3.1 Hofu Isiyo na Msingi
3.1 Unfounded Fear
Kuanguka kwa kituo kikubwa cha biashara cha dunia cha Wall Street na kuanguka kwa taasisi kubwa za kifedha za Wall Street kunaibua kwa namna ya kushangaza picha mbili za Uislamu: picha inayoeneza hofu na kubeba tishio; na picha inayong'aa kwa uhai na ustawi. Mashambulizi ya kigaidi yaliyoliangusha kituo cha biashara cha dunia tarehe 9/11/2001 yamefanya iwe vigumu sana kuonyesha mtazamo halisi wa Kiislamu kuhusu dunia. Licha ya wito uliorudiwa na wanasiasa, wanafalsafa na wanafikra wa kutofautisha kati ya Uislamu kama dini na wale wanaotekeleza mashambulizi hayo, upotoshaji wa taswira ya Uislamu ulikuwa mkubwa sana. Baada ya miaka saba tangu kuongezeka kwa vita dhidi ya ugaidi, soko la fedha la Wall Street lilianguka, lakini safari hii magaidi walikuwa wachumi, walitoka ndani ya mfumo wenyewe, na hawakuwa Waislamu. Matokeo yake, umma umekwama kati ya mitazamo miwili na picha mbili; moja inaonyesha Uislamu kama tishio na nyingine kama faida. Sehemu hii ya kitabu inashughulikia mkanganyiko huu. Si nia ya sehemu hii kujadili kwa urefu suala la ugaidi; hilo litashughulikiwa katika chapisho jingine. Litajadiliwa tu ndani ya mipaka na upeo wa kitabu hiki.
The collapse of the Wall Street’s giant world trade center and the collapse of Wall Street’s giant financial institutions spectacularly raise two images of Islam: An image that spreads fear and carries threat; and an image that shines with life and prosperity. The terrorist attacks which demolished the world trade center on 9/11/2001 have made it very difficult to portray the true Islamic view of the world. Despite the repeated calls by politicians, philosophers, and thinkers to distinguish between Islam as a religion and those who carry the attacks, the distortion of the image of Islam was quite significant. Seven years after heightening the war on terrorism, wall street financial market collapsed, but this time the terrorists were economists and were from within the system, and were not Muslims. As a result, the public is stuck with two views and two images; one portrays Islam as a threat and the other one as a benefit. This part of the book addresses this dilemma. It is not the intention of this part to discuss the issue of terrorism at length; this will be dealt with in another publication. It will only be discussed within the limits and the scope of this book.
Wakati suala la ugaidi linapojadiliwa sana, watu wengi wanaendelea kuweka mpaka madhubuti kati ya Uislamu kama dini ya kimataifa na vitendo vya ugaidi. Kwa tofauti na uwazi wa aina hii, haipaswi kuwepo hofu kubwa kutokana na kuongezeka kwa Uislamu. Hata hivyo, mtazamo huu haukuwa hivyo kwa aliyekuwa Katibu wa Ulinzi, Donald Rumsfeld. Katika moja ya kauli zake, alielezea kuongezeka kwa mfumo wa kisiasa wa Kiislamu kuwa tishio kwa Magharibi kwa ujumla, kama ilivyoripotiwa katika makala iliyochapishwa na The New York Times tarehe 12 Desemba 2005, chini ya kichwa “Maonyo ya Karne ya 21 kuhusu Tishio Lenye Mizizi katika Karne ya 7.” Katika makala hiyo, Bumiller anaonyesha jinsi wanasiasa wengi wa ngazi ya juu wanavyoliona Uislamu kuwa tishio kwa ustaarabu wa Magharibi na demokrasia. Akitumia suala la itikadi kali, msimamo mkali wa kidini na ugaidi, Wayne Kopping alitengeneza mwaka 2006 filamu “Obsession—The Threat of Radical Islam.” Lengo la filamu hiyo lilikuwa kuonya dhidi ya vitisho vinavyodaiwa kuletwa na Uislamu wenye itikadi kali.
When the issue of terrorism is widely debated, many people continue to draw a hard line between Islam as a global religion and the acts of terrorism. With this type of distinction and clarity, there should not be a serious fear from the rising trend of Islam. This view, however, was not the case with the former Defense secretary, Donald Rumsfeld. In one of his comments, he portrayed the rise of the Islamic political system as a threat to the west in general, as reported in an article published by The New York Times on December 12, 2005, under the title “21st-century Warnings of a Threat Rooted in 7th Century.”158 In this article, Bumiller shows how score of high level politicians view Islam as a threat to western civilization and democracy. Capitalizing on the issue of radicalism, fundamentalism, and terrorism, Wayne Kopping produced in 2006 the film “Obsession—The Threat of Radical Islam.”159 The purpose of the movie was to warn against the threats presumably posed by radical Islam.
