伊斯兰将人视为一个整体（不可分割的整体），并以一种一致而均衡的方式，通过伊斯兰教法（Ahkam Shar'iyyah）来规范人的行为，无论这些行为的数量和类型如何。这些伊斯兰教法是解决人类问题的伊斯兰制度。在处理问题时，人们认为每个问题都需要一个解决方案，也就是说，应将其视为需要推导出一条沙里亚律例（Hukm Shar'i）的问题。因此，伊斯兰将所有问题都视为人类问题，而非其他。所以，当伊斯兰处理一个经济问题，例如丈夫对妻子的生活供养（nafaqah），或一个统治问题，例如哈里发的任命，或一个社会问题，例如婚姻时，它并不是将该问题作为经济问题、统治问题或社会问题来解决，而是将其视为一个人类问题，并从中推导出解决方案，即推导出沙里亚律例。伊斯兰处理人类问题只有一种方法，即理解问题的实际情况，然后从详细的沙里亚证据中推导出安拉对该问题的法律规定。

Islam considers a human being as an integrated being (indivisible whole), and addresses his or her actions with AHkam Sharai’ah in a consistent and balanced manner regardless of the number and type of these actions. These AHkam Sharai’ah are the Islamic systems which address the problems of human beings. When problems are addressed, human beings deal with them considering that every problem requires a solution i.e. considering it as a problem that requires a Hukm Shara’i. Thus Islam addresses all problems as human problems and nothing else. So when Islam treats an economic problem such as the husband’s financial support (nafaqah) of his wife or a ruling problem such as the appointment of a Khaleefah or a social problem such as marriage, it does not solve that problem as an economic, ruling or as a social problem but rather treats the problem as a human problem to which a solution should be derived i.e. a Hukm shara’i should be derived. Islam has one method in addressing the problems of human beings, which is to understand the reality of the problem and then derive the rule of Allah for it from the detailed shar’ai evidences.

伊斯兰的体系由与以下方面相关的伊斯兰教法律条文（Ahkam Shari'ah）构成：宗教功修（ʿIbadat）、道德品行、饮食、服饰、交易事务（Muʿamalat），以及刑法。

The Islamic systems are composed of AHkam Sharai’ah related to ‘ibadat, morals, foodstuffs, clothing, mu’amalat (transactions) and penal code.

关于敬拜（ʿibādāt）、道德、饮食和服饰方面的天启律例，不能以“illah”（法律理由）来推论。先知（愿主赐他平安）说：“酒（khamr）被禁止，是因其本身的缘故。”ﷺ

The divine rules related to ‘ibadat, morals, food-stuffs, and clothing cannot be reasoned by ‘illah (legal reason). The Messenger (saw) said; “Wine (khamr) was forbidden for itself.”.

然而,涉及交易和刑法的伊斯兰教法规定(Ahkam Shar'iyyah)是以"illah"(法理依据,即立法理由)为基础的。这是因为这些事务中的沙里亚裁决(Hukm Shar'i)建立在"illah"之上,而"illah"就是制定该规则的理由。许多人已习惯于依据利益(maslahah)来解释一切沙里亚规定,这是受到西方意识形态和西方文化影响的结果,西方文化只把利益视为衡量行为的唯一标准。这种理解与伊斯兰思想领袖的观点相矛盾,后者认为精神是一切行为的基础,并以精神与物质的结合作为调节一切行为的准则。 涉及功修(ibadat)、道德、饮食和服饰的伊斯兰教法规定绝不是基于理性推演的,因为这些规则没有"illah"。它们应当按照经文的本来面貌接受,而不应以"illah"为基础。礼拜(Salah)、斋戒(Sawm)、朝觐、天课(zakah)、礼拜的方式和拜数、朝觐的仪式以及天课应付的最低财产额(niṣāb)等,都应当按照经文的规定(tawqifiyyah)加以接受并遵从,不应为之寻求"illah"。同样,禁食死畜肉、猪肉等也适用这一原则。为这些规定寻求"illah"是错误而危险的。因为如果为其寻求"illah",其结果将是:一旦该规定的"illah"不复存在,这条规定也就随之失效。而"illah"与规定之间的关系是有无随之的。举例来说,假如我们认为洁净是小净(wudu')的"illah",体育锻炼是礼拜的"illah",卫生是斋戒的"illah"等等,那么在"illah"不存在的情况下,规定也将不复存在,而事实并非如此。因此,寻求"illah"对规定本身及其履行都是危险的。 因此，对于功修类（ibadat）的规定，必须按其原样接受，而不去寻求其“伊拉”（'illah，即起因）。至于某条规定背后的哲理（hikmah，智慧），唯有真主知晓，因为我们的理智无法领会真主的本质，因此也无法理解祂的哲理。至于经文中提到的哲理，例如真主（SWT）的话：

