4.1 Upotovu wa Usekula kama Itikadi
4.1 The Corruption of Secularism as a Creed
Katika mtazamo wa Magharibi, neno creed (kwa Kifaransa: credo) linahusishwa na dhana kadhaa hasi. Kwa Mmagharibi, creed ni sawa na imani za kidini zinazotokana na chanzo cha kimetafizikia, ambacho kinamlazimisha mtu kuamini mambo bila ushahidi. Kwa Mmagharibi, creed pia inamaanisha kukubali fikra za hali halisi ya kimaumbile, iliyo juu au zaidi ya ulimwengu wa asili, bila ushahidi wala hoja.
In the Western perception, the word creed (French: credo) is associated with a number of negative concepts. For the Westerner, creed is synonymous with religious beliefs that emerge from a metaphysical source, which compels man to believe in things without evidence. To the Westerner, creed also implies an acceptance of the mind of the supernatural reality, that is above or beyond the natural world, without evidence or reasoning.
Imani inafafanuliwa na Jacqueline Russ katika Kamusi yake ya Falsafa (Kifaransa: Dictionnaire de philosophie) kama "...kwa mtazamo wa kimaadili, ni imani ya kiakili lakini isiyoweza kuthibitishwa inayohusu kuwepo kwa Mungu, kutokufa kwa roho na uhuru... kwa mtazamo wa kidini, ni mwelekeo wa kiroho kuelekea ufunuo na uhalisia wa kimafundisho (usiothibitishwa, bila kuzingatia kuvumilia maoni mengine)." Hivyo, ni lazima tupime upotovu wa mtazamo wa kiakili wa Magharibi kuhusu dhana ya itikadi na kiini chake, kabla ya kubainisha upotovu wa itikadi yenyewe ya Magharibi.
Faith is defined by Jacqueline Russ in her Dictionary of Philosophy (French: Dictionnaire de philosophie) “...from the moral perspective, it is the rational but unprovable belief related to the existence of God, immortality of souls and freedom... from the religious perspective, it is the spiritual orientation towards revelation and dogmatic reality (unproven with no consideration to tolerate other views).” Thus, we must evaluate the corruption of the Western intellectual view about the concept of creed and its essence, before clarifying the corruption of Western creed itself.
Katika hali yake halisi, imani (aqidah) humpa mwanadamu uthibitisho thabiti kuhusu masuala yanayounda mawazo ya msingi. Uthibitisho huu unaweza kuhusiana na dini au usihusiane nayo, yaani imani ya Muumba na Siku ya Kiyama. Wakomunisti wanaamini, yaani wanathibitisha kwa uhakika, kutokuwepo kwa Mungu na asili ya ulimwengu kuwa ya kimaada. Waislamu wanaamini, yaani wanathibitisha kwa uhakika, kuwepo kwa Mungu na kwamba uumbaji una Muumba. Kwa hiyo, uthibitisho wa uhakika ndio msingi wa kuzingatiwa kwa imani. Hili halitegemei asili ya uthibitisho wenyewe, iwe ni wa kidini au wa kutokuwa wa kidini. Uhakika unaweza kuwepo tu kwa ushahidi wa anayeuthibitisha. Kwa hiyo, imani ni uthibitisho wa uhakika wa ushahidi, bila kujali asili ya ushahidi unaotegemewa na anayeuthibitisha.
In its reality, creed grants human beings decisive affirmation over the issues that form fundamental thoughts. This affirmation may or may not be connected to religion i.e. the belief in the Creator and the Day of Resurrection. Communists believe, i.e. affirm decisively, in the absence of God and the materialistic nature of the universe. Muslims believe, i.e. affirm decisively, in the existence of God and the nature of creation having a Creator. So, decisive affirmation is the basis for consideration of creed. This is irrespective of the nature of the affirmation itself, as to whether it is religious or areligious. The decisiveness can only be with evidence by the one who affirms it. Accordingly, the creed is the decisive affirmation of the evidence, regardless of the nature of the evidence relied on by the one who affirms it.