Vita dhidi ya ugaidi pamoja na idadi kubwa ya vyombo vya habari, blogu, tovuti, vipindi vya majadiliano kwenye redio, na machapisho, vimesaidia kuzaa kile kinachofikia kiwango cha "Uislamofobia" katika ngazi ya umma pamoja na ngazi rasmi barani Ulaya na Marekani. Nchini Ufaransa, lilipitishwa azimio dhidi ya wanawake Waislamu kuvaa vazi la kichwa la Kiislamu katika shule za umma. Nchi kadhaa za Ulaya zilipanga sheria dhidi ya wanawake Waislamu kuvaa hijabu. Marekani ilipitisha sheria kadhaa zinazohusiana na usalama, zikiwemo sheria za kuwasifu watu kwa misingi ya kidini au kikabila (profiling), ujasusi, kuchunguza mawasiliano ya simu (wire tapping), Sheria ya Patriot, na sheria nyingine, ambazo zote zimehusishwa kwa njia isiyo ya moja kwa moja na Waislamu.
The war against terrorism and the myriad of media outlets, blogs, web pages, radio talk shows, and publication have helped create what amounts to an “Islamophobia” at the public as well as the official levels in Europe and the USA. In France, a resolution was passed against wearing Islamic head dress by Muslim women in public schools. Several European countries contemplated a law against Muslim women wearing the veil. The United States adopted several security related laws including profiling, spying, wire tapping, patriot law, and other laws, all of which have been indirectly related to Muslims.
Hoja kuu hapa ni kwamba hofu kubwa imeingiza giza katika mazingira ya Uislamu na uwezekano wa kuenea kwake. Kukabiliana na jambo hili si kazi rahisi, hasa pale utambulisho wa watu wanaofanya baadhi ya mashambulizi mabaya zaidi unapofichuliwa na kubainika kuwa ni Waislamu. Ugaidi wenyewe ni uhalifu wa kutisha; hauwezi kusamehewa, kukubaliwa, au kuhalalishwa kwa namna yoyote ile. Hilo likishasemwa, ni lazima pia iwe wazi kwamba Uislamu kama dini na itikadi kamili si chanzo wala sababu ya ugaidi. Kinyume chake, Uislamu, kama mfumo kamili, unaweza kuwa na nafasi ya maamuzi katika kuondoa ugaidi na mazingira yanayozaa ugaidi.
The point here is that a significant element of fear has clouded the atmosphere of Islam and its potential rise. Dealing with this phenomenon is not a simple task, especially when the identities of people who carry some of the worst attacks are revealed and found to be Muslims. Terrorism as such is a horrible crime; it cannot be condoned or accepted or justified in any way. This is said; it must also be clear that Islam as a religion and a comprehensive ideology is not the cause or reason behind terrorism. On the contrary, Islam, in its capacity as a comprehensive system, can play a decisive role in eliminating terrorism and the environment which breeds terrorism.
Hoja kuu ya kitabu hiki imekuwa kwamba Uislamu, kama itikadi, hufanya kazi kama mfumo mzima. Ili Uislamu uzae matokeo yanayotarajiwa, unahitaji kutekelezwa katika zaidi ya ngazi moja. Hata mifumo ya kiuchumi na kifedha, ambayo imepata idhini kubwa kutoka pande mbalimbali duniani, haitarajiwi kuleta utulivu na ustawi isipokuwa ikiambatana na vipengele vya kijamii, kisiasa na kimaadili vya itikadi hiyo. Ukweli kwamba Uislamu kama mfumo kamili haufuatwi wala kutekelezwa katika ulimwengu wa Kiislamu, unafanya iwe vigumu kuhusisha mwenendo wa jamii duniani kote na Uislamu, iwe katika nyanja za vita au amani. Si jambo la bahati kwamba Uislamu, katika miaka kumi na mitatu ya mwanzo ya kuinuka kwake, uliacha nje sehemu kubwa ya sheria zake, kanuni na taratibu zake. Kwa kweli, kanuni zote zinazohusiana moja kwa moja na mpangilio wa jamii na mwenendo wa kijamii zilishushwa katika miaka kumi ya mwisho ya maisha ya Mtume ﷺ, wakati dola ya Kiislamu ilipoundwa.
