The Legislator (Ash-Shari’) has given the authority to the Ummah, and made the appointment of the Khaleefah by all Muslims. He (swt) has not confined it to a particular group to the exclusion of another group, nor to a particular section to the exclusion of another section, thus the Bay’ah is an obligation on all Muslims:

“Whoever dies while there was no allegiance (Bay’ah) on his neck He dies a death of the days of ignorance (Jahiliyyah).” [Narrated by Muslim from ‘Abdullah Ibn ‘Umar] This applies to every Muslim. It therefore, follows that the prominent figures are not the only people eligible to appoint the Khaleefah to the exclusion of other Muslims. Those eligible to appoint the Khaleefah are not a specific group of people; rather this right belongs to all Muslims without exception, even to the hypocrites (Munafiqeen) and the wrongdoers (Fujjar), so long as they are mature Muslims. This is because the relevant texts came in a general form, nothing else has been reported to specify them except the rejection of the Bay’ah of the child who is under the age of maturity, and therefore they remain general in their scope.

Although, it is not a condition for all the Muslims to exercise this right, eventhough it is their right. Although it is an obligation on them, since the Bay’ah is obligatory, the obligation is one of sufficiency (Fard Kifayah) and not an individual obligation (Fard ‘Ayn). Accordingly, if some of the Muslims performed it the rest of the Ummah would be exempted. Nevertheless, the whole of the Ummah should be enabled to exercise their right of appointing the Khaleefah, regardless of whether they utilised this right or not. In other words, every Muslim should be able to participate in appointing the Khaleefah, by genuinely enabling him to do so. Therefore, the point at issue is in enabling the Muslims to perform that which Allah (swt) has ordained upon them of appointing the Khaleefah in a way that would exempt them of this duty and not the actual exercise of that duty by all the Muslims. This is because the obligation that Allah (swt) ordained on them is to appoint the Khaleefah by the Muslims and by their consent, and not obliged upon all Muslims to appoint him. Two issues could actually arise from this matter: One is that the consent of all the Muslims of his appointment was realised; the other is that the consent of all the Muslims of this appointment was not achieved, although, in both cases, the Muslims were genuinely enabled to exercise this right.

As far as the first issue is concerned, it is not stipulated to have a specific number of those who appoint the Khaleefah. In Actuality any number of Muslims who give their Bay’ah to the Khaleefah, whereby the consent of the Muslims is achieved by their remaining silent, or by pledging allegiance and obedience to him, or by any other similar sign which indicates their approval, can appoint the Khaleefah. Thereupon, the appointed Khaleefah becomes the Khaleefah of all the Muslims and He would be the lawful Khaleefah according to the Shari’ah, even if only five people appointed him. This is because they would be regarded as a valid group able to appoint a Khaleefah. Consent would be achieved through the Muslims remaining silent and pledging obedience or the like, on condition that this should be carried out with absolute flexibility of choice and with the necessary steps taken to enable everyone to voice his (or her) opinion should they wish to do so. If the consent of all the Muslims was not achieved then the appointment of the Khaleefah would not take place unless a group of Muslims undertook the task of appointing him and in so doing the consent of the populace is achieved, i.e. the majority, regardless of the number of that group. In this context, some learned scholars have concluded that: The appointment of the Khaleefah can be carried out if He is given the Bay’ah by the Ahlul Hall Wal Aqd because they - the scholars - regard them as being the group which represents the opinion of the Muslims at large, and those who are able to give the Bay’ah to any man who satisfies the contractual conditions. However, the Bay’ah of the Ahlul Hall Wal ‘Aqd does not actually make the appointment of the Khaleefah a forgone conclusion. Their Bay’ah is by no means a precondition which makes the appointment of the Khaleefah lawful. The Bay’ah is merely a sign indicating that the consent of the Muslims has to be achieved, since they are regarded as the representatives of the Muslims. Any indication that the consent of the Muslims has been realised by the Bay’ah of a Khaleefah makes the appointment legal and binding.

