The court of the Madhalim (injustices) is the only authority that can decide whether the change in the situation of the Khalifah removes him from the leadership or not, and it is the only authority that has the power to remove or warn him.

The evidence is that the occurrence of any issue from the issues that the Khalifah is removed for and those for which his removal is deserved, is a complaint from the injustices, and so it must be removed. And in the same manner it is one of the issues that require confirmation, and so it is imperative to be established in front of a judge. Since the court of Madhalim (injustices) is the one which rules to remove the injustices, and its judge is the one who has the power to confirm the injustice and rule upon it, accordingly the court of Madhalim decides whether any of the previous ten circumstances have occurred or not, and whether the Khalifah is removed.

However, if the Khalifah is afflicted by any of the circumstances and removes himself, then the issue is closed, and if the Muslims see that it is necessary for him to be removed due to this situation occurring and he disagrees with them, then the issue is referred to judgement due to the words of Allah (swt)

“And if you disagree over anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger.” (TMQ 4:59); in other words, if you and the people of authority disagreed, and this is a disagreement between the person of authority and the Ummah, and to refer it to Allah (swt) and His Messenger (saw) is to refer it to judgement, or in other words, the court of the Madhalim.

The Madhalim court has the power to limit the period of notice to remove the mastery over him, or the period of grace for freeing him from imprisonment, during which the temporary leader would work, and after if the Khalifah then could carry out his powers without being under the mastery of others or imprisoned, then the work of the temporary leader would end. If the mastery over him or imprisonment did not end, then the court would rule to remove him, and the temporary leader would begin the process of appointing the new Khalifah. 

The issues which alter the state of the Khalifah and ,therefore, remove him from the Khilafah are three:

a. If one of the contracting conditionsof the leadership of the State becomes deficient, such as if he apostatises, or commits flagrant sin, or becomes mad, or anything similar. This is because these are from the conditions of contracting, and the conditions of continuation.

b. The incapability to execute the duties of the Khilafah, for any reason whatsoever.

c. Coercion over him which makes him unable to independently act in the interests of the Muslims according to his opinion in agreement with the Shari’ah. So if an overpowering force could subdue him to the point that he became unable to govern the affairs of the subjects by his opinion alone according to the Shari’ah rules, he is considered legally incapable of executing the duties of the State, in which case he would be removed from the Khilafah. This could occur in two situations:

The first situation: For an individual or group of individuals from his advisors to hold sway over him to the point they began to take full control of running the affairs. If it was believed that he could be liberated from their influence, he is admonished for a specific time, and if he does not remove their influence, then he is removed. And if it was not believed that he could be liberated, he is removed immediately.

The second situation: For him to become a prisoner in the hands of an overpowering enemy, either literally or by his submission to the influence of the enemy. This situation is evaluated – if it was hoped he could be liberated, then there is a delay until no such hope remains, and if there were no hope in his liberation, then he is removed; if there was no hope in his liberation, then he is removed immediately.

The proof for this is the texts that have been related in regards to the conditions of the Khalifah, since these texts indicate that these conditions are conditions for continuation and not simply conditions for taking the position alone. When the Messenger (pbuh) said

 » لَنْ ي فُْلِحَ قَ وْمٌ وَلَّوْا أَمْرَهُمُ امْرَأَة «

“Never will succeed such a nation that makes a woman their leader” (reported by Al-Bukhari from Abu Bakrah), his words included the ruling, so as long as the person is a leader, he could not be a woman; so if a man who was a ruler became a woman, due to any reason, then he would have lost this condition and it would be obligatory to remove him immediately. In the same manner, when Allah (swt) said

“O you who have believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger (pbuh) and those in authority among you.” (TMQ 4:59), His (swt) words “Among you” next to “those in authority” clearly means that the person of authority must be an adherent of Islam as long as he is a person of authority. So if the person of authority became someone not from amongst us, in other words, became a disbeliever, then this characteristic which the Quran stipulated for the person of authority would be lost - the loss of the condition of being Muslim - at which point he becomes removed from this position of authority since it is not correct for him to be a person of authority while he is not from amongst us, in other words, not a Muslim. And the same applies to all the texts which have been related in regards to the conditions of the Khalifah; they are comprehensive texts which encompass the perpetual characteristics that are necessary for the one described, which indicates that they are conditions of continuation and not simply conditions for taking the position alone. Based upon that, the conditions for the contracting of the Khilafah are also the conditions for removing him, since their presence is a condition for the contracting of the Khilafah, and a condition for its continuation due to the generality of the text, and their loss means the loss of its continuation, and so it is prohibited for the person to remain in their position. This is the proof for paragraph “a” of the article.