The argument throughout this book has been that Islam as an ideology functions as a whole system. For Islam to produce the expected outcome, it needs to be implemented at more than one level. Even the economic and financial systems, which have received a great approval from several parties around the world, are not expected to provide the stability and prosperity unless coupled with the social, political, and ethical components of the ideology. The fact that Islam as a comprehensive system is not practiced or implemented in the Islamic world, makes it difficult to attach global societal behavior to Islam, whether in the fields of war or peace. It is not a coincident that Islam for the first thirteen years of its initial rise left out a great part of its legislation, rules, and regulations. In fact, all of the rules which are directly related to the organization of society and societal behavior were revealed during the last ten years of the life of the Prophet when a state for Islam was created.
Isipokuwa kwa ibada na mambo ya kibinafsi ya Uislamu, mambo ya kiutendaji ya dola ya Kiislamu yalibadilishwa katika karne ya ishirini na katika muongo wa kwanza wa karne ya ishirini na moja. Matokeo yake, ustaarabu wa Uislamu, ulioshamiri kwa miaka elfu moja mia tatu iliyotangulia, ulibadilishwa na mchanganyiko wa ustaarabu mbalimbali. Tangu khilafa ilipofutwa mwaka 1924 huko Istanbul, aina mbalimbali za utaifa pamoja na tofauti za ubepari na ujamaa zilitawala ulimwengu wa Kiislamu. Utawala wa ustaarabu hizi ulidhihirika katika mambo mengi ya maisha, ikiwa ni pamoja na muundo wa serikali, mfumo wa uchumi, taasisi za elimu, mtindo wa maisha, na mahusiano ya kimataifa. Pia ulionekana wazi sana wakati wa harakati za ukombozi wa kitaifa dhidi ya ukoloni, zilizoenea katika nchi nyingi za ulimwengu wa tatu. Kwa sehemu kubwa ya karne ya ishirini, itikadi na ustaarabu vilivyotawala viliathiriwa na harakati za ujamaa wa kitaifa, zilizoielezea Misri chini ya Unasserism, harakati za kitaifa za Kipalestina, harakati za Kihindi-Kipakistani, harakati za Kiindonesia, harakati za utaifa wa Kituruki, na nyinginezo.
Except for the rituals and personal aspects of Islam, the practical aspects of the Islamic state were superseded throughout the twentieth century and the first decade of the twenty-first century. As a result, the civilization of Islam, which flourished for the previous thirteen hundreds years, was replaced by a mixture of civilizations. Since the caliphate was abolished in 1924 in Istanbul, various types of nationalism coupled with variations of capitalism and socialism dominated the world of Islam. The dominance of these civilizations was reflected in many aspects of life including the government structure, the economic system, the educational institutions, the lifestyle, and international relations. It was also remarkably visible during the era of anticolonial national liberation movements, which swept the majority of third world countries. For the majority of the twentieth century, the dominant ideologies and civilizations were stamped by national socialist movements, which characterized Egypt Nasirism, Palestinian national movements, Indo-Pakistani movements, Indonesian movements, Turkish nationalist movements, and the like.
Dalili za Uislamu zilianza kuonekana katika harakati za kitaifa mwishoni mwa karne ya ishirini, wakati Shah wa Iran alipoangushwa na mapinduzi yaliyoongozwa na Ayatollah Khomeini mwaka 1979. Katika kipindi hicho hicho, uvamizi wa Kisovieti nchini Afghanistan ulichochea mapinduzi ya kupinga, yaliyo na sifa ya uzalendo wa Kiafghani, Uislamu wa kienyeji, na itikadi ya huria ya Magharibi. Baadaye katika karne hiyo, kuanguka kwa ujamaa na Umoja wa Kisovieti kulibadilisha harakati za kitaifa za kijamaa katika ulimwengu wa Kiislamu kuwa harakati za kitaifa za kidemokrasia.
Traits of Islam began to appear in the national movements towards the end of the twentieth century when the shah of Iran was toppled by a revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979. During the same period, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan prompted a counterrevolution characterized by Afghan nationalism, local Islam, and Western liberal idealism. Later in the century, the collapse of socialism and the Soviet Union shifted the national socialist movements in the Muslim world to national democratic movements.
