The balance of trade is the difference in total value between the visible imports and the visible exports over a period. If we were to calculate the total value of the imports on one side and the total value of exports on the other, we would be able to work out the balance of trade. So if the value of our exports exceeded that of our imports, the balance of trade would, in this case, be in our favour, because other countries owe to the State the difference between the value of the exports and imports.

Therefore, foreign demand for the State’s currency to pay for commodities from the State would exceed the State’s demand for foreign currency to do the same. However, the balance of trade would not reflect the real picture about the state of the national economy. Because the national income is not only restricted to the profits from foreign trade. Other sources of income would also be considered as part of national income. The balance of trade does however reflect the real picture concerning the state of our foreign trade. It would however be unwise to aim to maintain the balance of trade tipped in favour of the State at all times. This is because the State may have other designs related to her ideology, or to the propagation of that ideology, or related to industrial development, or to fulfilling her needs, or to political issues concerning the stance of a country with whom she has trade relations and how she aims to shape that stance. It could also be related to the international situation and what may influence it. In this context, the State’s intended designs would override the need to achieve a favourable balance of trade.

Therefore, although the commercial perspective would be based on profit, it should at the same time be from the State’s perspective, not from an individual’s, thus the objective and the entity of the State should override any commercial gains.

International trade yields a tremendous benefit due to the high real profits which are generated from it. What adds to a person’s conviction about the importance of international trade is the ferocious fighting and fierce competition between the superpowers over the acquisition of new markets and the protection of old markets, to which their merchandise is disposed of, and from which they import raw materials without obstacle. International trade has a host of distinguishing features, merits and outcomes. The main reason behind the establishment of international trade is the disparity in the proportional costs of commodities between one country and another. It would therefore be in the interest of all countries to establish international trade between them once the proportional costs differed in each country.

Since trade transactions moved from the bartering of commodities to using money as a medium of exchange, business between individuals flourished and grew.Work became more specialised at an individual level, at a national level as well as internationally. This marked the end of an era when the individual used to live by himself. It also marked the end of the era when generations in each nation or people lived within a nation in isolation from other nations and peoples, and domestic and foreign trade have therefore become one of life’s necessities world-wide.

There is a difference between domestic and foreign trade. Domestic trade represents the trade transactions which are undertaken by individuals belonging to a particular nation. This type of transaction should follow the rules of trade mentioned by the jurists. It does not require any initiation from the State, nor does it require direct supervision, but rather a general supervision aimed at enjoining the trade rules of Islam upon people and punishing those who violate these rules, just like any other transaction, such as hiring, marriage etc. Foreign trade reflects the trade transactions undertaken between peoples and nations, not between individuals of the same State, whether this was between two states or between two individuals who each belong to different states and where each is buying commodities with the aim of transferring them to his own country. All such transactions form part of the rules governing the relationship of one country with another.

Therefore, the State would undertake export sanctions on certain domestic goods and allow others, and would also licence all traders whether belligerent or under covenant. So, the State controls all aspects of trade and the issue of all foreign traders. As for her citizens, it would be sufficient to supervise them in their foreign trading just like she would do in their domestic trading, for the rules governing their actions fall under those of the domestic relations.

Foreign trade between states used to be conducted through individual traders. A trader would travel to another country, buy a commodity and transfer it back to his country, or He might take a commodity to another country to sell it and bring the money or another commodity back to his country. In all such cases, it is the State who would organise the aspects of this trade and directly monitor it. She would have control centres at the frontiers, these centres are referred to by the jurists as Masalih. The Khalifah should have these control centres (Masalih) on all the routes which give access to non-Muslim countries. People manning these centres would check all the traders. The centres would therefore directly control the imports and exports i.e. control all the traders, buyers and sellers alike. These control centres at the frontiers organise trade i.e. control directly the movements of traders and the currencies being brought into the State or taken out via her frontiers.

Since the Shari’ah rules are defined as being the speech of the Lawgiver related to the actions of the humans, the Shari’ah rules related to foreign trade have been revealed with regard to individuals, and the Shari’ah rules on wealth are related to wealth as far as its individual owners are concerned. Therefore, the rules of trade are connected to the traders not to the type of wealth. Accordingly, the rules related to foreign trade are in fact rules related to individuals from a Shar’a viewpoint concerning them and their wealth i.e. concerning the rule of Allah (swt) on them and the rule of Allah (swt) on the wealth they own.

Therefore, the Shar’a rules concerning foreign trade are not related to the traded material nor to its place of origin, but to the trader, because the rules concerning wealth follow the owner of wealth, accordingly they apply to both. Therefore, any rule which relates to the owner would automatically relate to the wealth He owns. This would be in contrast to the capitalist system, where the rules of foreign trade pertain to the wealth and not to the owner, so, it is the place of origin of the wealth that matters rather than the trader himself.