Hapa tunakabiliana na suala la ushahidi, kwani Magharibi inaweka kikomo cha uthibitisho wa ushahidi kwa sayansi peke yake. Dominique Morin anasema katika kitabu chake Dieu Existe-t-il? (Je, Mungu Yupo?), "Ikiwa jambo linahusu uwepo wa Mungu, wanafalsafa na wanatheolojia wa Kikristo wamekubaliana kwamba neno ushahidi, ambalo hakika katika ulimwengu wetu limeunganishwa na usahihi wa sayansi, halifai. Hivyo, wengi, kama Thomas Aquinas, wanapendelea kuzungumzia njia za kumfikia Mungu." Papa wa zamani Benedict XVI, Joseph Aloisius Ratzinger, alibainisha katika kitabu chake, Introduction to Christianity (kwa Kijerumani: Einfuhrung in das Christentum), "Je, dhamiri ya Kikristo haijakubali, kwa kiasi kikubwa—bila kujua—mtazamo kwamba imani kwa Mungu ni kitu cha kibinafsi?" Kuweka kikomo cha ushahidi kwa uzoefu wa kisayansi peke yake ni makosa. Kwa kweli, ushahidi maana yake ni kile kinachoongoza kwenye kile kinachohitajika au kufikia ufahamu wa mambo. Ushahidi ni mbinu iliyothibitishwa ya kuthibitisha usahihi wa kauli moja au dhana moja. Ushahidi ni maarifa yanayohitajika ili kujua maarifa mengine. Hii ndiyo maana ya ushahidi kwa watu wote. Hakuna tofauti katika kufafanua ushahidi kati ya kauli za Waislamu na za Mmagharibi. Katika kitabu chake Kitab Al-Kulliyat (cjLK1I), mwanazuoni Mwislamu Abul Baqaa' Al-Kafaw alisema: "Dalili (JaUI) ni kile kinachoongoza kwenye kile kinachohitajika. Kinachokusudiwa na kumaanishwa nayo ni kuthibitisha... kinachokusudiwa na kumaanishwa na ishara yake ni kile kinachothibitishwa. Moshi unaitwa dalili ya moto. Hivyo neno dalili hutumika kwa kila kitu kinachojulikana kwa kile ambacho dalili inaonyesha, iwe ni mambo yanayoonekana au mambo ya Sharia, iwe ni yenye hakika au isiyo na hakika..." Mmagharibi, Mholanzi H. Willemsen, alisema katika Kamusi yake ya Falsafa (kwa Kidenmark: Woordenboek Filosofie), "Ushahidi wa kauli yoyote ni mbinu inayothibitisha usahihi wake..." Mtu wa Magharibi, mwanamke Mfaransa Jacqueline Russ, katika Kamusi yake ya Falsafa (kwa Kifaransa: Dictionnaire De Philosophie), alisema: "Ushahidi ... ni mchakato ambao kwa huo uhalali wa dhana unathibitishwa." Kwa hiyo, ushahidi ni kitu ambacho kwacho inawezekana kuthibitisha kitu kingine. Huu ndio ushahidi kwa maana ya uhalisia wake miongoni mwa binadamu wote. Kuhusu hali ya kuwa wa kisayansi, au wa kiakili, au wa kimantiki, au wa kiintuitive, au wa kihisia, au chochote kingine zaidi ya hayo, hilo ni suala la sifa zake na muundo wake, si suala la kiini chake. Kwa maneno mengine, kile kinachoongoza kwenye kile kinachohitajika ndicho ushahidi. Kuzingatia kwake kwamba kinatokana na sayansi, au akili, au hisia, ndani ya maelezo ya kile kinachoongoza, hakukiondoi kamwe kuwa ushahidi katika kiini chake na uhalisia wake.
Herein rises an issue related to evidence as the West restricts the indication of evidence to science alone. Dominique Morin says in his book Dieu Existe-t-il? (God Exists), “If the matter is related to the existence of God, Christian philosophers and theologians have agreed that the word evidence, which is definitely in our world connected to the accuracy of science, is inappropriate. Thus, many, like Thomas Aquinas, prefer to speak of the ways to reach God.” The former Pope Benedict XVI, Joseph Aloisius Ratzinger noted in his book, Introduction to Christianity (German: Einfuhrung in das Christentum), “Has not Christian consciousness acquiesced to a great extent—without being aware of it—in the attitude that faith in God is something subjective.” The restriction of evidence to that of scientific empiricism is wrong. In fact, evidence means that which guides to what is needed or the arrival at the comprehension of issues. Evidence is the affirmed methodology for the validity of one of the statements or one of the hypotheses. Evidence is the necessary knowledge to know another knowledge. This is the meaning of evidence amongst all peoples. There is no difference in defining the evidence between the sayings of the Muslims and the Westerner. In his book Kitab Al- Kulliyat (cjLK1I); the Muslim Aalim, Abul Baqaa' Al-Kafaw said: idence (JaUI) is that which guides to what is needed. What is intended and meant by it is the evidencing ... what is intended and meant by its indication is that which is evidenced. The smoke is termed as the evidence of the fire. Thus the term evidence i.e. evidence is called upon everything known by what the evidence indicates, whether it is tangible or Shariah matters, whether it is definite or indefinite...” The Westerner, the Dutchman, H. Willemsen, said in his Dictionary of Philosophy (Danish: Woordenboek Filosofie), “Evidence of any statement is the method that affirms its validity...” The Westerner, the French women, Jacqueline Russ in her Dictionary of Philosophy (French: Dictionnaire De Philosophic) said, “The evidence...is the process by which the validity of hypothesis is established.” Thus evidence is something by which it is possible to establish something else. This is the evidence in terms of its reality amongst all human beings. As for the condition of being scientific or rational or logical or intuitive or emotional or other than that, it is the subject of its characteristics and constitution, not the subject of its essence. In other words, that which guides to what is needed, is evidence. The consideration of it arising from science or reason or emotion, within the description of that which guides, never stops it from being an evidence in its essence and reality.