As for paragraph “b”, its evidence is that the contract of the Khilafah is over the execution of its duties; so if he becomes incapable to execute what he was contracted upon, it becomes obligatory to remove him since he has become like one who in reality is not there. Additionally, due to his inability to execute the actions which are commissioned to him as Khalifah, the issues of the Deen and the interests of the Muslims would be suspended, and this is an evil that must be removed, and it cannot be removed except by his removal so as to be replaced by someone else. His removal in this situation would become mandatory. It should be known that this is not linked to a specific reason; rather anything which afflicted him leading to his incapacity in executing his actions necessitates his removal. If it does not make him incapable, then he is not removed, and for this reason it cannot be said that losing limbs from his body necessitates removal or not, in the same way, it cannot be said that if he is afflicted by a specific illness, it necessitates his removal or not. This is since there is no text regarding this at all; rather the Shari’ah rule is that the one incapable of executing the actions which they have been commissioned for necessitates his removal, whatever the reason for this incapacity. This is not specific for the Khalifah, rather it is general and applies to everyone who is commissioned to an action, irrespective of whether he was appointed as a ruler such as a governor or as an employee such as a department manager; his incapacity necessitates his removal.

The proof for paragraph “c” is the same as the proof for paragraph “b”. That is because the incapacity to execute the actions that have been commissioned to him as the Khalifah is of two types: literal incapacity and legal incapacity. Literal incapacity is when he is physically incapable, in other words, the loss of the physical capability to execute the actions, and this is what was discussed in paragraph “b”. Legal incapacity is when he is physically able to execute the actions, but he is incapable of freely acting to undertake the actions, and so the rule of literal incapacity would apply to him, since he is unable to undertake the execution of the actions which have been commissioned to him by himself, due to his incapability of freely acting in the affairs by himself, and so he becomes like the one who is absent; for this reason, it is necessary to remove him. This has two situations: the first is being confined, and the second is being overpowered.

As for the situation of confinement, it is when someone from his assistants takes control over him, and takes full control of implementing the issues while preventing him from dealing with them, and the one in control is the one who deals with the position of the Khilafah, and so the Khalifah in this situation is considered to be like the one who is confined and is prevented from freely speaking. Since the contract of the Khilafah only proceeds upon the person of the Khalifah, and ,therefore, it is obligatory to attend to the Khilafah himself, this confinement over him or the full control of his assistants means that he has lost the ability to execute the actions that have been commissioned to him; accordingly, he has become like the one who is absent and must be removed. However, this situation will be evaluated; if there was some hope that the influence of the one who took control over the Khalifah could be removed and that his confinement could be broken, then his removal is delayed; if the confinement is not broken, then he is removed.

As for the situation of being overpowered, such as when he becomes a prisoner in the hand of the overpowering enemy and is unable to liberate himself from them, then he is prevented from the contract of the leadership given to him due to his incapability of looking into the affairs of the Muslims. This is the case whether the enemy was from amongst the disbelievers or rebellious Muslims. In this situation, it is obligatory upon all the Ummah to save him either through fighting or paying a ransom, and if there was no hope of this happening, then if he was a prisoner in the hands of the disbelievers, he would be removed immediately. If, however, he was a prisoner of the rebels, the situation would be evaluated; if they had an Imam, and they lost hope in recovering the Khalifah, then he would be removed at the time, and if they did not have an Imam, then he would be considered as the one who is in the situation of confinement, in other words, they would delay for a period, and if his imprisonment was not ended, he would be removed.

These are the proofs for the three paragraphs and in totality, they are the proofs for the conditions of the Khilafah. So, in the same manner, the ability to carry out what has been commissioned to him is a condition. Thus, his incapacity to carry out what he has been commissioned to do entails the loss of this condition. However, it should be noticed that the loss of some of these conditions remove him from the Khilafah, in other words, annul the contract instantly, and the loss of some of them does not remove him from the Khilafah but would mandate his removal. The three situations of apostasy from Islam, being completely mad and becoming a physical prisoner in the hands of the disbelievers with no hope of releasing him, remove him from the Khilafah and he has deposed himself immediately even if his removal was not ruled upon. Therefore, it would mean that it is not obligatory to obey him, and his orders are not implemented and the contract of the Khilafah with him is annulled.