Jambo muhimu hapa ni kwamba ustaarabu wa Kiislamu haukuwa chanzo kikuu cha matukio na mienendo ya kijamii katika ulimwengu wa Waislamu kwa miaka mia moja iliyopita. Matukio makuu yalisukumwa na utaifa, ujamaa, na baadaye katika karne hiyo, demokrasia na uliberali. Mchanganyiko wa ustaarabu huu ulizaa karibu kila mazingira katika ulimwengu wote wa Waislamu. Hii inajumuisha mazingira ya umaskini katika nchi kama Misri na Indonesia, au ustawi katika nchi kama Qatar na Bahrain. Pia inajumuisha ukosefu wa maendeleo ya kiuchumi katika sehemu nyingi, pamoja na kutokuwepo kwa utulivu wa kisiasa na dhuluma katika sehemu nyingine. Wajibu wa Uislamu kwa hali zilizotawala katika kipindi hiki chote ni karibu sifuri na si wa kuzingatiwa. Kwa kweli, sehemu ya hali zilizoendelea katika maeneo mengi ya ulimwengu wa Waislamu ilihusisha mateso ya wanaharakati wa Kiislamu na kuondolewa kwa nguvu kwa Uislamu katika maisha ya kila siku ya watu. Uturuki, kwa mfano, bado inapiga marufuku baadhi ya mienendo ya hadharani ya Kiislamu, kama vile kanuni ya mavazi ya wanawake Waislamu.
The point here is that the Islamic civilization was not the main driver of events and societal behavior in the Muslim world for the past one hundred years. The main events were driven by nationalism, socialism, and later in the century by democracy and liberalism. A mixture of these civilizations created almost every environment in the entire Muslim world. This includes the environment of poverty in countries like Egypt and Indonesia or prosperity in countries like Qatar and Bahrain. It also includes lack of economic developments in many parts and political instability and oppression in other parts. The responsibility of Islam for the conditions which prevailed throughout this period of time is almost null and negligible. In fact, part of the conditions which persisted in many places in the Muslim world included the persecution of Islamic activists and forced ejection of Islam from the practical life of people. Turkey, for example, continues to ban some Islamic public practices like the Muslim women dress code.
Katika kipindi hiki, ambacho kinatambulika kwa kutengwa kwa Uislamu kama ustaarabu na itikadi, mazingira ya msimamo mkali na vurugu yaliundwa katika baadhi ya sehemu za ulimwengu wa Kiislamu. Sehemu ya msimamo huu mkali ilikuwa ni matokeo na mwendelezo wa harakati za ukombozi zilizoundwa hapo awali chini ya hali za ukoloni, ukaliaji wa ardhi, au ukandamizaji wa kijamii. Al-Qaeda, kwa mfano, ilizaliwa kutoka tumboni mwa harakati ya jihadi ya Afghanistan dhidi ya Usovieti, ambayo iliungwa mkono na kufadhiliwa kwa sehemu na operesheni za siri za Marekani. Hamas, huko Palestina, ilizaliwa katikati ya maasi dhidi ya ukaliaji wa Israeli wa ardhi za Wapalestina, ambayo ndiyo iliyochochea kuundwa kwa aina kadhaa za harakati za ukombozi wa kitaifa wa Wapalestina. Licha ya tabia ya kiislamu inayoonekana katika harakati hizi za kimsimamo mkali, Uislamu haukuchangia katika mazingira ambamo harakati yoyote kati ya hizi iliundwa. Uislamu ulitumiwa katika harakati nyingi hizi kama chombo cha kuajiri wanachama na chanzo cha msukumo kwa wanachama wake.
During this period, which is characterized by an exclusion of Islam as a civilization and ideology, an environment of militancy and violence was created in some parts of the Muslim world. Part of this militancy was an outgrowth and continuation of previously created liberation movements under conditions of occupation, colonialism, or social repression. Al-Qaeda, for example, grew out of the womb of the Afghan anti-Soviet jihad movement, which was in part supported and funded by US covert operations. Hamas, in Palestine, was born in the midst of uprising against Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands, which had instigated the creation of several brands of Palestinian national liberation movements. Despite the apparent Islamic character of these militant movements, Islam did not contribute to the environment in which any of these movements was created. Islam was used in the majority of these movements as a recruiting vehicle and a source of inspiration for the members.
Kabla Uislamu haujajitokeza mbele, uzalendo na hisia za kitaifa ziliwahamasisha kundi lile lile lililotoa wapiganaji wa vipindi vilivyotangulia. Kwa maneno mengine, mazingira ya vurugu, vita, ukandamizaji, ugaidi, uvamizi, umaskini, unyimwaji wa kiuchumi na kutokuwa na utulivu wa kisiasa yalitawala sehemu kubwa ya ulimwengu wa tatu, ikiwa ni pamoja na ulimwengu wa Kiislamu, bila Uislamu kuwa sehemu ya mandhari ya nchi hizo. Kukabiliana na hali na mazingira hayo, mataifa ya nchi hizi yalitumia itikadi na ajenda nyingi za kisiasa; itikadi moja inapofeli au kukosa nguvu, nyingine huingia kuchukua nafasi yake. Harakati za Wapalestina ni mfano bora wa jambo hili, ambapo misukumo ya kitaifa na ya kizalendo ilibadilishwa polepole na misukumo ya Kiislamu. Nchini Afghanistan, Uislamu ulisaidia kuchochea misukumo ya kikabila ya watu wa Afghanistan. Hoja hapa ni kwamba Uislamu kama itikadi si wa kulaumiwa wala kusifiwa, wa kupongezwa wala kulaaniwa kwa shughuli na harakati zozote zilizojitokeza katika miaka mia moja iliyopita.