Kwa kweli, kuhusiana na sifa yoyote moja au zaidi kati ya sifa zake, ushahidi huonyesha tu muundo wake na kubainisha chanzo cha kuundwa kwake. Hata hivyo, hilo halizuii kuwa ushahidi kwa asili yake. Kwa hiyo, iwe wanafalsafa, wanatheolojia au wanafikra wa Kimagharibi wanauita ushahidi kuwa njia, dalili, kiashiria au ishara, hilo halibadilishi uhalisia na kiini cha ushahidi. Vilevile haijalishi kama wanatheolojia wanauchukulia dhamiri kuwa msingi, wapragmatiki wanauchukulia manufaa, wanamaadili wanauchukulia sifa ya kimaadili, au wanaakili wanauchukulia akili kuwa msingi wa imani na itikadi. Wote wanaamini katika ushahidi kwa msingi wake, ingawa wanatofautiana kuhusu aina ya ushahidi na asili yake.
Indeed, with respect to any one or more of its characteristics, the evidence only expresses its constitution and identifies its source of formation. However, it does not prevent it from being an evidence per se. Therefore, whether the philosophers, theologians or Western thinkers name the evidence as method, denotation, indicator or sign, does not change the reality and essence of evidence. It is also regardless of whether the theologians consider conscience, pragmatists consider benefits, moralists consider the moral attribute or rationalists consider rationalism as the basis of belief and creed. All of them believe in evidence essentially, although they differ over the type of evidence and its nature.
Ikiwa jambo hili litaeleweka, basi kosa lililopo katika ngazi ya utafiti na uchunguzi huko Magharibi kuhusu itikadi linaweza kuonekana. Utafiti haupaswi kujikita katika asili ya kuthibitisha itikadi kwa ushahidi au kwa kitu kisicho ushahidi. Hii ni kwa sababu hali halisi ya itikadi miongoni mwa binadamu ni kwamba inaweza tu kuthibitishwa kwa ushahidi. Hivyo basi, utafiti unapaswa kujikita katika usahihi wa ushahidi ambao itikadi inautegemea. Je, lazima iwe ya kisayansi, ya kimantiki, ya kiakili au ya kitu kingine chochote cha kiakili, ikizingatiwa kwamba uthibitisho wa uhakika miongoni mwa binadamu wote unaweza tu kutokana na ushahidi? Je, inafaa kudhani kwamba ushahidi wote unafikia uthibitisho wa uhakika au la? Hili ni katika ngazi ya utafiti.
If this is comprehended, the error at the level of study and inquiry in the West for the creed can be seen. The study must not be devoted to the nature of affirmation of evidence or other than evidence. This is because the reality of creed amongst humankind is that it can only be affirmed by evidence. The research must therefore be devoted to the validity of the evidence upon which the creed depends. Does it have to be scientific, rationalistic, logical or rational something else, considering that decisive affirmation amongst the whole of humankind can only come from the evidence? Is it appropriate to consider that all evidences achieve the decisive affirmation or not? This is at the level of study.
Sayansi haifai kuwa ushahidi wa itikadi kwa sababu sayansi inahusika tu na mambo yanayoonekana kwa macho na yanayohisika kwa hisi, kwa ajili ya utafiti na majaribio. Hata hivyo, uwepo wa Mwenyezi Mungu hauonekani kwa macho, ingawa unahisika; na uwepo wa pepo, moto wa Jahannam na malaika hauhisiki, kwa hiyo haviwezi kufanyiwa majaribio. Hapo ndipo makosa ya mtazamo wa Kimagharibi kuhusu itikadi yanapodhihirika, kwa upande wa dhana, masharti na hali. Kwa upande wa kile kinachofaa kuwa ushahidi wa kuthibitisha jambo lolote kwa uhakika, yaani ushahidi wa itikadi, ni akili au njia ya kimantiki. Kama tulivyofafanua hapo juu, hii ndiyo njia pekee inayofaa kuwa msingi wa kufikiri kwa binadamu, ambao juu yake hujengwa hukumu, na kwa msingi wake huanzishwa mtazamo kamili wa uwepo wa binadamu na kusudi lake maishani. Kwa hiyo, mtazamo wetu kuhusu itikadi ya Kimagharibi, katika kuthibitisha kutokuwa sahihi kwake na upotovu wake, umejengwa juu ya akili. Umejengwa juu ya njia ya kimantiki ya kuhukumu mambo na masuala. Upotovu wa itikadi ya Kimagharibi umethibitishwa kimantiki, unaonyeshwa na mambo kadhaa, ambayo ni:
Science is not suitable as evidence for creed because science is limited to issues that are tangible and sensed for research and experimentation. However, the existence of God is not tangible, though sensed, whilst the existence of paradise, hellfire and angels is not sensed and so they cannot be subjected to experimentation. Hence the error of the Western view of the creed, in terms of concept, stipulation and condition, becomes apparent. As for what is suitable as evidence for the decisive affirmation of anything, i.e. as evidence for creed, it is the intellect or the rational method. As we have clarified above, it is the only method that is suitable as a basis of thinking for humans, upon which the judgments are built and the comprehensive view of the existence of man and his purpose in life are established. Accordingly, our view towards the Western creed, in terms of establishing its invalidity and corruption is based on the intellect. It is based on the rational method to judge upon things and issues. The distortion of the Western creed is rationally established indicated by a number of aspects, which are:
1- Itikadi ya Magharibi kwa kweli ni matokeo ya hali za kijamii, kisiasa na kihistoria za Magharibi peke yake. Ilijitokeza kama suluhisho la maridhiano kwa mgogoro kati ya Kanisa, kwa upande mmoja, na wanafikra na watawala, kwa upande mwingine. Haikutokana na fikra wala haikujengwa juu ya akili na busara. Ni itikadi ya makubaliano ya wengi ya kutenda kwa mujibu wa itikadi hii, si itikadi ya akili, yaani watu wake hawakuthibitisha kwa hoja za kiakili uhalali wake. Mfano wa hili ni nchini Ufaransa. Sheria ya LaTcite iliwasilishwa kwa kura ya wengi katika Baraza la Wawakilishi (Chambre des deputes). Tarehe 3/7/1905 LaTcite ilipata kura 341 za kuunga mkono na kura 233 za kupinga. Kisha iliwasilishwa kwenye Baraza la Juu la Kutunga Sheria tarehe 6/12/1905 na matokeo yalikuwa kura 181 za kuunga mkono na kura 102 za kupinga. Hivyo, LaTcite ikawa sheria inayowafunga watu, bila kujali uhalali au ubatili wake kwa mtazamo wa kiakili. Basi, sekularismu haina msingi wa kiakili wa kuthibitishwa. Badala yake, hoja zake zote ni za kihistoria tu, kama udhihirisho wa uzoefu wa watu. Upotofu wa hoja hizi hauko siri kwa mtu yeyote mwenye akili timamu. Mtu akisema, ‘Magharibi iliteseka kwa sababu ya dini, na ikakataliwa nayo. Magharibi ilipotenganisha dini na maisha, Magharibi ikafufuka,’ hata hivyo, anaweza kujibiwa kwa kusema, ‘Waislamu walifufuka na kuinuka kwa dini. Walipodhoofika katika kuelewa dini yao, na ilipoondolewa katika maisha yao, wakadhoofika.’ Kwa hiyo, hukumu za kihistoria zinazoonyesha uzoefu wa watu hazifai kuwa ushahidi wa kiakili wa kuthibitisha uhalali wa itikadi. Lazima kuwepo na hoja za kiakili na ushahidi wa busara, na sekularismu haina hivi.
1- The Western creed is in fact a result of the societal, political and historical circumstances of the West uniquely. It has emerged as a compromise solution for the conflict between the Church, on the one hand, and the thinkers and rulers, on the other. It did not result from a thinking nor was it built upon reason and intellect. It is the creed of popular consensus to act upon this creed and it is not the creed of reason, i.e. its people did not establish its evidence rationally for its validity. An example of this is in France. LaTcite was submitted for majority vote in the House of Representatives (Chambre des deputes). In 3/7/1905 LaTcite received 341 votes for and 233 votes against. Then it was submitted to the Upper Legislative House on 6/12/1905 and the result was 181 votes for and 102 votes against. Thus, LaTcite became law binding upon the people, regardless of its validity or invalidity from the intellectual perspective. So, secularism does not have an intellectual justification for it. Instead, all of its justifications are historical alone, as an expression of the experience of people. The corruption of these justifications are not hidden to any sane person. If someone were to say, ‘The West suffered from the religion, and it was declined by it. When the West separated religion from life, the West was revived.’ However, he can be rebutted by saying, ‘Muslims were revived and elevated with the religion. When they became weak in understanding their religion, when it was removed from their life, they declined.’ Therefore, the historical judgments expressing the experience of people is not suitable as a rational evidence to establish the validity of the creed. There must be intellectual justifications and rational evidence, and secularism lacks these.
2- Kwa kuwa usekula ulijitokeza kama suluhisho la maelewano katika mzozo kati ya Kanisa upande mmoja, na wanafikra pamoja na watawala upande mwingine, ulikuwa suluhisho la maelewano, ambapo pande zote mbili zilikubali kuacha sehemu ya madai yao. Katika muktadha huu, tunahitaji utafiti juu ya uhalisia wa itikadi hii kwa upande wa asili yake. Utafiti kama huo ungetufafanulia mantiki inayopingana ya fikra za Magharibi za kisasa. Tunauliza maswali yafuatayo: Kanisa lilikubali kuacha mambo gani? Je, Kanisa lilikubali kuacha sehemu ya dai la kidini, au dai la kikasisi?
2- Since secularism emerged as a compromise solution to the conflict between Church on one side, with thinkers and rulers on the other, it represented a compromise solution, whereby both parties conceded part of their demands. In this context, we are in need of study into the reality of this creed in terms of origin. Such a study would clarify the contradictory logic of modern Western thought for us. We ask the following questions: Over what matters did the clergy concede? Did the clergy concede a part of a religious demand or a clerical demand?