However the AHkam Shara’iah related to transactions and penal code are are reasoned by an ‘illah. This is because the Hukm Shar’ai in these matters are built upon an ‘illah, which is the reason for legislating the rule. Many people have become used to justifying all the Sharee’ah rules according to benefit (maslaHah), because they are influenced by the Western ideology and Western culture, which views benefit alone as a criterion for actions. Such an understanding contradicts the Islamic intellectual leadership which considers spirit as the basis for all actions; and makes the mixing of the spirit with the material the regulator of all actions. The AHkam Sharai’ah related to ‘ibadat, morals, foodstuffs, and clothing are absolutely not reasoned, since there is no ‘illah for these rules. They should be taken as they came in the text and should not be based upon an ‘illah. Prayer (Salaah), fasting (Sawm), the Hajj, zakaah, the method of praying the Salaah and the number of its rak’at, the rites of Hajj and the minimum amount of property liable to payment of zakaah (niSaab of zakaah) and the like, should be taken, accepted and submitted to as they came in the text (tawqeefiyyah) and no ‘illah is sought for them. The same thing applies to the prohibition of eating the meat of a dead animal, pork and the like. Seeking an ‘illah for these rules is wrong and dangerous. This is because if an ‘illah was sought the result would be that if the ‘illah of the rule ceased to exist then the rule would no longer exist. The ‘illah is connected to the rule in existence and absence. As an example, if we assumed cleanliness was the ‘illah for the wudu, and physical exercise as the ‘illah for salaah, and hygiene as the ‘illah for fasting (Sawm) etc., then in these situations, whenever the ‘illah does not exist, the rule would not exist either, though the matter is not like this. Therefore seeking an ‘illah is dangerous for the rule and its performance. Thus, it is obligatory to take rules of ‘ibadat as they are, without seeking an ‘illah for them. As for the Hikmah (wisdom) behind a rule, Allah alone knows it, since our mind cannot conceive the essence of Allah, and hence we cannot comprehend His Hikmah. As for the Hikmah mentioned in the texts, such as the saying of Allah (swt),

“诚然，拜功（Salah）能使人远离淫秽和罪恶。” [TMQ Al-’Ankabut:45]

“Lo! Prayer (Salah) preserves from lewdness and iniquity.” [TMQ Al-’Ankabut:45]

并且安拉(SWT)的话语,

And Allah (swt) words,

“使他们能见证为他们而设的益处”[TMQ 圣城 22:28]，以及真主(SWT)的话语，

“That they may witness the benefits (provided) for them” [TMQ Al-Hajj:28] and for His (swt) words,

“你为求安拉的喜悦而交纳的天课，必获得成倍的增长。” [TMQ Ar- Rum:39]

“That which you give in Zakah seeking Allah’s countenance, has increased manifold.” [TMQ Ar- Rum:39]

除了文本中所述的其他类型的“হিকমة”（智慧/hikmah），它们应当按照文本所述字面理解，而不作类比。除非文本中提及某条律例的hikmah，否则既不需要探求其hikmah，也不需要探求其‘illah（效因）。

And other sorts of Hikmah that are stated in the texts, they should be taken literally as mentioned in the text without making comparison to them. Unless the Hikmah of the rule is mentioned in a text, neither Hikmah and nor an ‘illah has to be sought for the rule.