Before Islam was drawn into the front, nationalism and sense of patriotism inspired the same crowd which supplied the fighters of the earlier periods. In other words, the environments of violence, war, repression, terrorism, occupation, poverty, economic deprivation, and political instability were predominant throughout the majority of the third world including the Muslim world, without Islam being part of the mosaic of the land. In response to these conditions and environments, the nations of these lands used many ideologies and political agendas; when an ideology fails or runs out of energy, another one comes into play. The Palestinian movements provide the best example of this phenomenon, where the nationalistic and patriotic drivers were slowly replaced by Islamic ones. In Afghanistan, Islam helped fuel the tribal motives of the Afghan people. The point here is that Islam as an ideology is not the one to blame or praise, to commend or to condemn for whatever activities and movements which culminated in the last one hundred years.
Wakati Uislamu ulipotawala na ustaarabu wa Kiislamu ulikuwa ustaarabu mkuu na mkubwa katika nchi za Kiislamu, wanahistoria wangeweza kwa urahisi kuhusisha matukio mengi, hali na mazingira mbalimbali na Uislamu. Hili lilikuwa kweli hata wakati dola ya Kiislamu ilipokuwa dhaifu zaidi wakati wa vita vya Msalaba, kwa sababu Uislamu uliendelea kutoa sheria za nchi. Hakuna mjadala kwamba wakati wa utawala wa Kiislamu na hadi kudorora kwake mwishoni mwa karne ya kumi na tisa, Uislamu ulihusika na mabadiliko ya hali, kukata tamaa au matumaini, utulivu au machafuko, maendeleo au kudorora kwa uchumi, ghasia au amani, na maendeleo au ukosefu wa maendeleo ya kisayansi. Uvumbuzi uliofanywa Baghdad au Samarqand, usanifu majengo wa Andalusia au Istanbul, na maktaba za Alexandria au Baghdad bila shaka ni matokeo ya ustaarabu wa Kiislamu. Leo, kuna wabunifu, wanasayansi, waandishi na wasomi Waislamu wengi. Lakini ukweli wa jambo hili, unaotambuliwa na mtazamaji yeyote katika fani hii, ni kwamba watu hawa mahiri si zao la ustaarabu wa Kiislamu, licha ya ukweli kwamba wengi wao ni Waislamu wacha Mungu. Hakuna shaka kwamba Uislamu husaidia kuunda haiba ya wanasayansi na wabunifu na huchangia tija yao; lakini mazingira yaliyoyaunda uwezo wao wa kuvumbua na kufanikiwa ni zao la ustaarabu wa kisasa, ambao nao ni mchanganyiko wa utaifa, uliberali, ujamaa, ubepari, na demokrasia.
When Islam ruled and the Islamic civilization was the main and dominant one in the lands of Islam, historians could easily attribute many events, conditions, and environments to Islam. This was true even when the Islamic state was at its weakest point during the crusade wars, because Islam continued to provide the law of the land. There is no dispute that during the period of Islamic dominance and until its decline at the end of the nineteenth century, Islam was responsible for the ups and downs, the despair or hope, the stability or chaos, the economic progress or downturn, the violence or peace, the scientific advancement or the lack of it. The inventions made in Baghdad or Samarqand, the architecture in Andalusia or Istanbul, the libraries in Alexandria or Baghdad are undoubtedly the results of Islamic civilization. Today, there are thousands of Muslim innovators, scientists, writers, and scholars. But the truth of the matter, which is recognized by any observer in the field, is that these brilliant people are not the product of the Islamic civilization, despite the fact that many of them are devout Muslims. There is no question that Islam helps molding the personality of scientists and innovators and contributes to their productivity; but the environment, which created their ability to invent and excel, is a product of the contemporary civilizations, which in turn are mix of nationalism, liberalism, socialism, capitalism, and democracy.
Kwa msingi, Mwislamu anayeshinda Tuzo ya Nobel katika fasihi au sayansi amefikia mafanikio hayo chini ya masharti na mifumo iliyoundwa na itikadi nyingine zisizo za Kiislamu. Si haki kuhusisha mafanikio kama hayo na Uislamu, kwa kuwa Uislamu si chanzo cha sheria za nchi wala muundaji wa ustaarabu wa nchi hiyo. Katika jamii zinazotawaliwa na sheria zisizo za Kiislamu, watu wa Kiislamu wanaofanikiwa si bidhaa ya Uislamu. Vivyo hivyo, Mwislamu anayelipua soko lililojaa watu au kubeba bomu katika ndege pia si bidhaa ya Uislamu. Wote wawili ni bidhaa za sheria, kanuni, mifumo na ustaarabu unaotawala jamii ambamo wanasayansi au magaidi hao wanakua.