Ikiwa itasemwa kwamba viongozi wa dini walikubali sehemu ya madai ya kidini, hilo linathibitisha kwamba dini kwa kweli ina uhusiano na maisha. Basi katika kesi ya madai ya kidini si sahihi kutenganisha dini na maisha. Hili lingeonyesha kosa la imani ya Kimagharibi inayosisitiza kutenganishwa kwa dini. Lakini ikiwa itasemwa kwamba viongozi wa dini walikubali sehemu ya madai yao wenyewe ya kiukasisi, si madai ya kidini, hilo lingemaanisha kwamba dini kwa kweli haina uhusiano wowote na maisha. Hili pia lingebatilisha makubaliano yaliyofikiwa kati ya viongozi wa dini na wanafikra, yaliyoweka sharti la kutenganisha dini na maisha. Hiyo ni kwa sababu ingekuwa makubaliano juu ya mzozo usiokuwepo, kwani katika kesi hii hakungekuwa na uhusiano wa dini na maisha wa kulazimisha sharti la kutenganisha.
If it is said that the clergy conceded part of a religious demand, this affirms that religion has, in fact, a relation to life. So in the case of the religious demand it is not appropriate to separate religion from life. This would show the error of Western creed in insisting on the separation of religion. However, if it is said that the clergy conceded part of its own clerical demands, not religious demands, this would mean that the religion has, in fact, no relation to life. This would also invalidate the agreement that took place between the clergymen and thinkers, stipulating the separation of religion from life. That is because it would be the agreement upon a non-existent dispute, as there would be no relation of religion to life in this case, to compel the condition of separation.
Hapa, mtu anaweza kusema: ‘Dini, kwa mtazamo wa Magharibi, maana yake ni makasisi, kwa kuwa kulikuwepo uhusiano kati ya Kanisa na dini. Kwa hiyo, Magharibi haitofautishi kati ya hivi viwili.’ Hata hivyo, jibu lake lingekuwa: ‘Hili lingebatilisha asili ya usekula kuwa itikadi ya kimataifa, inayofaa kwa wanadamu wote. Hii ni kwa sababu unategemea uzoefu wa Magharibi wa dini, hivyo si sahihi kujumlisha jambo hilo kwa binadamu wote.’ Hii ni kwa upande mmoja. Kwa upande mwingine, suluhisho la maridhiano ni muafaka wa kuridhiana ambao hauwezi kutumika kubagua kati ya maoni na mawazo. Maridhiano hutumika kwa upatanisho miongoni mwa watu wenye maslahi yanayokinzana. Hata hivyo,
Here, one might say: ‘Religion means the clergy according to the Western perspective, as there existed a connection between the Church and religion. Accordingly, the West does not differentiate between both.’ However, the rebuttal would be: ‘this would invalidate the nature of secularism being a universal creed, appropriate for all of humankind. This is because it is based on the Western experience of religion and so it is not suitable to generalize upon the whole of humanity.’ This is from one aspect. From another aspect, the compromise solution is a compromising conciliation that cannot be used to discriminate between opinions and thoughts. Compromise is deployed for conciliation amongst peoples with conflicting interests. However,
hukumu juu ya wazo hufichua sifa yake kuwa ni batili na potofu, au sahihi na halali. Akili timamu haikubali kuunganisha kweli na uongo, nuru na giza, katika maridhiano ya kuafikiana.
judgment upon a thought reveals its characteristic as either being invalid and wrong, or correct and valid. A sound mind does not accept combining truth and falsehood, light and darkness, in a compromising conciliation.
Kwa hiyo, sekularism kwa kweli ni suluhisho la maelewano kati ya makundi mawili yanayopingana. Kundi la kwanza ni wale wanaokataa dini, wakijipa mamlaka ya kuafikiana na mawazo ya kiakili (rationalist). Kundi la pili ni wale wanaoshikilia dini, wakijipa mamlaka ya kukubali kupunguza msimamo wa kidini. Hii inathibitisha kwamba sekularism iliibuka kama matokeo ya maridhiano ya kibinadamu, kama suluhisho la maelewano kati ya pande mbili zinazopingana. Suluhisho au upatanisho wa namna hiyo haukutokea kati ya fikra halisi za kiakili na dini zenyewe. Hili linaonyesha kwamba mgongano kati ya dini na fikra za kiakili unaendelea kuwepo hadi leo. Pia linaonyesha kwamba fikra za Magharibi hazikutoa suluhisho la kiakili kwa chanzo cha tatizo. Hili linaweza kuonekana katika mijadala kuhusu dini na uhusiano wake na siasa mpaka leo ndani ya jamii ya Magharibi.