This is the difference between the capitalist viewpoint and the Islamic viewpoint. Since the capitalist system considers the wealth according to its place of origin, it gives a verdict on the origin. Islam, considers the owner of the wealth i.e. the trader, regardless of the origin of the wealth. Capitalism considers the wealth, whereas Islam considers the individual. It is true that the wealth with which one trades would have an effect when judging whether the trade is permitted or forbidden, but this is connected to the description of the wealth, insofar as to whether it is harmful or beneficial, not regarding the origin of the wealth. Therefore, the rule is connected to the individuals who own the trade or the business i.e. the trader, and not the trade. The traders who enter or leave the Islamic State are of three types. They are either citizens of the State, whether Muslims or Dhimmies, those under treaty or belligerent (i.e. Harbi).

As for the traders who are citizens of the Islamic State, they would be forbidden from exporting to the belligerent countries any commodity which may assist or aid the enemy’s war effort, such as weapons. In other words, they would be forbidden from exporting any strategic materials, which are effectively used in war, from the Islamic State, for this would mean supplying the enemies and helping them in their fight against the Muslims. This would be considered a co-operation on sin, because it would be a co-operation with the belligerent against the Muslims. Allah (swt) says:

“And do not cooperate in sin” [Al-Ma’idah: 2]

Therefore, no person, Muslim or Dhimmi alike, would be allowed to export such commodities from the Islamic State where the exporting of such commodities would assist the belligerent disbelievers in their war against the Muslims. However, if it does not assist them against the Muslims, exporting to them would be allowed. As for the export of other commodities such as clothing and foodstuffs or any such commodity, this is permitted because the Messenger of Allah (pbuh) ordered Thamama to supply the people of Makkah with provisions while they were belligerent enemies to him, and because assisting the enemies in their war effort did not apply in such areas. Also, because Muslim businessmen used to travel to the belligerent countries to trade with them in the times of the Sahaba, in their presence and with their full knowledge. The Sahaba did not object nor did they condemn such actions, despite the fact that they would not have been expected to keep silent over such an action had it been unlawful. Therefore, their silence over this, with their full knowledge of it, could only be considered as a silent consensus. The Muslim and the Dhimmi traders would therefore be allowed to export foodstuffs and goods, unless these are needed by the community due to their shortage, in which case their export would not be allowed.

This is as far as the trade with the belligerent country who is not effectively at war with the Islamic State, is concerned. However, if the belligerent country were that of an actual belligerent enemy, such as Israel for instance, trade with such a country is categorically forbidden, whether in weapons, food or any other commodity, because this would help the enemy to resist against the Muslims and it would become a cooperation with them in sin and in aggression, and is thus prohibited.

This would be as far as exports outside the Islamic State were concerned. As for the imports, Allah (swt) says:

“And Allah has permitted trade” [Al-Baqarah: 275]

This verse is general comprising domestic trade and foreign trade. There is no other Shari’ah text preventing the Muslim or the Dhimmi from importing wealth into the country. Therefore, the verse would remain in its generality, and accordingly it would be permitted for the Muslim to import into the country any type of commodity, and He would not be forbidden from importing any commodity which the Muslim or any person is allowed to possess, without restrictions.

As for the traders under covenant (with the State), they would be treated in accordance with the foreign trade clauses of the treaty which the State has signed with them, whether in imports or exports. However, they would not be allowed to purchase any weapons or any other military hardware that may be used in the war effort. If they bought such commodities, they would be prevented from exporting them abroad, for this would assist them, and although they are traders under covenant, this would not alter the fact that they could one day become belligerent enemies. Any other commodity, which is not deemed an aid in their war effort, is allowed to be exported. Furthermore, if it were in the Muslims’ interest to supply them with certain weapons, those considered noneffective and which do not reach the level of military assistance, they would also be allowed to be exported. This is because the Shari’ah reason (Illah) for prohibiting the sale of weapons or any other military hardware, used as war aid, is to prevent the supply and help of the enemy. Therefore, if the reason vanishes, the rule would not apply.