As for if his just character is damaged by the appearance of clear sin, or changing his sex to female or someone whose gender is not clear, or if he became afflicted by temporary madness, or he became literally incapable of carrying out the Khilafah, or he is confined through being influenced by an individual or group from his advisors who take full control of executing the affairs, or he becomes a physical prisoner with the hope of being able to be liberated, or he falls under the influence of the disbelievers who control him; in these seven circumstances, it is obligatory for him to be removed, however, he is not removed except by a judge’s verdict. In all of these seven circumstances, it is obligatory to obey him and execute his orders until the order to remove him is issued; this is because none of these situations results in the automatic annulment of the contract of the Khilafah but rather relies upon the verdict of a judge. The difference between the conditions which if lost result in his removal from the Khilafah and those conditions whose loss does not remove him from the Khilafah but rather mean that he is deserving of being removed, is that those conditions whose loss makes the contract invalid from its origin and quality, in that they return to the contract or are one of its pillars, then the contract would be invalid in this case since if they were not present at the time of the contracting of the Khilafah, then the contract would be invalid and would not have been concluded. If they appear during the period of the Khilafah, the contract would be invalid, and would be void as well. This would occur with conditions such as the condition of Islam, sanity and the capability to carry out the actions individually. As for the conditions whose loss does not make the contract invalid, but rather its basis remains legitimate, but it makes it invalid from its properties, since it does not return to the contract itself, nor to one of its pillars, but rather to a property attached to it. In this case, the contract is not invalid but rather is imperfect. So if all these conditions were not present at the time of contracting the Khilafah, the Khilafah is contracted but it would be imperfect and its annulment would rely upon the verdict of a judge. In the same manner, if they appear during the period of the Khilafah, then the contract would become imperfect, but it would not void itself. Rather, its annulment would rely upon the verdict of a judge. Examples of this would be like the condition of being male, just and whatever is similar. It is from this explanation, that the difference between the changing of the condition of the Khalifah which removes him from the Khilafah, and the changing of condition which does not remove him from the Khilafah but rather makes him deserving of being removed has been arrived at.

The Khalifah does not have a fixed term of office; as long as the Khalifah preserves the Shari’ah and he implements its rules, and is capable of carrying out the affairs of the State, he remains as a Khalifah as long as his situation does not change to one that would remove him from the leadership of the State. If his state changes in this manner, then it is obligatory to remove him from his position at that time.

The proof for this is that the text of the pledge of allegiance mentioned in the narrations came in an absolute form and was not restricted by any specific period. Additionally, the righteously guided Khulafaa’ were each contracted upon a pledge in an absolute form, which was the pledge mentioned in the narrations, and their terms were not fixed. So each one of them undertook the Khilafah from the time they were contracted until they died, which is an Ijma’ of the companions that the Khilafah does not have a fixed term, rather it is absolute, and if someone is contracted, they remain as Khalifah until they die. This is the case unless something occurs to the Khalifah which would remove him, or make it necessary to remove him at that time. But this is not a limit upon the term of the Khilafah, rather it would be something that occurred which led to a deficiency in the conditions of the Khilafah, since the form of the pledge of allegiance which has been determined by the Shari’ah texts and the Ijma’ of the companions made the Khilafah an indeterminate term. However, it is limited by the undertaking of what he was contracted upon, which was the Book and the Sunnah, in other words, the implementation of the Shari’ah; if he did not protect the Shari’ah or did not implement it, then he would display open disbelief which would make resistance against him obligatory upon the Ummah due to the narration

» إِلاَّ أَنْ تَ رَوْا كُفْرًا بَ وَاحًا «

“Unless you witness open Kufr” (agreed upon narration from ’Ubadah b. Al-Samit). 

The Khalifah has the complete right to govern the affairs of the subjects according to his opinion and Ijtihad. He can adopt anything of the permitted issues that he needs to run the affairs of the State and to manage the peoples’ affairs and he is not permitted to contradict any Shari’ah rule for the sake of benefit. For example, he cannot prohibit the single family from having more than one child on the pretext of shortageof foodstuffs, or fix prices on the pretext of preventing exploitation, or appoint a non-Muslim or a woman as a governor on the pretext of looking after the affairs or benefit, nor anything else which contradicts the Shari’ah rules. It is not permitted for him to prohibit a permitted matter and nor to allow a prohibitedmatter.

The Khalifah has the complete right to govern the affairs of the subjects according to his opinion and Ijtihad, but he is not permitted to contradict any Shari’ah rule using benefit as the proof – so he cannot prevent the subjects from importing goods for the sake of protecting the State’s industry, unless it would damage the State’s economy, or fix prices for the sake of preventing exploitation, or force the owner to rent his property for the sake of easing housing, unless there was a pressing emergency for that, nor anything else which contradicts the Shari’ah rules. It is not permitted for him to prohibit something permitted and to make something prohibited permitted.