这一内容涉及‘ibadat（崇拜）。道德（Aqhlaaq）则是一些价值准则，伊斯兰教为之确立了规则，用以阐明美德与高尚的行为，以及与之相悖的事物。它们既源于‘ibadat，也体现于mu’amalat（人际交往）之中。这是因为伊斯兰教在立法时旨在引导人走向完美，使其达到可能达到的最高境界。因此，人必须努力获得至高的品质，并加以保持。良好的道德是一种价值，人在践行时便有意去实现它。它特指沙里尔（Shar'）所规定的德行（faDaa'il），其价值体现在履行这些德行并使之成为自身品质的过程中。道德是伊斯兰教沙里亚（Shari'ah）的组成部分，也是安拉的命令与禁令的一部分，每一位穆斯林都必须努力达到，使其对伊斯兰教的遵循趋于完备，使其履行安拉的命令与禁令臻于完善。

This is in respect to ‘ibadat. Morals (Aqhlaaq) are however values for which rules have been established to illustrate the virtues and noble deeds and the things that contradict them. They also result from ‘ibadat, as well as being observed in mu’amalat. This is because Islam aims in its legislation to take man on the road towards perfection so as to reach the highest achievable level. Therefore man has to work towards acquiring the supreme qualities and to maintain them. The good Aqhlaaq is a value which one intends to realise when exhibiting it. It is specific to the virtues (faDaa`il) stated by the Shar’, and its value is targeted when performing these virtues and acquiring them. Aqhlaaq are a part of the Islamic Shari’ah, and a part of the commands and prohibitions of Allah, which must be achieved by every Muslim so that his observance of Islam becomes complete, and his undertaking of the commands and prohibitions of Allah is perfected.

一个穆斯林培养品德（Aqhlaaq），既不是为了品德本身，也不是为了所谓的现实利益，而只是因为安拉命令他这样做，别无其他缘由。因此，穆斯林具备诚实的品质，并非为了诚实本身，也不是为了可察觉的好处，而是因为沙里亚（Shar'a）如此命令。

A Muslim neither acquires Aqhlaaq attributes for their sake, nor for the perceived benefit. Rather he or she acquires them only because Allah commanded him with them and for no other reason. So a Muslim is not characterised with truthfulness for the sake of truthfulness in itself, nor for the perceived benefit, rather because Shar’a ordered it.

关于穆斯林不为品德本身而培养品德这一点，其原因在于对行为的界定。人所做的某件事，本身可能是丑恶的（qabeeh），但他们认为它是美好的（hasan），于是去做了它。人所具备的某种品性，本身也可能是丑恶的，但他们视之为美好的品性，于是去培养它，由此便产生了错误，因为人是为了品德本身而遵循品德的。除非伊斯兰为穆斯林界定了美好的品性与丑恶的品性，并且穆斯林依照这一界定去践行，否则他们对这些品性的培养便不符合伊斯兰教法（Ahkam Shar'iyyah）。因此，穆斯林不应为诚实而诚实，也不应为慈悲而慈悲，更不应为品德本身而具备一切品德。相反，他们应当因为这些品德是真主的命令而具备它们，因为根本的事实在于，这些品德建立在伊斯兰信仰（'aqeedah）之上。遵循这一原则，能够保证个人品德的养成，从而净化灵魂的一切污垢，使其远离一切败坏的因素。保护品德的最佳途径，是将其限定在经文（《古兰经》与《圣训》）所载的范围之内，将其局限于精神的根基，并以伊斯兰信仰为根基去建立它们。

As for the fact that the Muslim does not acquire Aqhlaaq for the sake of Aqhlaaq, this is because of the description of the actions. An action which human beings perform might be by itself qabeeh but they thought it hasan so they performed it. The attribute which human beings are characterised with might be by itself qabeeh but they consider it a hasan attribute so they acquire it and thus errors would arise because man observed Aqhlaaq for their own sake. Unless Islam defines for the Muslim the hasan attributes and the qabeeh attributes and unless the Muslim performs them according to this definition, then their acquiring of these attributes would not be in compliance with the AHkam Sharai’ah. Therefore Muslims should not be characterised with truthfulness for the sake of truthfulness, nor should they be characterised with compassion for the sake of compassion, nor should they be characterised with all the Aqhlaaq for their own sake. Rather they should be characterised with them because they are commands from Allah because the fundamental fact is that these Aqhlaaq are based on the Islamic ‘aqeedah. Observing this issue would guarantee the acquisition of the Aqhlaaq in individuals thus purifying the soul of any impurity and distancing it from any corrupting factors. The best way to protect Aqhlaaq is to confine them to what is stated in the text (Qur’an and Sunnah), restrict them to the spiritual basis and build them upon the Islamic ‘aqeedah.