As for the warring belligerent, they are those with whom the State has no treaty and they are not citizens of the Islamic State, regardless of whether there is combat between them and the State or not. In the view of Muslims they would be considered as warring belligerent. If the state of war between us and them effectively existed, they would be considered just like any enemy we happen to meet on the battlefield. We would take their prisoners, slay anyone we overpower unless He had been given protection, and seize their properties. If the war did not effectively exist, none of this would be violable except for the one who enters our land without protection, whether He or his property entered; He would be treated as a warring belligerent, as would his wealth. It would be on this basis that the warring belligerent traders, buyers and sellers alike, would be treated. The Shari’ah rule on this could be summarised as follows:

A warring belligerent could not enter the Islamic household unless He is given protection i.e. a special entry visa. Giving Him protection means a permission to enter. If He entered without protection it has to be examined. If He entered with commodities to sell in the Islamic land, and the State’s common practice happened to allow traders to enter without protection, they would not be harmed, but their commodities would be subjected to the same restrictions and levies imposed on all foreign commodities, these would be based on what they impose on our traders; in other words, they would be treated the same way they treat our traders. Those who enter would be allowed to trade according to the common practices, as is the case for instance with those who live near the State’s frontiers. These traders would be allowed to enter without an entry visa i.e. without protection. However, if there were no prior common practice allowing them to enter as traders, or such common practice were in force but a person happened to enter with no intention to trade, He would be treated like the non-trading warring belligerent, and his blood and his wealth would not be protected within the State’s territories. If He claimed to have come seeking protection, this would not be accepted of him. This is because giving protection to the belligerent is a condition for Him to deserve the safeguarding of his blood and wealth in our land, so if He were not given protection, the State would not be responsible for his safety. Protection would be given based on the common practice in force concerning and exclusively for the traders, provided they were carrying goods they intended for trade. Giving the belligerent protection would also entail protecting his wealth. If He decided to settle in the Islamic State and were given the right of abode, then He decided to leave to the belligerent country, leaving his wealth behind for a Muslim or for a Dhimmi to look after, or lending it to either of them, it would in this case have to be examined as to the reasons why He left. If He left for personal reasons, or as a trader, an envoy, a tourist or for a pressing matter, and returned to the Islamic land, then the protection He had been given to his person and his wealth would remain in force. This is because if He left to the belligerent country, but with the intention to remain as a resident of the Islamic State, He would be treated like the Dhimmi who leaves to the belligerent country, therefore the same rule would apply to both. His leave to the belligerent country would not nullify his protection as long as his intention is to reside in the Islamic land. However, if He returned to the belligerent country as a resident, his protection for himself would be nullified, and if He wished to return to the Islamic land, He would require a new application for protection. As for the protection given to his wealth, this has to be examined. If He had left it behind in the Islamic land, by leaving it in the care of a Muslim or a Dhimmi, then his wealth would remain protected. This is because once He had reached the Islamic land and was given protection, this protection would cover both his person and his wealth. If his wealth was left behind and He returned by himself to the belligerent country, the protection given to Him would be nullified once He reached the belligerent country, but the protection given to his wealth would remain valid for that which He had left in the Islamic land, due to the fact that the nullifying factor would be restricted to his person only. So if He died, his wealth would be transferred to his inheritors; because the protection is a binding duty related to the wealth. Therefore, if this wealth was transferred to his heirs, so too should the right to protection be given to his heirs. However, if He took his wealth with him, He would lose the protection given to both himself and to his wealth.

Therefore, the trading commodities of the belligerent should not enter our land without a protection given to the owner, and his protection extends to the protection of his trade. If the belligerent wanted to bring his trading commodities in without however entering himself, a protection to his trading commodities may or may not be given, because in this case the protection which may be given to the commodities could be separated from the protection given to his person. For if the belligerent person entered our land, and He were given protection for himself, this protection would automatically be extended to his commodities which He brings with him, but not to the wealth He didn’t bring with Him to the Islamic land. If He departed the Islamic land and left his commodities behind in the Islamic land, the protection given to his commodities would remain in force within the Islamic land, and the protection He had been given to himself would be terminated. Therefore, it would be permitted for the Khalifah to give protection to the trading commodities of the belligerent i.e. to his commodities, if this wealth were to reach the Islamic household without its owner. If protection to his wealth i.e. trading commodities was granted, He would be allowed to transport this trade with an agent, an employee or otherwise. This indicates that for the wealth of the belligerent to enter the Islamic land, it would require protection, just like the entry of the belligerent person. Therefore, foreign trade requires protection for it to enter the Islamic land i.e. it requires a permit from the State. If a permit were given, then the State would have to protect this wealth just like any other wealth belonging to her citizens. If it entered without protection i.e. without a permit, it would be a violable property which the State could seize. However, this would only occur if the commodities were the property of the belligerent traders.Whereas, if these commodities were purchased by a trader who happened to be a citizen of the Islamic State, whether Muslim or Dhimmi, and He wanted to import the goods to the Islamic State, He would not in this case require a permit. This would be on condition that the commodities happened to be his property, and that the transfer of ownership had been completed in all its aspects. For if the transfer of ownership were not yet completed, because the sale deal was not completed, but just happened to be in process, as is the case in most business deals at present, where for instance the buyer would not be committed to the sale until He receives the shipping documents, or where the goods are yet to be received although they had already been bought, these goods would in this case be considered the trading commodities of a belligerent, and their entry to the Islamic land would require protection i.e. a permit. If the receipt of goods took effect once they have left the factory or the warehouse, or once they have been shipped, then the goods would be considered as being the trading property of the Muslim or the Dhimmi. However, if the handover did not take effect until the goods reached their destination, in this case they would be considered as the property of a belligerent.