Accordingly, secularism is in fact a compromise solution amongst two conflicting groups. One group is of those who reject religion, giving themselves the authority to compromise rationalist opinion. The other group is of those who adhere to religion, giving themselves the authority to concede religious opinion. This affirms that secularism emerged as a result of compromising conciliation between men, as a compromise resolution between two conflicting parties. Such a resolution or reconciliation did not occur between the actual rationalist thought and religion in themselves. This indicates that the conflict between religion and rationalist thought continues to exist until this day. This also indicates that Western thought did not provide a rational solution to the root of the problem. This can be observed in debates about religion and its relation to politics until this day within the Western society.
Inaweza kusemwa hapa: ‘Magharibi imemaliza mjadala kwa kutouchunguza, na badala yake imeifanya mada ya tatizo kuwa maslahi ya watu binafsi.’ Jibu la hoja hii ni: ‘Suala la kuwepo kwa Muumba, Mola, na dini inayopanga mambo ya mwanadamu ni suala la ubinadamu kwa ujumla, wala si suala la kibinafsi. Linamhusu mwanadamu katika hadhi yake ya kuwa binadamu, wala si katika hadhi yake ya kuwa mtu binafsi. Ushahidi kwamba suala hili ni suala la ubinadamu ni kwamba linawahusu binadamu wote kwa pamoja. Ndiyo sababu ubinadamu umelipa umuhimu tangu zama za kale hadi leo. Kwa hiyo dini si suala la kibinafsi. Hata hivyo, ni Magharibi ndiyo inayotaka kulifanya suala la kibinafsi, ilhali ni suala la binadamu wote.’
It may be said here: ‘The West has ended the dispute by not examining it and made the subject of the problem the interests of individuals instead.’ The rebuttal to this is: ‘The issue of the existence of the Creator, the Lord and a religion that organizes the affairs of man is an issue of humanity in general and not an individualistic issue. It is related to man in his capacity as a human and not in his capacity as being an individual. The evidence for the issue being an issue of humanity is that it concerns the humans as a whole. It is this that is given importance by humankind, since ancient times until the present day. Thus religion is not an individualistic issue. However, it is the West that wants to make it an individualistic issue, even though it is an issue for all of humanity.
Zaidi ya hayo, ni Magharibi inayofanya dini kuwa jambo la mtu binafsi tu, ikikimbia tatizo. Hivyo basi Magharibi haiwezi kulitatua tatizo kwa undani, ama kwa kukubali dini na nafasi yake katika maisha na jamii, au kwa kutetea kuondolewa kabisa kwa dini kwa kuikataa. Badala yake, Magharibi ilichagua maelewano ya kati ya kutenganisha dini na maisha, na kuiacha kama suala la imani na kutokuamini Mungu kwa watu binafsi. Hili linaonyesha kwamba Magharibi haikutatua tatizo kweli, bali ilikimbia tatizo. Kukimbia kutatua tatizo kunamaanisha kwamba tatizo bado linaendelea kuwepo. Hili ndilo lililomsukuma mwanasosholojia maarufu, Peter L. Berger, ambaye alikuwa mmoja wa watetezi wakubwa wa usekula katika miaka ya 1960, kueleza katika kitabu chake, The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics, kwamba: "Ingawa neno "nadharia ya usekulishaji" linarejelea kazi za miaka ya 1950 na 1960, wazo kuu la nadharia hiyo kwa kweli linaweza kufuatiliwa hadi Enlightenment. Wazo hilo ni rahisi: Usasa bila shaka unaleta kupungua kwa dini, katika jamii na katika akili za watu binafsi. Na ni wazo hili kuu hasa ambalo limeonekana kuwa si sahihi. Ni kweli kwamba usasa umekuwa na baadhi ya athari za usekulishaji, zaidi mahali pengine kuliko pengine. Lakini pia umechochea harakati zenye nguvu za kupinga usekulishaji." Kwa hiyo, swali kuhusu uhusiano wa dini na maisha bado linaendelea kuwepo, ambalo fikra za Magharibi bado hazijalisoma wala kutoa jibu lake.
Moreover, it is the West that makes religion a matter for individual concern alone, fleeing away from the problem. Thus the West is incapable of solving the problem radically, either by acknowledging religion and its role in life and society, or by advocating the elimination of religion completely, by denying it. Instead of that, the West chose the conciliatory compromise of separating religion from life, leaving it as an issue of belief and atheism for individuals. This reveals that the West did not actually solve the problem, fleeing away from the problem instead. Fleeing away from solving the problem means the problem still persists and continues to exist. This is what prompted the famous sociologist, Peter L. Berger, who was one of the most vocal advocates of secularism in the 1960s, to express in his book, The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics, “Although the term “secularization theory” refers to works from the 1950s and 1960s, the key idea of the theory can indeed be traced to the Enlightenment. That idea is simple: Modernization necessarily leads to a decline of religion, both in society and in the minds of individuals. And it is precisely this key idea that has turned out to be wrong. To be sure, modernization has had some secularizing effects, more in some places than in others. But it has also provoked powerful movements of counter-secularization.” Accordingly, the question about the relation of religion to life still continues to exist, which the Western thinking has yet to study and provide an answer for.