至于不为获取利益而培养品德,原因在于人不应当以获取利益为目的去追求品德,否则品德就会被败坏,使其围绕利益而转。品德是人必须自由、自愿地以敬畏真主的(taqwa)之心来使自己具备的特质。穆斯林遵守品德,并不是因为它们在今世给人带来利益或伤害,而是出于对真主命令和禁令的回应。明白这一点,具备良好品德的状态就会恒定而坚定,不会围绕利益而转移。

As for not acquiring Aqhlaaq for the sake of benefit, this is because one does not seek or aim to acquire benefit from the Aqhlaaq, lest it corrupts it and makes it revolve around the benefit. Aqhlaaq are attributes which man must be characterised with, freely and willingly, by the incentive of taqwa (the fear of Allah). Muslims do not abide by Aqhlaaq simply because they benefit or harm them in life; rather they do so in response to the commands and prohibitions of Allah. With this understanding the characterisation with good Aqhlaaq is constant and steadfast and does not revolve around benefit.

像这样建立在利益交换之上的道德(Aqhlaaq),会使人成为伪君子,表面展现某些行为,却掩盖其真实本性。原因在于,他们的道德建立在利益之上,因此其道德围绕利益运转;他们使有理由的规则围绕其'illah(效果因/理由)转动,一旦'illah不复存在,他们便不相信规则的存在,也不认为其具有约束力。

Such Aqhlaaq built on the exchange of benefit would make the individual a hypocrite, revealing certain behaviour while concealing his true nature. This is because their Aqhlaaq are built on benefit, so their Aqhlaaq revolve around the benefit, for they make the reasoned rules revolve around their ‘illah and they do not believe in the existence of the rules nor in their obligation if the ‘illah ceased to be present.

道德规范（Akhlaaq）不应以理性推论来确立，也不应以其“illah”（成因、理由）作为依据。它们应当按照沙里尔（Shar'a）所传的原样接受，无论是否存在某种“illah”。为道德规范寻求“illah”是错误且危险的，因为这可能导致人在其“illah”消失时便放弃以这些道德规范来约束自身的行为。

Aqhlaaq are not reasoned and should never be taken by their ‘illah. They must be accepted as they came in Shar’a, irrespective of any ‘illah. It is erroneous and dangerous to seek ‘illah for Aqhlaaq, so as not to abandon the characterisation with Aqhlaaq when their ‘illah has ceased.

由此可见,敬拜(’ibadat)的目的仅在于其精神价值,修养品德(Aqhlaaq)的目的仅在于其道德价值。二者必须局限于这些既定的价值之内。敬拜与品德中不应显露功利或私利,因为这种显露是危险的,它会使敬拜者和有德之人产生虚伪,也会在其所求的利益或好处不再显现时,导致敬拜与品德被弃置。

It becomes evident that the aim of the ‘ibadat is the spiritual value only and the aim of acquiring Aqhlaaq is the moral value only. They must be restricted to these intended values. Benefit or interest should not be manifested in the ‘ibadat and Aqhlaaq, because such a manifestation is dangerous, causing hypocrisy in those who worship and those who are virtuous people. It will also lead to the abandonment of the ‘ibadat and Aqhlaaq when their benefit or interest does not appear.

关于与他人交往中人的行为相关的沙里亚律例（Ahkam Shari'ah），有些作为依据的经文包含一个“伊莱”（'illah，即法定依据/因由）。例如，关于将布奈·纳迪尔（Bani Nadhir）的战利品分给迁士（Muhajireen）而非辅士（Ansar）一事。关于此事，安拉（SWT）说：

In regard to the AHkam Sharia’ah related to man’s actions in his relation with others, some of the texts that came as evidence to them include an ‘illah such as in respect to giving the spoils of Bani Nadhir to the Muhajireen and not the Ansar. Allah (swt) says regarding this,

“这样它就不会在你们中间的富人之间沦为一种商品。” [TMQ Al-Hashr:7]

“that it does not become a commodity between the rich among you.” [TMQ Al-Hashr:7]

虽然其他一些文本根本不包含“伊利拉”（ʿillah）这一要素，例如

While some other texts do not include an ‘illah at all such as,

“安拉允许买卖（bai'a），并禁止利息（Riba）。” [Al-Baqara:275]

“Allah has permitted bai’a (trading) and has forbidden Riba (interest).” [Al-Baqara:275]