This is as far as the trade of the belligerent and the entry of the belligerent are concerned. As for the exit of the belligerent’s trade out of our land i.e. the purchase by the belligerent of our local goods, this has to be examined: if the goods were of a strategic nature, such as weaponry or any other war aid that may be used in the war against the enemy, He would be prevented from purchasing such commodities, and if He had already purchased them, He would be prevented from exporting them. As for other types of commodities such as foodstuffs, consumables and others, the belligerent who had been given protection would be allowed to purchase, transport and export such commodities from our land, as long as these are not among the necessities of the citizens because of their scarcity, in which case an export ban would apply due to the citizens’ need for them. The Muslim and the Dhimmi traders would also be prevented from exporting such commodities, the Shari’ah reason (Illah) being the need of the citizens for such commodities.

This is as far as the movements of traders and trading commodities in and out of the Islamic land are concerned. As for the levies imposed on these commodities, the Shari’ah rule varies according to the traders, and not according to the types of trading commodities. Because Islam does not view the trading commodities as being merely a property, nor does it view them in relation to their origin, but rather to the fact that the trading commodities are owned by individuals. Therefore, levies imposed on the trading commodities would depend on the traders themselves, regardless of the origin of goods and regardless of their type. Therefore, if the trader were a citizen of the Islamic State, Muslim or Dhimmi alike, no ’Ushr customs would be imposed on his business whatsoever. This is because Ad-Darimi, Ahmed and Abu ‘Ubayd reported on the authority of ‘Uqbah ibn ‘Amir that He heard the Messenger of Allah (pbuh) say: “He who imposes maks (custom duty) would not enter paradise.” Abu Mohammed said: “He (pbuh) means the ‘Ushr customs, and the one who collects the tithe on imported commodities”. Muslim bin Musbih reported that He once asked Ibn ‘Umar: “Did you know that Umar took from the Muslims the tithe?” He said: “No, I did not”. Ibrahim Ibn Muhajir reported: “I heard Ziyad Ibn Hadeer say: ‘I was the first to collect the tithe in Islam’. I asked: “Whom did you use to levy the tithe?” He replied: ‘We never used to levy the tithe on a Muslim or a covenantor (Dhimmi); we collected the tithe from the Christians of Bani Taghlib.’ ‘Abdurrahman Ibn Ma’qal reported: “I asked Ziyad Ibn Hadeer: Whom did you use to levy? He replied: ‘We never used to levy a Muslim or a covenantor.’ So I said: “then whom did you levy?” He replied: ‘The belligerent traders, for they used to levy us when we went to them on business.’ Ya’aqub Ibn ‘Abdurrahman Al-Qarri reported on the authority of his father who said: ‘Umar Ibn Abdul-Aziz wrote to ‘Uday Ibn Arta’ah the following: “Remove from people the burden of Fidya (redemption), the burden of having to provide food as atonement, and also remove the burden of Maks i.e. customs. Indeed, it is not customs duty but the withholding of people’s due, in which Allah (swt) says:

“And withhold not the things which are people’s due and commit no evil on earth with intent of being mischievous” [Hud: 85]

...he who brings to you charity (Sadaqah), accept it from him; and He who does not, Allah would then adequately account him. Kariz Ibn Sulayman said: “Umar Ibn Abdul-Aziz wrote to ‘Abdullah Ibn ‘Awf Al- Qarri the following: “Ride to the house which is in Refah called the house of Maks, demolish it, then take it to the sea and throw it in, leaving no trace of it.” Abu ‘Ubayd reported these five narrations in the book of Al- Amwal. Abu Ubayd said: “The meaning of these reports in which we mentioned the ushr, the dislike of customs duty and the harsh warning against it, has its roots in the days of ignorance (Jahiliyya), when it was the practice of Arab and non-Arab kings to impose upon the traders ‘a tithe’ of their properties if they happened to pass by their lands. This is illustrated in the letters dispatched by the Messenger of Allah (pbuh) to other provinces such as Thaqeef, Bahrain, Doomat al-Jandal and others among those who embraced Islam, in which He (pbuh) wrote: “That they should not be pressed nor should they be levied on.” Therefore, we gathered from this that it was a customary practice of the days of ignorance (with many tales about it reaching us) until Allah (swt) abolished this practice when He (swt) sent His Messenger (pbuh) with Islam” i.e. it was the customary practice of the days of ignorance to impose the tithes i.e. customs duties (Mukus), so Allah (swt) abolished this by Islam.