The proof for this is the words of the Prophet (phuh)

 » الإِمَامُ رَاعٍ وَمَسْ ئُولٌ عَنْ رَعِيَّتِهِ «

“The Imam (ruler) is a guardian and responsible (will be questioned) of his subjects” reported by Al-Bukhari through ’Abd Allah Bin Umar, and also that the rules which the Shari’ah gives to the Khalifah such as his independence of action according to his opinion and Ijtihad in the wealth of the commissioned Bayt Al-Mal (state treasury), and such as the coercion of the people to follow a specific opinion in the single issue, and whatever else is similar. This narration gives the Khalifah the complete right in governing the affairs of the subjects without any restriction, and the rules of the Bayt Al-Mal, adoption, preparation of the Army, appointing the governors, and whatever else which has been given to the Khalifah was given to him in an absolute manner without any restriction, which is proof that he can carry out the governing of the affairs according to how he views without any restriction, and to obey him is obligatory while disobeying him is a sin. However, the undertaking of this governing must be done according to the rules of the Shari’ah; in other words, according to the Shari’ah texts. So the mandatory power, even if it has been given to him absolutely, is restricted by the Shari’ah; in other words, according to the rules of the Shari’ah. For example, he has been granted the power to appoint the governors as he pleases, but it is not correct to appoint the disbeliever, or child, or woman as a governor, since it has been prohibited by the Shari’ah. Another example is that he may permit the opening of embassies of the disbelieving countries in the lands which are under his authority, and he is allowed to do that without any restriction, however it is not correct to permit the opening of embassies for a disbelieving country that wants to use the embassy as a tool for control over the Islamic lands, since the Shari’ah prohibited that. Likewise, he may draft the sections of the budget, and the necessary amounts for each section, but he may not draft a section in the budget for building a dam whose cost is beyond the revenues of the Bayt Al-Mal on the basis that he will collect taxes to pay for it. This is because it is not permitted from the Shari’ah to raise taxes for the sake of something which is not vital such as this dam. In this manner, though he has absolute power in governing the affairs which have been given to him by the Shari’ah, but this absoluteness can only operate according to the rules of the Shari’ah. Additionally, what is meant by the absolute right in the governing of the affairs is not that he can draft laws which he sees as necessary for the governing of the affairs of the lands, but rather the meaning is that he has been given the independence of action to act according to his opinion of how the affairs should be carried out in those issues that have been permitted to him, at which point he drafts the laws in those issues which he has been permitted to undertake according to his opinions, and then it becomes obligatory for the people to obey him since the Shari’ah gave him the independence of action to apply his opinion in those issues and ordered us to obey him. So he may make this opinion into a law which people are obliged by. For example, he has been given the right to manage the affairs of the Bayt Al-Mal according to his opinion and Ijtihad, and order the people to obey him accordingly, so he can draft financial laws for the Bayt Al-Mal at which point it becomes obligatory to obey these laws. Likewise, he has been given the leadership of the Army and the management of its affairs according to his opinion and Ijtihad, and the people are ordered to obey him accordingly. So he may draft laws regarding the leadership of the Army and for its administration at which point it becomes obligatory to obey those laws. Likewise, he has been given the right to manage the interests of the subjects according to his opinion and Ijtihad, and to appoint people to manage the interests and work with them according to his opinion and Ijtihad, and the people have been ordered to obey him accordingly. So he may draft laws for the Administration of the Affairs, and he may draft laws regarding the civil servants at which point it becomes obligatory to obey those laws. He may draft laws for every issue that has been left to the opinion and Ijtihad of the Khalifah in the issues which he has the mandatory powers, and it would be obligatory to obey those laws.