因此,凡是经文中包含"illah"(效因)的规定都是有理由可循的,可以对其进行类比推理(Qiyas);而对于经文中没有效因的规定,则不去寻求效因,也不能运用类比推理。有效的效因,是《古兰经》和《圣训》文本中提及的沙里尔效因(Shar'ai 'illah),因为只有这两者才是沙里尔(Shar'i)的经文依据。以沙里尔效因为基础建立的沙里尔律例,其效因属于沙里尔效因,而非理性效因。换言之,效因必须在文本中被提及,无论是明示、暗示,还是通过推导或类比得出。该效因与有理由的律例在有与无上相互关联。因此,律例与其效因相伴而转。我们发现,某事物在某种情况下因沙里尔效因的存在而被禁止,若该效因消失,那事物便变为允许。所以,沙里尔律例随效因的存在与不存在而转:效因存在,律例便存在;效因不存在,律例便不存在。

Therefore any rules where the text included an ‘illah are reasoned and Qiyas may be made to them; whereas for the rules whose text is without an ‘illah, an ‘illah is not sought and Qiyas cannot be used. The valid ‘illah is the Shar’ai ‘illah that is mentioned in the text from Qur’an and Sunnah, for only these two are the Shar’ai texts. The ‘illah upon which the reasoned Hukm Shar’ai is built is a Shar’ai ‘illah and not a rational ‘illah. In other words the ‘illah must be mentioned in the text either explicitly or implicitly or by deduction or through Qiyas. This ‘illah is connected with the reasoned Hukm in presence and absence. Thus the rules revolve with their ‘illah. So we find a thing is prohibited in a situation due to the existence of a Shar’ai ‘illah, and if this ‘illah disappears that very thing becomes permissible. So the Hukm Shar’ai revolves with the ‘illah in existence and in absence, when it exists the Hukm exists and if the ‘illah does not exist the Hukm does not exist.

当某一裁决因“illah（动因）不存在而不被适用时，这绝不意味着该教法裁决（Hukm Shar'ai）发生了改变；相反，所涉问题的教法裁决依然如故，没有任何变化。只是由于“illah不存在，该裁决暂不被适用；一旦“illah存在，该裁决便会被适用。

The absence of the Hukm due to the absence of the ‘illah does not at all mean that the Hukm Shar’ai has changed, rather the Hukm Shar’ai of the question remains as it is without change. It is only that the Hukm is no longer applied due to the absence of the ‘illah and will be applied if the ‘illah is present.

规则与illah（动因）在存在与缺失时的关系，并不意味着规则会随时间和地点的变化而改变。因此，有人主张获取利益与防止败坏是Hukm Shar'ai（法律判断）的illah，而该判断会随时间和地点变化，从而Hukm Shar'ai也随之变化，这种说法是站不住脚的。获取利益与防止危害根本不是AHkam（律例）的illah，因为没有任何经文表明获取利益与防止败坏是所有AHkam的illah，也没有经文表明它们是某一特定Hukm的illah。因此，它不能被当作一个Shar'ai的illah。

The relationship of the rule with the ‘illah in existence and in absence does not mean that the rules change due to the change of the time and place, therefore claiming that bringing about the benefit and preventing corruption is the ‘illah of the Hukm Shar’ai, which changes as the time and place change, so the Hukm Shar’ai changes accordingly. Bringing about benefit and preventing harm are not at all the ‘illah of the AHkam, since no text came to denote that bringing about benefit and preventing corruption are ‘illah for all the AHkam, nor to denote that they are an ‘illah for a specific Hukm. Consequently, it cannot be taken as a Shar’ai ‘illah.

Shar'ai 'illah(沙里尔的"伊拉")是取自沙里尔文本的,应当仅限于该文本及其含义。沙里尔文本既未表明带来益处或防止败坏是"伊拉",沙里尔的"伊拉"乃是沙里尔文本所提出的内容,而不是带来益处或防止败坏。文本中所提出的内容,既不是由时间或地点所表明的,也不是由行为本身所表明的,而是由文本在彰显该律例的"伊拉"时所表明的。此文本永不改变,因此在这一语境中不考虑时间和地点,也不存在将带来益处和防止败坏作为价值的依据。

The Shar’’ai ‘illah is that which is taken from a Shar’ai text and should be restricted to it and its meaning. The Shar’ai text has neither indicated that bringing about a benefit nor warding off corruption as being the ‘illah. The Shar’ai ‘illah is that which the Shar’ai text has brought, not the bringing about of benefit or warding off corruption. That which is brought in the text is not indicated by the time or the place nor indicated by the action itself. It is rather indicated by the text in manifesting the ‘illah of the Hukm. This text never changes, so no consideration is given to the time and place in this context, nor is there a value to bringing about benefit and preventing corruption.