This reported Hadith of the Messenger of Allah (pbuh), as well as the reports from ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab and ‘Umar Ibn Abdul-Aziz, indicate that no customs duty should be taken from the Muslim or the Dhimmi on their trading commodities, be they imports into the Islamic land or exports to the belligerent household. Umar ibn al-Khattab adhered to this and never took customs duty from the Muslim and Dhimmi traders, and the Sahabah approved of this, therefore it indicates silent consensus i.e. a Shari’ah evidence. The customs duty is the money taken on the trading commodities which pass through the State’s frontiers either in or out of the country. The house erected on the frontiers for this purpose is called Bait ul-Maks. The customs duty on goods is either money that was taken in the days of ignorance from the salesmen in the markets, or specific items taken by the State’s officials upon the sale of commodities, or upon their entry into the cities. The plural of customs duty is Mukus. It is said: Makasa i.e. He collected the money of customs duty. Therefore, it is specifically applied to the levy taken on trade. The prohibition of taking the customs duty is general, comprising the Muslim and the Dhimmi.

As for the Hadith reported by Abu ‘Ubayd in Al-Amwal, on the authority of Harb Al-Thaqafi on that of his maternal grand-father that the Messenger of Allah (pbuh) said: “No tithe (ushr) should be imposed upon the Muslims, but they should be imposed upon the Jews and the Christians.” This Hadith has been reported through three chains, two of which narration was made from an unknown, and the narration of Harb Ibn ‘Ubaydullah Al-Thaqafi, which He reported on the authority of his maternal grandfather, on which the Hadith narrators did not comment on and remained silent about. Besides, none of the scholars (Mujtahideen) adopted it, and no reports whatsoever reached us stating that someone has used it as evidence, whether from among those who say that nothing should be taken on the trade, or from those who say that a quarter of the tithe should be imposed upon the Muslim’s trade as Zakat and half of the tithe on the Dhimmi as a political responsibility. If the report had been confirmed as being sound, it would have surely been adopted and used as evidence. So the Hadith has not been judged to be sound by anyone, and thus must not be used.

As for what has been reported that ‘Umar used to take a quarter of the ‘Ushr (tithe) from the Muslims and, the from Dhimmies half of the ‘Ushr (tithe) and from the belligerent the ‘Ushr (tithe), this should be linked to the rule concerning purchase and sale transactions undertaken by the Muslim, the Dhimmi and the belligerent. As for the Muslim and the Dhimmi, the Ahadith have been explicit about the prohibition of imposing anything upon them when they stated in general terms, the prohibition of Maks, which is the taking of ‘Ushr on trade. Therefore, what ‘Umar had taken from the Muslim would have been Zakat, and what He had taken from the belligerent would have been based on reciprocity, for they used to impose the ‘Ushr (tithe) on our traders, and what He had taken from the Dhimmi would have been in accordance to what He had agreed with them as a peace settlement. What He had therefore taken from the Dhimmies would have been within the remit of the peace treaty, and not a Maks, because Allah (swt) has only imposed the Jizya on the disbelievers. Therefore, if half of the ‘Ushr (tithe) were taken from them, within the terms of the peace treaty, together with the Jizya, it would then be a correct and sound treaty. Otherwise, it would be unlawful to take anything from their wealth once the treaty of the Dhimma has been soundly concluded with the Jizya and the submission, and as long as they did not violate the treaty. Abu ‘Ubayd said: “What I found difficult to perceive was his taking (meaning ‘Umar) from the people of the Dhimma (halftithe), so I kept saying: They are not Muslims in order to take from them Sadaqah (Zakat), nor are they belligerent in order for us to treat them with reciprocation. So I did not realise what it was until I studied one of his reports, so I found that He had struck a peace deal with them on this basis (i.e. to pay half an ‘Ushr (tithe), in addition to the Jizya (poll tax) and the Kharaj (land tax) of the two lands.”

This is as far as the Muslim and the Dhimmi traders are concerned. As for the trader under treaty, He would be levied according to the text of the treaty concluded between them and us. If the treaty had stated that He should be exempted, He would then be exempted, and if it stated that a certain sum must be imposed, it would then be collected from him, thus implementing upon Him what the treaty had stipulated.