It cannot be argued that these laws are styles, and that the styles are from the permitted issues, and so they are permitted for all the Muslims in which case it is not permitted for the Khalifah to specify specific styles and make them obligatory, since it is making it obligatory to act upon something permitted, and to obligate an act upon something permitted is making the Mubah (permitted) Fard (obligatory), and making the Mubah (permitted) Haram (prohibited) by prohibiting anything other than these styles, and this is not allowed. This cannot be argued, since the permitted are styles from the angle that they are styles, as for the styles of administrating the Bayt Al-Mal, they are permitted for the Khalifah and not every person, and the styles of the leadership of the Army are permitted for the Khalifah and not every person, and the styles of the management of the interests of the subjects are permitted for the Khalifah and not all the people. Therefore, the obligation of acting according to this permitted issue which the Khalifah decided upon, does not make that Mubah (permitted) into a Fard (obligation), rather it only makes obeying the Khalifah obligatory according to what the Shari’ah gave to him from the right to act independently according to his opinion and Ijtihad or in other words, in what he decided from opinion and Ijtihad in order to govern the issues. Since although it was originally permitted, the Khalifah made it mandatory and prohibited anything else, but it is permitted for the Khalifah to govern according to it, since the governing is his issue, and it is not permitted for any other person since this governing is not their issue. Therefore, it is not obligatory to adhere to what the Khalifah adopted from the permitted actions in order to govern the affairs; in other words, what the Shari’ah gave to the Khalifah to act independently in according to his opinion and Ijtihad, from the angle that the Khalifah made something Mubah (permitted) into Fard (obligatory), and made the Mubah into Haram (prohibited), but rather from the angle that the obedience to the Khalifah is obligatory in whatever the Shari’ah gave to the Khalifah to act independently in according to his opinion and Ijtihad. So, every Mubah (permitted issue) that the Khalifah made binding in order to facilitate the governing of the issues becomes obligatory upon every individual from the subjects to adhere to. Based upon this, Umar bin Al-Khattab (ra) registered the departments, and based upon this, the Khulafaa’ laid down specific arrangements for their administrators and for the subjects, and obliged them to work according to these arrangements and prohibited them to work in any other way. Based upon this, it is permitted to draft administrative laws and the remaining laws which are from this type, and obedience to them is obligatory in the same manner as obedience to the rest of the laws, since the obedience is to the Khalifah according to what he orders, from what the Shari’ah has given him in terms of rights and independence to act.

However, this is only in the permitted issues which are for the governing of the affairs, in other words, what has been given to the Khalifah to act independently in according to his opinion and Ijtihad, such as the organisation of the administrations, arranging the soldiers and similar, and not in all the permitted issues but rather only what is permitted for the Khalifah in his capacity as a Khalifah. As for the rest of the rules from the Fard (obligation), Mandub (recommended), Makruh (disliked), Haram (prohibited) and the Mubah (permitted) for all the people, then the Khalifah is restricted in those according to the Shari’ah rule. He is not permitted to stray outside of these at all, due to the words of the Prophet (phuh)

 » مَنْ أَحْدَثَ فِي أَمْرِنَا هَذَا مَا لَيْسَ مِنْهُ فَ هُوَ رَد «

“If anyone introduces in our matter something which does not belong to it, will be rejected”, which is general encompassing both the Khalifah and anyone else.

With regards to that which has not been given to the Khalifah to run according to his opinion and Ijtihad but instead was permitted for all of the people – it is not permitted for him to legislate laws which force people upon it; for example, the techniques of leading the Army are run according to his opinion and Ijtihad, but the people are permitted to wear the clothes that they like according to the appearance they like and so it is not permitted to draft laws which would limit the appearance of their clothes. And they are permitted to build their houses according to any architectural style they like, and so it is not permitted for the Khalifah to draft laws which would limit the styles for their houses, since this is a Mubah (permitted) issue for all the people, so any forcing of the people upon a specific thing in this type of Mubah (permitted) issue at the expense of others, is equivalent to obligating and prohibiting the Mubah, and this is not permitted for the Khalifah. If he did it, obedience to him would not be obligatory and the issue would be raised to the court of the Madhalim (injustices). Rather, his adoption is limited to a single area, which is that in which he has been given the independence to act according to his opinion and Ijtihad. It is permitted for him to make the people adhere to a specific opinion and Ijtihad, and obedience to him is obligatory; in other words, it is permitted for him to draft laws in these issues, in other words, those issues which are permitted for the Khalifah and not for the general people such as the styles of leading the Army and so on. In such issues, he can obligate people to follow his specific opinion and Ijtihad, and it would be obligatory upon them to obey him, in other words, it is permitted for him to draft laws in such issue, while it is not permitted for him to do so at all in anything other than these issues.

Accordingly, it is not permitted for the Khalifah to make prohibited what has been permitted or to make permitted what has been prohibited with the justification that it is for the governing of the affairs. So it is not permitted for him to say that it is not permitted to sell wool to outside of these lands with the justification that it is for the sake of governing the affairs; this is since trade is Mubah (permitted). It is not permitted to make it Haram (prohibited) or to prevent it. But, if selling wool or weapons or anything from amongst the Mubah (permitted) things is confirmed to cause a harm, then selling that thing alone becomes Haram (prohibited) because it leads to a harm, while the object itself remains Mubah (permitted); this is according to the principle taken from when the Prophet (phuh) prohibited the Army from drinking from the wells of Thamud.