In essence, a Muslim who wins a Noble Prize in literature or science achieves this performance under the conditions and systems created by ideologies other than Islam. And it is not fair to attribute such achievements to Islam when Islam is not the driver of the laws of land or the maker of the civilization of the land. In societies ruled by non-Islamic laws, Muslim achievers are simply not the product of Islam. By the same token, a Muslim who blows up a market full of people or carries a bomb on an airplane is not a product of Islam either. Both are the products of the laws, regulations, systems, and civilizations which dominate the societies in which both brands—scientists or terrorists—grow.
Hadi wakati Uislamu utakapokuwa chanzo cha sheria na mifumo katika nchi, na kuwa mwongozo mkuu wa ustaarabu na mwenendo wa kijamii, itakuwa si sahihi kiitikadi kuhusisha matukio yoyote ya kisasa na Uislamu. Kama itikadi nyingine yoyote, msingi wa kinadharia wa Uislamu peke yake hauwezi kuzaa matokeo yanayotarajiwa isipokuwa utakapoanza kipindi cha utekelezaji kwa kutekeleza mifumo inayotokana na msingi huu. Kanuni hii inatumika kwa uchumi wa Uislamu pamoja na siasa zake. Katika miaka kumi na mitatu ya kwanza ya kuibuka kwa Uislamu, kulikuwa na majadiliano mapana kuhusu vipengele vingi vya mwenendo wa kijamii na masuala kama vile umaskini, haki, maadili, ugawaji wa mali, vita, amani, mahusiano ya kifamilia, na mengine mengi. Na Uislamu haukuchukua jukumu kwa vitendo vya watu waliokuwa wakiishi na kutenda mambo haya, ingawa baadhi ya Waislamu walihusika katika vitendo hivyo. Kwa mfano, baadhi ya Waislamu waliokuwa wakiishi Makka wakati huo waliendelea kushiriki katika biashara ya riba, ambayo Uislamu ulikuwa umeilaani.
Until and unless Islam becomes the source of laws and systems in the land, and becomes the main guide for the civilization and the societal behavior, it will be ideologically incorrect to attribute any of the contemporary events to Islam. As any ideology, the theoretical foundation of Islam alone cannot produce its expected outcome unless it begins the practical period by implementing the systems that emanate from this foundation. This principle applies to the economics of Islam as well as to its politics. During the first thirteen years of the first rise of Islam, there was an extensive discussion on many aspects of the societal behavior and issues such as poverty, justice, morals, wealth distribution, war, peace, family ties, and much more. And Islam did not take the responsibility over the actions of people living and practicing any of these issues, although some of the Muslims were part of these actions. For example, some Muslims living in Mecca during that era continued to be part of the usury practices, which were condemned by Islam.
Hata baada ya kuanzishwa kwa dola ya Kiislamu huko Madina, jamii na dola ya Kiislamu hazikuchukua jukumu kwa Waislamu waliokuwa wakiendelea kuishi nje ya wigo wa jamii ya Kiislamu na dola. Hili ni muhimu kulijua, kwa sababu Uislamu, pale unapochukua jukumu juu ya jambo fulani, lazima uwe na mamlaka kamili ya kuathiri matokeo ya jambo hilo pamoja na vigezo vyote vinavyochangia ndani yake. Nabii Muhammad ﷺ alipofanya mkataba wa amani na kabila la Quraish la Makka, alikubali kumfukuza Muislamu yeyote atakayehamia dola ya Kiislamu kinyume na matakwa ya Quraish. Imesimuliwa katika wasifu wa Muhammad ﷺ, kama ulivyokusanywa na Ibn Hisham,160 kwamba Muislamu mmoja alikimbia Makka na kuingia Madina akitafuta ulinzi wa dola ya Kiislamu; lakini Nabii ﷺ alimlazimisha mtu huyo arudi Makka kwa ombi la Quraish. Mtu huyo alipokimbia tena na kuanza kufanya mashambulizi ya kijeshi dhidi ya Quraish, Nabii ﷺ alijitenga na vitendo vyake na akakataa kumpa msaada wa aina yoyote.