As for the belligerent trader, the Shari’ah rule is to impose upon Him the same levy imposed by his country upon the State’s traders. So if a belligerent trader entered the State’s land with protection, the State would impose upon Him what is imposed upon the traders of the Islamic State, whether they were Muslims or Dhimmi, for Abu Qudamah mentioned in his book “Al-Mughni” that Abu Majlaz Laahiq Ibn Hameed said: “They said to ‘Umar: ‘How much should we take from the belligerent people if they came to our land?’ He asked: ‘How much do they take from you?’ They said: ‘The ‘Ushr (tithe).’ He said: ‘So take the same from them.” ‘Abu Ubayd reported in “Al-Amwal” that Ziyad Ibn Hadeer said: “We never used to levy ‘Ushr (tithe) on a Muslim or one under treaty. I asked: ‘On whom did you use to levy ‘Ushr (tithe) on then?’ He said: ‘The traders from the belligerent people, just as they used to levy (the tithe) on us when we went to them with our trade.’ ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab did so in the presence of the Sahaba, and no Sahabi rebuked Him for this”; they all kept silent and therefore it was a general consensus (Ijma’a). However, to impose on the belligerent traders a levy equal to that they impose on the State’s traders is permitted, and not compulsory i.e. it would be at the State’s prerogative, and not an obligation upon her to impose a levy. It would be permitted for the State to exempt the belligerent of the Maks (custom duty), or to impose a lower Maks than that imposed on it. However, the State is not allowed to impose a higher Maks than that imposed upon it. This is because imposing Maks is not designed for the collection of revenue, but is based on the principle of reciprocity. When adopting such a policy, the Khalifah would consider the interests of the Muslims. Abu ‘Ubayd reported in “Al-Amwal” that Salim b. ‘Abdullah ibn Umar reported on the authority of his father who said: “ ’Umar used to impose half-tithe on oil or wheat brought in by the Nabatean traders, in order to encourage imports into Madinah, and He used to impose the tithe on textiles.” The tithe was what they used to levy on our traders at the time. Therefore, the customs duty taken from the belligerent would depend on what the interests of the State entail. The customs duty could therefore either be imposed or waived; it could also be either high or low, provided that it does not exceed what the belligerents impose upon the State’s traders.

Exchange is the conversion of one currency for another i.e. the interchange of one currency with another. This would be either exchanging one currency for another of the same type, such as the exchange of gold for gold, and silver for silver, or the exchange of one currency for another of a different type, such as the exchange of gold for silver or vice versa. As for the exchange of one currency for another currency of the same type, this necessitates equality between the two types and differences are absolutely prohibited, since this would be Riba which is forbidden, such as the exchange of gold for gold, or the exchange of intrinsic paper money – which can be exchanged for its value in gold for gold. Therefore, the exchange rate does not apply in this case.

As for the exchange of one type of money or one currency for another of a different type, such as the exchange of gold for silver, or the exchange of pounds sterling for the U.S. dollar or the exchange of a ruble for a franc, this is permitted, provided the exchange takes place on the spot. The exchange rate would be the rate of one currency in ratio to the other, in other words the exchange rate would be the ratio of exchange between two different currencies.

What prompts people to exchange is the need of one of the exchanging parties for the currency of the other party. As for the exchange taking place between people in the currency circulating in one particular country, such as the exchange of silver for gold, or gold for silver, this is straightforward and would be between gold and silver, because the country would be operating both the gold and the silver standard and the exchange rate would be fixed between the two currencies, according to the market rate. There would be no harm if the exchange rate fluctuated between the two types of currency used in one country, because this would be just like the fluctuation in the commodities’ prices.

As for the exchange between two different currencies of two countries or more, this is regarded as a source of problems. It would therefore be appropriate to investigate its reality and clarify the Shari’ah rule regarding it and regarding the exchange rate as such.

As for its reality, this is reflected in the fact that countries operate different standards and the position of countries who operate the gold standard differs from those who operate the non-exchangeable paper money standard. Therefore, when several countries operate the gold standard, the exchange rate between these countries or the ratio of exchange between their currencies would consequently remain almost stable. This would be so if they were operating the metallic standard, because in fact, one would not in this case be exchanging two different currencies where the value of each one of them may alter with regard to the other in accordance with the level of supply and demand related to each of them. Instead, one would be exchanging gold for gold, and the only difference would be the fact that gold in one country has been coined in a different shape and stamped with a symbol different to that used in the other country. The exchange rate would then be determined by the ratio between the weight of the net gold to be found in the currency of one country and the net weight of gold to be found in the currency of the other country. The exchange rate between the countries who operate the gold standard would only fluctuate within two specific margins which would be dependent on the transfer charges of gold between them. This is known as the gold limits (Haddi Dhahabiyy). Since these charges are minimal, we can say that the exchange rate between countries operating the gold standard is virtually stable. Furthermore, if a country operated the intrinsic paper money standard, it would be in exactly the same position as a country that operates the metallic standard, because the real circulation taking place is that of the metallic money. The only difference would be that the metallic money itself circulates, whereas paper money circulates in lieu of it, for it acts as representative to it. Therefore, the intrinsic paper money would be dealt with in exactly the same way as far as the exchange rate is concerned. In fact the rule of intrinsic paper would in all aspects be the same as metallic money.