Therefore, the Shar’ai verdict is executed if a group of people appointed a Khaleefah and in so doing the consent of the Muslims was achieved by any indication. It could also be by the Bay’ah of the majority of the Ahlul Hall Wal ‘Aqd or by themselves being the representatives of the Muslims, or by the silence of the Muslims about the Bay’ah of the Khaleefah whom they had given the Bay’ah to. It could also be by the Muslims rushing to pledge allegiance and obedience on the strength of such a Bay’ah, or by any other means or indications so long as they had been fully enabled to voice their opinion. The Shari’ah verdict does not contain any provisions maintaining that such an indication must be arrived at through the Ahlul Hall Wal’Aqd or that they should constitute five or 500 people or more or less, nor that they need be the inhabitants of the capital or the provinces. The Shari’ah rule merely states that with their Bay’ah the consent of the majority of the Muslims is achieved according to any indication that reflects such consent. This means that the right to vote has been guaranteed, and their ability to voice an opinion has not been curtailed.

In this context, “all the of Muslims” means those Muslims living in that country under the rule of the Islamic State, i.e. those who were the subjects of the previous Khaleefah, if the Khilafah was (already) established, or those through whom the Islamic State would be reestablished, and by whose Bay’ah the Khilafah would be contracted if the Islamic State was not established and they had worked towards establishing it so as to resume the Islamic way of life. The Bay’ah of the other Muslims would not be considered as a condition, nor would their consent be considered as such. This is because they would either be outside the authority of Islam, or living in Dar-ul Kufr and unable to join Dar-ul Islam. In either case, they would not have the right to give the Bay’ah of contract but they should give the Bay’ah of obedience. Those who do not submit to the authority of Islam would be considered rebels (Bughat). Those living in Dar-ul Kufr were thus evidently unable to achieve the establishment of the Islamic authority and therefore they cannot now establish it practically or join it immediately. Thus, the Muslims who possess the right to excercise the Bay’ah of contract and those whose consent is conditional for the Khaleefah to be lawfully appointed are the ones through whom the authority of Islam effectively gains its establishment. It would be wrong to say that this is an intellectual matter that has no Shari’ah evidence to back it up with. One cannot say this because this is related to the subject of the verdict (Manat-ul Hukm) and not the verdict itself. Therefore, it is necessary to explain its reality, rather than bring a Shari’ah evidence for it. For instance, the eating of carrion meat is forbidden, now that is the verdict (Hukm). To investigate and determine what constitutes carrion meat would be the subject of the verdict, i.e. the Manat or the subject that the verdict is related to. Thus the Muslims have to establish a Khaleefah constitutes the Shari’ah verdict, and this appointment has to be carried out by consent and choice would be the verdict too, these are what require evidence. Whereas, if we were to ask who constitutes the Muslims by whom the appointment would be carried out and what constitutes the matter which makes consent and choice achievable these would constitute the subject of the verdict (Manat-ul Hukm), i.e. the subject for which the ‘Hukm’ (verdict) had come to deal with. The conformity of the Shari’ah verdict with the subject makes the verdict achievable and accomplished. So the subject that the Shari’ah verdict came for should be investigated by explaining its reality.

It would be incorrect to say that the ManaT-ul Hukm is the reason behind the Hukm (‘illatul Hukm) therefore requiring evidence. This is incorrect because the subject (ManaT) of the verdict is different from the reason (‘illah) behind the verdict; in fact there is a big difference between the subject and the reason. The reason is what initiates the verdict to be initiated, i.e. it is the thing that indicates the intention of the Legislator behind the verdict. Without any doubt, this requires a Shari’ah evidence to indicate and understand the intention of the Legislator for initiating the verdict. As for the subject of the verdict, this is the subject upon which the verdict applies or to which the verdict is related. In other words, it is the issue that the verdict conforms and not its evidence nor its reason (‘illa). It therefore, follows that the ManaT is the thing that the verdict is attached to, i.e. the verdict is brought to deal with it, or solve it. It is not true to say that the verdict is brought because of it, so as to say that it is the reason behind the verdict. Thus, the ManaT of the verdict is the nontextual aspect of the Shari’ah verdict. To realise it would be other than to realise the reason, for realising the reason would be to understand the text that had come to justify the reason, and this is to actually understand the text (Naqliyyat). This is not the ManaT either, because the ManaT is completely different from the Naqliyyat, as it (ie. the ManaT) is the reality to which the Shari’ah verdict conforms.