Even after the creation of the Islamic state in Medina, the Islamic society and state did not assume responsibility for Muslims who continued to live outside the scope of the Islamic society and the state. This is important to know, because Islam, when it assumes the responsibility over an issue, it must have the complete authority to impact the outcome of that issue as well as all the parameters that contribute to it. When Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) conducted a peace treaty with the Quraish tribe of Mecca, he agreed to expel any Muslim who migrates to the Islamic state against the will of Quraish. It is narrated in the biography of Mohammad, as compiled by Ibn Hisham,160 that a Muslim fled Mecca and ran into Medina seeking the protection of the Islamic state; but the Prophet forced that man to return to Mecca based on the request of Quraish. When that man fled again and began to carry militant assaults against Quraish, the Prophet (PBUH) distanced himself from his actions and refused to provide him with any type of support.
Wakati huo huo, Nabii ﷺ, kama kiongozi wa dola, aliendesha mahusiano kati ya dola yake na dola nyingine kwa uwajibikaji kamili. Kanuni za mwenendo kati ya dola yake na ulimwengu uliosalia zilikuwa zimefafanuliwa vyema, iwe wakati wa amani au vita. Uislamu ulitoa mwongozo kamili na wa kina wa kanuni za mwenendo huo. Lakini kanuni hizi hutekelezwa katika ngazi ya dola, si katika ngazi ya watu binafsi wala makundi. Uwajibikaji wa vitendo hivyo umejikita katika kituo kimoja na umefafanuliwa vyema. Dola au mfumo wa Kiislamu hauchukui uwajibikaji wala kubeba matokeo ya vitendo vya watu binafsi au makundi yaliyo nje ya wigo wa dola. Hoja ninayotaka kuitoa hapa ni kwamba, ili Uislamu uwajibike kikamilifu kwa vitendo au matukio ya Kiislamu, lazima uwe na udhibiti wa jamii na sheria za nchi. Mara Uislamu unapokuwa madarakani, na sheria za nchi zinapoongozwa na kudhibitiwa na Uislamu, na uongozi mkuu wa kati ukiwa chini ya khalifa, ndipo tu tunaweza kuhusisha tabia na vitendo vya jumla na Uislamu. Wakati Uislamu haupo madarakani, na uongozi mkuu wa kati haupo, vitendo vya kubahatisha, vya vipindi na vya ghafla vya Waislamu wengi duniani vitaendelea kuwa nje ya wigo wa mfumo na itikadi ya Kiislamu; kila mtu atabeba uwajibikaji wa vitendo vyake mwenyewe.
In the meantime, the Prophet as a leader of a state conducted the relations between his state and other states with complete responsibility. The rules of engagement between his state and the rest of the world were well defined, whether in peace or war. Islam provided a full and complete script for the rules of engagement. But these rules are carried out at a state level, and not at the levels of individuals or groups. The responsibility for the acts are centralized and well defined. The Islamic state or system does not assume the responsibility or bear the consequences over the acts of individuals or groups outside the scope of the state. The point I want to make here is that for Islam to be fully responsible for Islamic acts or events, it must be in control of the society and the rules of the lands. Once Islam is in control, and the laws of the land are driven and controlled by Islam, and a central leadership in the form of a caliph is in charge, then and only then we can attribute general behavior and actions to Islam. While Islam is not in power, and a central leadership is absent, the sporadic, fitful, and spasmodic acts of many Muslims in the world will continue to be outside the scope of the Islamic system and ideology; each individual will be responsible for his own acts.
Isipokuwa miaka kumi na mitatu ya kwanza ya maisha ya Muhammad ﷺ, huu ni wakati wa kwanza katika historia yote ya Uislamu ambapo Waislamu wanajikuta wakiishi katika jamii na mataifa yasiyotawaliwa na Uislamu na mifumo yake. Tofauti, hata hivyo, ni kwamba katika kipindi cha miaka kumi na mitatu ya kwanza, mifumo ya Uislamu haikuwa imeteremshwa kikamilifu, na dola ya Kiislamu haikuwa imewahi kuundwa kabla ya hapo. Wakati huu, mifumo ya Uislamu tayari imekusanywa na inaweza kupatikana katika maandiko asilia ya Qur'an, Sunnah, na vitabu vingi vya fiqhi; zaidi ya hayo, historia ya zaidi ya karne kumi na tatu za utekelezaji halisi inapatikana kwa urahisi kwa kila mtu. Hata hivyo, kimsingi, zama hizi mbili zinafanana, kwa sababu kuwepo kwa dola ya Kiislamu na uongozi wa kati ni jambo la lazima kwa utekelezaji wa Uislamu. Ukweli kwamba kanuni na sheria za Uislamu zimekusanywa na zinaweza kupatikana katika vyanzo vingi haimaanishi kwamba sheria hizi zinafanya kazi zenyewe au kwa nguvu ya imani iliyo mioyoni mwa wanaoziamini. Sheria na kanuni zinahitaji dola ya kati na utawala ili kuzianzisha. Vivyo hivyo, mifumo ya uchumi, utawala, maisha ya kijamii, na fiqhi haifanyi kazi yenyewe ndani ya jamii; ili mifumo hii iwe hai na izae matokeo yake, inahitaji mfumo wa kisiasa wa kuiweka, kufuatilia utendaji wake, na kuilinda dhidi ya ufisadi.