3- Itikadi ya kutenganisha dini na maisha inajipinga yenyewe. Hii ni kwa sababu inaithibitisha dini na pia inaikanusha dini kwa wakati mmoja. Kwa kutetea kutenganishwa kwa dini na maisha, inaithibitisha dini, kwa kuwa kutenganishwa kati ya mambo mawili kunakubali na kuthibitisha kuwepo kwa vyote viwili. Kutengana hutokea kati ya vitu viwili vilivyopo. Kutengana hakutokei kati ya vitu viwili visivyokuwepo, wala kati ya kitu kilichopo na kisichokuwepo. Kuhusu kukanusha dini baada ya kuithibitisha, hilo linaeleweka kutokana na uhalisia wa dini yenyewe. Dini ni imani kwa Muumba na kwa Siku ya Ufufuo na Hukumu. Imani kwa Muumba inalazimu kukubali sifa kamilifu za Muumba kama vile uwezo, utawala, kusimamia mambo yote na ujuzi kamili wa kila kitu. Hata hivyo, kutenganisha dini na maisha kunakanusha imani hii. Kunakanusha sifa za Muumba na kukanusha uwezo wake wa kutawala na kusimamia mambo yote. Kwa kuwa dini inalazimu imani katika Siku ya Hukumu, kutenganisha kunalikanusha hilo, kama vile kinavyokanusha matendo kwa ajili ya (siku ya) hukumu. Je, Muumba ndiye atakayehesabiwa kwa yale Anayoamrisha na Anayokataza, au ndiye atakayehesabu yale yanayoamrishwa na kukatazwa, kwa mujibu wa mantiki ya mtu wa Magharibi?
3- The creed of separating religion from life contradicts itself. This is because it both affirms and negates religion at the same time. By advocating the separation of religion from life, it affirms religion, since separation between two matters acknowledges and affirms the existence of both of them. Separation occurs between two existing things. Separation neither occurs between two non-existent things nor between an existing thing and a non-existent thing. As for the negation of religion after its affirmation, it is understood from the reality of religion itself. Religion is a belief in the Creator and in the Day of Resurrection and Judgment. Belief in the Creator mandates acknowledging of the attributes of perfection for the Creator such as ability, governance, managing all the affairs and complete knowledge of everything. However, the separation of religion from life negates this belief. It negates the attributes of the Creator and negates his ability of governance and managing all the affairs. Since religion mandates the belief in the Day of Judgment, the separation negates it, just as it negates the deeds for (the day of) judgment. Should the Creator account upon what He commands and prohibits or is he to account upon what is commanded and prohibited, by the reasoning of Western man?
Zaidi ya hayo, kuthibitisha uwepo wa Muumba kunalazimu kuwa na mtazamo kuhusu uhusiano wake na viumbe. Uhusiano wa Muumba na viumbe lazima ufafanuliwe either na Muumba mwenyewe, au na viumbe. Kwa upande wa viumbe, si sahihi kwao kufafanua uhusiano wao na Muumba kutokana na kutoweza kwao, upungufu wao na mipaka yao. Zaidi ya hayo, viumbe hawana ujuzi kuhusu Mapenzi ya Muumba (Iradathul Khaliq) yanayohusu uumbaji, isipokuwa Muumba mwenyewe awajulishe. Kwa hiyo, kufafanua uhusiano wa Muumba na viumbe ni haki ya Muumba mwenyewe peke yake. Hapa linazuka swali: ni nani mwingine wa kufafanua uhusiano wa Muumba na uumbaji, ikiwa, kwa mujibu wa dhana ya Kimagharibi, dini inapaswa kutenganishwa na mfumo wa Muumba? Ikisemwa kwamba uhusiano huo unafafanuliwa na viumbe, basi huo ni batili, kama tulivyoeleza hapo juu. Ikisemwa kwamba uhusiano huo wa kutenganisha unafafanuliwa na Muumba mwenyewe, basi ushahidi wake uko wapi? Ikiwa kuna ushahidi wowote wa dhana ya Kimagharibi, basi ni usemi wa Biblia, "Mpeni Kaisari vilivyo vya Kaisari, na Mungu vilivyo vya Mungu" (Kigiriki: AttoSote ouv tci Kaioapog Kafoapi koi to toO OeoO to) 0£(jj). Hata hivyo, ushahidi huu ni batili kwa sababu si ushahidi wa kiakili kwa wanadamu wote kwa ujumla. Hii ni kwa sababu ushahidi huo unaweza, kwa upeo wake, kuhalalisha kutenganisha dini na maisha kwa Wakristo tu, kulingana na uelewa wao uliopotoka wa Ukristo. Lakini hilo halihalalishi kutenganisha dini kwa wengine kama Waislamu, kwa kuwa Uislamu unampa Kaisari (mtawala) na mali zake zote kwa Allah (swt). Kwa hiyo, si sahihi kwa usekula kuwa itikadi ya binadamu wote kwa ujumla.
