, and they are: the Book, the Sunnah, the Ijma’ of the Companions and Qiyas whose Illah is from the Shari’ah, and other than these four evidences have no definite proof that indicates them. Accordingly, it has become apparent that the Shari’ah evidences are only these four alone.

然而，应当明确的是：在那些由四大依据之外的证据推导出的律例中，凡是伊玛目视为沙里亚律例的，对于主张它的人和反对它的人而言，都是沙里亚律例，因为存在一个模糊的证据表明这些依据被视为证据。因此，认为穆斯林公议（伊杰玛尔）是沙里亚证据并由此推导出某项律例的人，这项律例对他而言便成为沙里亚律例，是对他有约束力的沙里亚律例，他也因此被禁止改取其他律例。同样的律例在反对它的人看来也是沙里亚律例，但对他们而言并不构成有约束力的沙里亚律例。对于“前人的沙里亚即是我们的沙里亚”、公共利益（Al-Masalih Al-Mursalah）、善意推定（Istihsaan）和理性推理，情况也是如此。

However, it should be clear that the rules deduced from evidences other than these four, from amongst the rules that an Imam considered as Shari’ah rules, are Shari’ah rules in the eyes of those who advocate them and those who oppose them because there exists a vague evidence denoting that they are considered as evidences. Hence, the one who considers the general consensus of the Ummah as being a Shari’ah evidence and who then goes on to deduce from this a rule; consequently, this rule would become a Shari’ah rule in his or her eyes and a binding Shari’ah rule upon him or her, and he or she would be forbidden from taking another rule instead. The same rule also becomes a Shari’ah rule in the eyes of those who oppose it but it does not become a binding Shari’ah rule upon them. The same applies to 'the Shari’ah of those before us is a Shari’ah for us', Al-Masalih Al-Mursalah, Istihsaan and rationality.

因此,从这些证据中推导出的每一条规则,在主张所据证据属于伊斯兰教法证据的人看来是教法规则,在反对者看来同样如此。然而,它只对推导出该规则的人具有约束力,而对持不同理解的人没有约束力。这就像从经文中推导出的规则:对经文理解的差异,并不会使推导出的规则在推导者眼中成为教法规则,而在反对此理解者眼中成为不合法的规则。相反,只要从经文中能够得出这种理解的可能性存在,它对所有穆斯林而言都是教法规则;换言之,只要存在疑似证据(Shubhat Daleel),情况便是如此。然而,它并非对所有穆斯林都具有约束力的规则,而只对推导者本人和效仿他的人具有约束力,对反对者则无约束力。尽管如此,无论如何它都是教法规则。同样,从某一证据中推导出的规则与从经文中推导出的规则完全相同:只要疑似证据存在,它对所有穆斯林而言都被视为教法规则,无论对于那些认为该证据属于教法证据的人,还是对于那些不认为它属于教法证据的人。例如前面那些证据,我们已经反驳了它们作为教法证据的地位。

Hence, every rule deduced from any of these evidences is considered a Shari’ah rule in the eyes of those who advocate that what the rule has been deduced from is part of the Shari’ah evidences and in the eyes of those who oppose it as well. However, it is only a binding Shari’ah rule upon the one who deduces it and not binding upon the one who holds a different understanding. This is like the rules deduced from the texts since the difference in understanding the text does not make the deduced rule a Shari’ah rule in the eyes of the one who deduced it and illegitimate in the eyes of the one that opposed him or her in this understanding. Rather, it is a Shari’ah rule from the viewpoint of all the Muslims as long as the possibility of reaching such understanding from the text is possible; in other words, as long as the doubted evidence (Shubhat Daleel) exists. However, it is not considered a binding rule upon all the Muslims but only binding upon the one who has deduced it and the one who has emulated it, and not binding upon the one who has opposed it. Nonetheless, in any case it is a Shari’ah rule. Likewise, the rule deduced from an evidence is exactly like the rule deduced from the text; it is considered a Shari’ah rule in the eyes of all the Muslims whether for those who considered it a Shari’ah evidence or for those who did not consider it a Shari’ah evidence, provided the doubted evidence is existent, such as in the case of the previous evidences which we refuted their consideration as the Shari’ah evidences.