Aside from the first thirteen years of the life of Mohammad (PBUH), this is the first time, throughout the history of Islam, where Muslims find themselves living in societies and states which are not governed by Islam and its systems. The difference, though, is that during the first thirteen years’ period, the systems of Islam were not completely revealed and the Islamic state was never created before. This time around, the systems of Islam have already been compiled and can be found in original texts of the Quran, the Sunnah, and many books of jurisprudence; moreover, a history of more than thirteen centuries of real practice is readily available for all. Fundamentally, though, the two eras are similar, because the existence of the Islamic state and central leadership is essential for the implementation of Islam. The fact that the rules and laws of Islam are compiled and can be found in many sources does not mean that these laws perform on their own or by the power of conviction in the hearts of those who believe in these laws. Laws and rules need a central state and governance to activate them. By the same token, the systems of economy, governance, social life, and jurisprudence do not run on their own in a society; in order for these systems to be active and produce their results, they require a political system to install these systems, monitor their performance, and protect them from corruption.
Hoja kuu hapa ni kwamba hofu ambayo baadhi ya watu wanayo kuhusu utekelezaji wa Uislamu si ya kweli. Hofu hii inatokana na dhana potofu kwamba Uislamu unasimama nyuma ya matendo ambayo watu wamezoea kuyahusisha na Uislamu. Hofu hii ni ya kweli, lakini haijengwi juu ya msingi halisi. Imejengwa juu ya dhana kwamba itikadi ya Kiislamu ni mshiriki hai katika mambo yanayotawala dunia, ikiwemo yale ya asili kali. Ukweli ni kwamba Uislamu haujakuwa sehemu ya mchanganyiko wa itikadi ambazo zimeunda mambo ya dunia na siasa kwa miaka mia moja iliyopita. Kinyume chake, Uislamu umekuwa ukiinuka, na katika visa vingi kwa shida kubwa, kupinga mchanganyiko huo wa sasa wa itikadi. Kwa hiyo, Uislamu unapaswa kutazamwa na kuchunguzwa kwa mtazamo wa itikadi inayotafuta nafasi katika mambo ya dunia. Msingi wa uchunguzi huu unapaswa kuwa misingi ya kinadharia ya Uislamu na historia ya Uislamu katika vitendo.
The point here is that the fear that some people may have regarding the implementation of Islam is not realistic. This fear is created out of the false perception that Islam stands behind the actions that people have been accustomed to attribute to Islam. This fear is real, but it is not founded on real grounds. It is based on the premise that the Islamic ideology is an active participant in the affairs prevailing in the world including those of extreme nature. The truth of the matter is that Islam has not been part of the mix of ideologies, which have shaped the world affairs and politics for the last one hundred years. On the contrary, Islam has been rising, and in many cases with great difficulty, to challenge the current ideological mix. Consequently, Islam should be viewed and scrutinized from the perspective of an ideology seeking a foothold in the world affairs. The basis of this scrutiny should be the theoretical foundation of Islam and the history of Islam in action.
Uhalali wa itikadi yoyote unapaswa kwanza kujaribiwa katika kiwango cha nadharia yake. Ikiwa itikadi hiyo imetekelezwa kwa muda wa kutosha, basi pia inapaswa kujaribiwa katika kiwango cha utekelezaji. Nadharia ya Uislamu imekamilika, imekusanywa na inaweza kupatikana katika vyanzo vingi; kwa hiyo, inaweza kuthibitishwa na kujaribiwa. Uislamu pia umetekelezwa na una historia ya utekelezaji wa zaidi ya miaka elfu moja mia tatu (zaidi ya itikadi nyingine yoyote moja). Kwa hiyo, utekelezaji wa vitendo wa Uislamu pia unaweza kujaribiwa na kuthibitishwa.
The validity of any ideology should be first tested at the level of its theory. If the ideology had been practiced for a sufficient period of time, then it should also be tested at the implementation level. The theory of Islam is complete and had been compiled and can be found in numerous sources; therefore, it can be verified and tested. Islam also had been implemented and has a history of implementation over thirteen hundred years (more than any other single ideology). Therefore, the practical implementation of Islam can also be tested and verified.