Furthermore, the affirmation of the Creator mandates a view about his relationship with the created. The relation of the Creator with the creation is to be either defined by the Creator, or by the creation. As for the creation, it is not suitable to define its relationship with the Creator due to its inability, deficiency and limitation. This is in addition to its lack of knowledge about the Will of the Creator (Iradathul Khaliq) pertaining to creation, unless the Creator Himself informs the creation. Accordingly, defining the relationship of the Creator with the creation is exclusive to the Creator Himself alone. Here the question arises: who else is to define the relationship of the Creator with creation, if, according to the Western conception, there is to be a separation of religion, or the system of the Creator? If it is said that the relationship is defined by the created, then it is invalid, as we have clarified above. If it is said that such a relationship of separation is defined by the Creator himself, then where is the evidence for it? If there is any evidence of the Western conception, then it is the expression of the Bible, “Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God’s (Greek: AttoSote ouv tci Kaioapog Kafoapi koi to toO OeoO to) 0£(jj).” However, this evidence is invalid because it is not rational evidence for all of humanity, universally. This is because the evidence may give legitimacy to separating the religion from the life for Christians at best, according to their distorted understanding of Christianity. However, this does not justify the separation of religion for others like Muslims, as Islam renders Caesar (the ruler) and all his possessions to Allah (swt). Thus, it is invalid for secularism to be the creed of humanity as a whole.
4- Itikadi ya usekula ni itikadi inayopingana pia na silika ya asili ya binadamu. Kwa kukiri kwa njia ya dhahiri dini, inakubali silika ya kuitakasa dini, ambayo ni ya asili na ya kizaliwa kwa binadamu. Kwa kuikubali dini, usekula unakubali umuhimu wa kutosheleza silika ya kutakasa. Licha ya hayo, usekula kisha unaizuia kutosheleza huko kwenye utakasaji na ibada ya mtu binafsi peke yake. Hata hivyo, silika ya kutakasa haionekani katika ibada ya mtu binafsi peke yake. Itaonekana pia na kudhihirika katika mambo mengine yote ambayo mtu hana uwezo nayo na anayahitaji. Kwa kuwa usekula unatenganisha dini na maisha, unakanusha uhalisia wa udhaifu na uhitaji wa binadamu, yaani unakataa na kukana sehemu ya muundo wa silika ya binadamu.
4- The creed of secularism is a creed that also contradicts the instinctual nature of humans. By implicitly acknowledging religion, it acknowledges the instinct of religious sanctification, which is natural and instinctive in humans. By acknowledging religion, secularism acknowledges the necessity of satiating the instinct of sanctification. Despite that, secularism then restricts that satiation to individual sanctification and worship alone. However, the instinct of sanctification does not appear in individual worship alone. It will also appear and be apparent in all other matters in which one is incapable and needy. Since secularism separates religion and life, it negates the reality of human incapability and need, i.e. it rejects and denies a part of the human instinctive constitution.
Usekula ulipunguza dini kuwa uhusiano wa kibinafsi na wa kujitenga kati ya Muumba na viumbe. Usekula unakiri kwa upande mmoja kwamba dini ni kwa ajili ya utakaso wa mtu binafsi na ibada, lakini kwa upande mwingine unapuuza hisia za binadamu za kutoweza na upungufu wake katika kusimamia mambo ya pamoja ya wanadamu na utawala. Binadamu, katika kusimamia mambo yake ya maisha, yaani katika kupanga tabia yake inayohusiana na kutosheleza silika zake na mahitaji ya kiumbe chake, huonyesha tofauti, kutofautiana na mkinzano. Hili linaonyesha kwamba binadamu hana uwezo na anahitaji Muumba, Yule anayesimamia mambo yote. Kwa msingi huo, dini au mfumo ulioamriwa na Muumba, Yule anayesimamia mambo yote, ni miongoni mwa silika za binadamu. Muumba peke yake ndiye anayejua siri za binadamu, ambayo ndiyo msingi wa kusimamia mambo ya binadamu.
Secularism reduced religion to a personal, individualistic relationship between the Creator and the created. Secularism recognizes on the one hand that religion is for individual sanctification and worship, but on the other hand, it ignores the human feelings of inability and shortcomings in managing the collective affairs of humans and governance. Man in managing his own affairs of life, i.e. in organizing his behavior related to satiating his instincts and organic needs, shows differences, disparity and contradiction. This indicates that man is incapable and is in need of the Creator, the One who manages all the affairs. Accordingly, the religion or the system commanded by the Creator, the one who manages all the affairs, is amongst the human instincts. The Creator alone is the One who knows the secrets of man, which is the basis of managing the affairs of man.
Kwa kumalizia, itikadi ya usekula ni itikadi batili kwa sababu inapingana na akili na silika. Si makosa kusema kwamba itikadi ya usekula, kama inavyojulikana kwa binadamu, ni itikadi ya uongo ambayo msingi wake ni dhaifu, hoja zake ni za juujuu, na jengo lake la kifikra ni dhaifu.
In conclusion, the creed of secularism is an invalid creed because of its contradiction to reason and instinct. We are not wrong to say that the creed of secularism, known by man, is a false creed whose foundation is fragile, whose justifications are superficial and whose intellectual edifice is fragile.