However, if a country operated fiduciary paper money i.e. banknotes, the gold in this case would only be covering some of the fiduciary money’s value and not all of its value, even though the country would be operating the gold standard. Therefore, the value of the fiduciary paper money would differ according to the gold reserves covering it, and this would determine the exchange rate between them. This exchange rate would however remain stable and easy to monitor, for it would depend on the percentage rate of gold reserves whose quantities would be defined.

However, if a host of countries were to operate the non-exchangeable paper money standard, the issue of fixing the exchange rate between these countries would then arise. This is because when the exchange of currency to gold at a fixed price becomes impossible, then the problem facing these countries operating the non-exchangeable paper money standard is the way to fix the exchange rate between them.

Solving this problem lies in the fact that the various types of paper money are considered commodities which are exchangeable in the international money market. They in fact do not buy these notes for their own worth, but for their ability to purchase other commodities in their countries of origin. Therefore, the ratio between two paper currencies, or the exchange rate between them, would be determined according to the purchasing power of each paper money in its respective country of origin.

Therefore, the exchange rate would be determined by the ratio between two currencies. If for instance Egypt and Italy were operating the paper money standard, and the Italian lira would purchase in Italy 10 units of commodities, whereas the Egyptian pound would purchase in Egypt 100 units of commodities, the ratio between these two currencies would be 1 Egyptian pound for 10 Italian liras. However, the exchange rate could fluctuate because the paper currencies are in fact commodities which people exchange and trade in the international money market; they do not buy them for their own worth, but for their ability to purchase goods and services from the countries which issued them. Their value would therefore increase when the prices of commodities decrease in their respective countries of origin, and decrease when those prices increase. Therefore, the benefit that one makes from a foreign currency depends on its purchasing power. If this power increases the benefit we gain, our willingness to pay more with our own currency in order to obtain an equivalent amount of that foreign currency would also increase. On the other hand, if the purchasing power diminishes then the benefit obtained from that currency would also diminish, and our willingness to pay more with our own currency in order to obtain an equivalent amount of that foreign currency would also diminish. This is because that foreign currency could no longer purchase in its country of origin the same units of commodities it used to, while our currency would still maintain its value.

Let us suppose that in a specific year, the level of prices in Egypt and England were 100 in both countries, and that the exchange rate between them was 1.00 Egyptian pound for £1.00 sterling. In this case the exchange rate would be equal, and since the incentive to exchange is to achieve a sufficiency in the need for English goods, therefore, no great demand for, nor turning away from pounds sterling would occur in Egypt. However, if the price level were to rise in Egypt to 200, the pound sterling value would double in Egypt, and the exchange rate would become 1 Egyptian pound for £0.50 sterling. Therefore, a demand for sterling pounds would be generated due to the relative price decrease in England whereas, the demand for the Egyptian pound would diminish due to the relative price increase in Egypt. This would entail a decrease in the demand for the Egyptian pound by the English, and their demand for Egyptian goods would decrease, and they would inevitably prefer their own goods with their present prices because the prices of Egyptian goods would have doubled while their own prices remained the same. Therefore, the exchange rate would change according to changes in the commodity prices of the country which had issued the currency. If the price level in one country rises as far as another country is concerned, due for instance to the increases in money supply, the exchange rate between these two countries would inevitably change, leading to a decrease in the foreign value of the country in which the prices had risen. The exchange rates between the currency of one country and foreign currencies would be in line with the relationship established between the other foreign currencies’ exchange rates themselves. In other words, if for instance the Iraqi Dinar equalled 100 Iranian riyal, 200 Italian liras or 400 French francs, the exchange rates between the foreign currencies would therefore be, in Iran, 1 Iranian riyal for 2 Italian liras or 4 French francs, and in Italy it would be 1 Italian lira for 2 French francs or 0.5 Iranian riyal and so on. This is in fact what would happen if every country left the foreign value of her currency to fluctuate according to the fluctuation of price levels, without imposing heavy restrictions upon international trade and upon the transfer of foreign currency into local currency or local into foreign currency. However, a country may attempt to sustain the foreign value of her currency despite high prices at home, by restricting the local importers’ demand for foreign goods by reducing the number of import licences, for instance. In such a case, the harmony between the various exchange rates in the various countries would be disturbed. This difference between the exchange rates in different countries could not occur unless some countries opted to impose restrictions on their foreign currency transactions. Because if there were no restrictions, a businessman would be able to exchange the currency and make a profit. Thus other people would rush to seize this business opportunity and do the same, which would in turn lead to the establishment of harmony between the various exchange rates once again.