因此,沙里阿的律例不会随时间和地点的变化而改变,无论这些变化如何,它们都保持原样。

Consequently, AHkam Shara’iah do not change with the changing of the time and place, they remain as they are regardless of this change.

关于人们习俗和惯例的改变，它并不能改变律例。因为习俗不是Hukm Shar'ai（沙里尔律例）的'illah（动因），也不是其来源。习俗可能与沙里尔相符，也可能相悖。若与沙里尔相悖，则沙里尔已来废除并改变它们，因为沙里尔的功能正是改变那些败坏的习俗和惯例，因为它们是造成社会败坏的因素。因此，习俗不被视为Hukm Shar'ai的来源，也不是其'illah，律例也不会因此改变。若习俗与沙里尔相符，则该律例是由其沙里尔证据和沙里尔'illah所证明，而非由这些习俗所证明，即使这些习俗并不与沙里尔相违。习俗不能凌驾于沙里尔之上，反而是沙里尔统辖着习俗和惯例。Ahkam Shara'iah（沙里尔律例）有其自身的证据，即经文，并有其沙里尔'illah，习俗和惯例与此毫无关系。

As for the change of traditions and customs of people, this does not have an effect in changing the rule, for the tradition is not an ‘illah of the Hukm Shar’ai and neither a source for it. The traditions may agree or disagree with the Shar’a. If they disagree with the Shar’a then the Shar’a has come to abrogate and change them, since the function of the Shar’a is to change the corrupted traditions and customs, because they are the factors that cause corruption in society. Hence they are not taken as a source for the Hukm Shar’ai nor an ‘illah for it and the Hukm does not change. If the traditions were in agreement with shar’a, then the Hukm is proved by its Shar’ai evidence and by its Shar’ai ‘illah and not by these traditions, even if these traditions do not contradict the Shar’a. The customs cannot rule over the Shar’a, rather the Shar’a rules over the traditions and customs. The AHkam Shara’iah have their own evidences, which is the text and they have Shar’ai ‘illah and the traditions and customs are not a part of that at all.

关于伊斯兰教法适用于每个时代和每个地方，其原因在于：伊斯兰教法以其规则应对人类在各个时代、各个地方的问题，并且能够解决人类的一切问题，无论这些问题多么纷繁复杂、数量多少。这是因为它在处理人类的问题时，是把人当作人来对待，而不是以其他身份来对待。无论时代与地点如何变化，人类在本能和生理需求方面始终保持不变，因此解决其问题的规则也不会改变。真正改变的是人的生活方式，而生活方式并不影响人们对生命的看法。至于人类不断涌现的新的、众多的需求，则是人类为满足其本能和生理需求而努力的结果。伊斯兰教法正是为解决这些新的、众多的需求而降示的，无论其数量多少、模式如何变化。这也是促进伊斯兰教法学（fiqh）发展的因素之一。然而，伊斯兰教法这种广阔的包容能力并不意味着它可以随意变通，适应一切事物，哪怕与之相悖的事物也可以接受；也不意味着它会随时间演变而改变。它的意思是：经文有能力从中推导出大量的规则，同时这些规则也能够适用于许多事情。例如，安拉（SWT）说：“如果她们为你们（的孩子）哺乳，就应当付给她们报酬。” [TMQ At-Talaq: 6]

As for the suitability of the Islamic Shari’ah for every time and place, it results from the fact that the Islamic Shari’ah addresses man’s problems by its rules through all times and places and is capable of solving all problems of human beings irrespective of how diverse and numerous they are. This is because when it addresses their problems, it treats them in their capacity as a human being and not in any other capacity. Whatever the time and place, human beings remain the same with respect to their instincts and biological needs without changing at all. Hence the rules which solve their problems do not change. What does change for human beings, are the patterns of life, which do not affect their viewpoint about life. As for the constant new and numerous demands of human beings, they emerge as a result of the humans endeavour to satisfy their instincts and biological needs. The Shari’ah was revealed to solve such new and numerous demands, regardless of their number or how their patterns change. This was one of the factors which contributed towards the growth of fiqh. However this vast capacity of the Sharee’ah does not mean that it is flexible and adapts to everything or to every issue even if it contradicts it. Nor does it mean that it evolves thereby it changes with time. It rather means that the texts have the capacity to derive numerous rules from them. It also means that the rules have the ability to apply on many issues. So for example, Allah (swt) says; “Then if they give suckle for you (your children) give them their due payment.” [TMQ At-Talaq: 6]

由这段经文可以推导出一条沙里尔律例：离异的妇女有权因哺乳婴儿而获得报酬。由此又可推导出另一条沙里尔律例：受雇者，无论是私营部门还是公共部门的雇员，只要完成了工作，就有权获得工资。这一规则适用于许多领域，例如政府雇员、工厂里的工人、农场里的农夫等等。因此，他们每一个人只要完成了工作，就有权获得工资，因为他们属于私营雇员。同样的道理也适用于制作橱柜的木匠、缝制衣服的裁缝、制作鞋子的鞋匠等。他们都是公共雇员，只要完成了工作，就有权获得工资。由于雇佣是雇主与雇员之间的契约，统治者（Haakim）不在此列，因为他不是由乌玛（Ummah）雇用的，而是执行沙里尔律例，即实施伊斯兰教法。哈里发完成其工作无权获得工资，因为他是凭着执行沙里亚、传播伊斯兰da‘wah的效忠誓约而就任的，因此他不是乌玛雇用的人员。同样，他的助手（副手），即执行机构的成员以及瓦利（省长）完成其工作也无权获得工资，因为他们的工作是统治，所以他们不是雇员。他们不领取薪水，而是被划拨一定的款项以满足其生活需要，因为他们因履行职务而无法从事自己的事务和职业。

From this verse a Hukm Shar’ai is derived, that the divorced woman deserves a compensation for suckling the baby. Another Hukm Shar’ai is derived from it, that the hired person is entitled to a wage if he or she has carried out their work, whether they are a private or common employee. This rule applies to numerous areas, such as the government employee, the labourer in the factory, the farmer on the farm and the like. So every one of them is entitled to their wage if they have completed their work, this is because they are private employees. The same applies to the carpenter who makes the cupboard, the tailor who sews the dress, the shoemaker who makes the shoe and the like. All of them are entitled to their wage if they have carried out their work because they are common employees. Since the employment is a contract between an employer and an employee the ruler (Haakim) is not included, because he is not hired by the Ummah, but rather he executes the AHkam Shar’aiah i.e. implements Islam. The Khaleefah is not entitled to a wage for carrying out his work, since he was given the pledge to implement the Shar’a and to convey the Islamic Da’wah, so he is not employed by the Ummah. Similarly, his assistants (deputies), i.e. the members of the executive and the Walis (governors) are not entitled to a wage for carrying out their work since their work is ruling, thus they are not employees. They do not take a salary but an amount is assigned to them to meet their needs due to being kept preoccupied from practising their own affairs and occupations.

这些经文能够推导出众多规则，而这些规则又能够适用于众多问题，正是这一点使伊斯兰教法（Sharee'ah）能够应对各地、各时代、各民族生活中的一切问题。这不能被描述为灵活性与演变。

This capacity of the texts to derive many rules and the capacity of the rules to be applied to many problems is what makes the Islamic Sharee’ah suitable to address all problems in life at all places and times as well as to all peoples and generations. This cannot be described as flexibility and evolution.

根据经文（《古兰经》或圣训）推导出的沙里亚律例之依据，在于解决现实中存在的问题，因为立法者意在让我们遵循经文的含义，而不是拘泥于经文的字面意义。因此，在推导沙里亚律例时，必须注意“伊莱”（‘illah）的含义，即在推导律例时观察经文中的立法意图。

The Daleel of the Hukm Shar’ai taken from the text, either Qur’an or Sunnah, is to address existing problems, because the Legislator intended that we follow the meanings of the texts rather than halting at the literal meaning of the text. Therefore, when deriving the AHkam Shar’aiah, attention has to be paid to the meaning of the ‘illah i.e. to observe the legislative aspect in the text when deducing the rule.