These restrictions imposed upon exchange transactions have become a widespread phenomenon in many countries in wartime and at times of severe economic unrest.We find that at such times, the value of the local currency in a country who subjects her monetary transactions to such restrictions would vary from one country to another according to the monetary system applied in each country. Therefore, in a country where the uniform exchange rate is applied, the official exchange rate between the currency of such a country and the country mentioned earlier would remain stable, for the currency would be purchased by the central bank and the banks which are licensed to undertake foreign currencies transactions at a fixed rate and sell these currencies at a fixed price.

For countries who operate the uniform exchange rate system and whose central banks do not undertake to buy or sell foreign currencies at a specific price, the prices of foreign currencies would fluctuate from time to time according to supply and demand. The exchange rate system in a country which allows the fluctuations of foreign currencies according to supply and demand is described as the variable exchange rate system. It is noticed that in a country operating such a system, the exchange rate would not stem exclusively from the fluctuation in price levels between her and other countries, it could also stem from restrictions imposed on international trade, or from a deficiency in the balance of trade experienced by various countries for whatever reason. The variable exchange rate system would in some countries be legitimate, as is the case in Lebanon, where the government allows the fluctuation in exchange rates according to the daily fluctuations of supply and demand. In other countries, the variable exchange rate system could be illegal, but despite this, some transactions would take place between individuals, which include the purchase and the sale of currencies, or foreign accounts, at prices completely different from the official prices.

This is regarding the exchange, and the exchange rate throughout the world. The Shari’ah rule concerning exchange and the exchange rate is as follows: The Islamic State operates the gold standard, regardless of whether she uses the metallic, or paper money standard (which would have gold and silver backing equal to its nominal value), and regardless of whether she adopted a specific fixed distinct feature or not for the metallic money. She is obliged to abide by this standard because it is a Shari’ah rule upon which many Shari’ah rules depend. Exchange between two units of the same type within the Islamic State must be equal, and it would be forbidden to have a disparity. Likewise, exchange between two currencies of the same type would follow exactly the same rule outside the Islamic State. The Shari’ah rule is one and does not change. As for the exchange between two different standards, it is permitted to have equality as well as disparity, such as with the exchange between gold and silver, on condition that the hand-over takes place on the spot i.e. “hand to hand” in gold and in silver. There is no difference here between the transactions of exchange undertaken at home or abroad, because the Shari’ah rule is the same and does not change. Just as disparity in the exchange between gold and silver (on the spot), would be allowed at home, so would exchange between them be allowed abroad. The same rule would apply in the exchange between the Islamic State’s currency and other countries’ currencies for both metallic money and the intrinsic paper money i.e. the money that is backed by an amount of gold and silver exactly equal to its nominal value. Disparity in these transactions would be permitted if the standards were different, only on condition that the hand-over is on the spot in gold and silver. However, disparity would not be permitted when the currencies are of the same standard. Equality must be observed, for disparity in this case would be Riba and that is forbidden from a Shari’ah viewpoint.

As for fiduciary paper money, which is partially backed i.e. with a reserve that is less than its nominal value, the monetary value of this currency would be considered only up to the amount of reserves it holds. It would be exchanged against the Islamic State’s currency on this basis. Consequently, this currency would be valued on this basis and according to such valuation it follows the same Shari’ah rule as that applies to the exchange between gold and silver metallic money, with only the value of the reserve considered when evaluating the exchange.

As for non-exchangeable paper money, which does not act as a substitute for either gold nor silver, nor is it backed by gold or silver, its rule according to Shari’ah would be the same as that of the two currencies of different types. Therefore, it is permitted to have in such transactions both equality and disparity, but they must be traded on the spot.

Therefore, exchange between the Islamic State’s currency and the currencies of other countries is allowed, just like the exchange between her local currency. It is also permitted for the exchange to include a disparity because they are of two different standards, on condition that the hand-over is on the spot (“hand to hand”) as far as gold and silver are concerned.

The ratio between gold and silver, or the exchange rate between them would not be totally stable. It would rather fluctuate according to the gold and silver market prices, with no difference between the local or the foreign exchange. The same would apply to the Islamic State’s currency and the currencies of other countries; i.e. it would be permitted for the exchange rate between them to fluctuate. However, the exchange rate between the Islamic State’s currency and the currencies of other countries would not have an effect upon the Islamic State for two reasons:

1. The Islamic lands possess all the raw materials that the Ummah and the State need. Therefore, her need for other countries’ commodities would not be essential or necessary. She is self-sufficient of her local goods, thus not affected by exchange fluctuations.

2. The Islamic lands possess commodities which all other countries need, for example oil. The Islamic State could restrict the sale of such commodities unless they are paid for by gold. The State could do away with other countries’ commodities by relying solely on her own local commodities, and who ever owns commodities that all other peoples need, could not in any way be affected by the fluctuation of the exchange rate. It is she who could control international markets, with none able to control her currency.